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American-Russian Political Tension in the Global Age: A New Cold War

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Dedication

It is with our deepest gratitude and warmest affection that we dedicate this
dissertation to our Teachers, Families, Friends

Who have been our source of knowledge and inspiration to complete our work.

KADI Salah & MOUD Mahammed Tedjani

Acknowledgments

In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate all praise be to Allah, the Lord of the worlds; and prayers and peace be upon Mohammed His servant and messenger.

First and foremost, we should acknowledge our limitless thanks to Allah, the Ever-Magnificent; the Ever-Thankful, for His help and bless. We are totally sure that this work would have never become truth, without His guidance.

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Abstract

The cold war was a twentieth-century conflict between the United States of America (USA), the Soviet Union (USSR), and their respective allies over political, ideological, and military issues in the world. The main purpose of this research is to investigate the increasing American-Russian tension after the end of the World War II, and their struggle during and after the Cold War. In 1991, USSR defeated by USA, the world order changed due to the collapse of communism. USA's allies number increased, and the international law has modified and imposed by the name of America. This led to crises, wars, and new ideologies that appeared and expanded in a term of visible interference by both America and Russia among countries. Correspondingly, it is hypothesized that the same political conflicts are repeating themselves in a new skeleton. Thus, the New cold war comes with new concealed ideological tension around the world.

Keywords: Cold War, United States of America (USA), Soviet Union (USSR), Russia, Political Tension, New Cold War.

الملخص

عَرفت الحرب الباردة صراعاً خلال القرن العشرين بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية والاتحاد السوفياتي (اتحاد الجمهوريات الاشتراكية السوفياتية) وحلفاءه على القضايا السياسية والإيديولوجية والعسكرية منها حول المعمورة. إن الهدف الرئيسي من بحثنا هذا هو سبر أغوار التوتر الأمريكي الروسي المتزايد بعد نهاية الحرب العالمية الثانية، وكذا صراعهما أثناء وبعد الحرب الباردة. في عام 1991 لقي الاتحاد السوفياتي هزيمته على يد الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، الأمر الذي أدى إلى تغيير النظام العالمي بسبب زوال نظام الشيوعية. وقد تضاعف عدد الحلفاء لدى الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية آنذاك، وقد تم كذلك تعديل النظام الدولي وفرضه باسم الدولة العظمى. مما أدى إلى أزمات وحروب وإيديولوجيات جديدة، والتي ظهرت وتوسعت في فترة التدخل غير المرئي من قبل كل من أمريكا وروسيا بين الدول. فيما يتعلق بالفرضية، فإن تكرار الصراعات والاحداث السياسية نفسها على شكل هيكل جديد، افضى إلى الحرب الباردة الجديدة بتوتر إيديولوجي جديد مستتر حول العالم.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الحرب الباردة ، الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية ، اتحاد الجمهوريات الاشتراكية السوفياتية ، التوتر ، الحرب الباردة الجديدة.

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General Introduction

The Cold War was a global system of counties centered around America and the Soviet Union. At the centre of this political and military tension, an ideological contest between capitalism and socialism/communism that had been going on throughout the twentieth century. The cold war was intense, categorical, and highly dangerous: strategic nuclear weapons systems were intended to destroy the superpower opponent, even at a cost of devastating half the world.

The aftermath was the collapse of the Soviet Union and Russia took its position in international affairs. The collapse of the Soviet Union changed Russia's international status dramatically; the country lost its global power position. However, Russia enjoyed a substantial economic rebound in the late 1990s and its leaders regained confidence.

Today's international affairs, accompanied with radical administrations in both blocks: Bush (the father and the son) in America and Vladimir Putin in Russia, reveal that history repeats itself and that the world starting from the last 1990s till the present day is witnessing a new phase of a new cold war. Given the president, Putin's desire to reestablish a sphere of influence in his neighborhood and elsewhere in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, the broad goal of the US administration of the time is to resist and deter Russia efforts to undermine the post-cold war security order in Europe and elsewhere.

The following study is an attempt to prove that US-Russian political tension in the global age at a variety of levels can be described as a new Cold War since the confrontation tools and mechanisms are the same aiming at expanding sphere of influence through hot and cold confrontations in different international organizations

as the United Nations Organization, and different regional conflicts as that of Ukraine and Syria crises. Thus, it is hypothesized that the political conflict between the two world superpowers, America and Russia, are no more than symptoms of a new Cold War.

In order to prove that hypothesis, the researchers provide a critical analysis and interpretations to the literature of the cold war. Then, the descriptive method is implemented aiming at interpreting some historical and political events in order to strengthen the research vision and dimension selected.

The layout of the dissertation is divided into two (02) chapters: The first chapter revolves around the origins of the Cold War, the ideological struggle of the communism and capitalism, and the conflict of the intellectuals. Also, it points the effective areas of the expansions of each bloc (USA, USSR) such as the Cuban crisis, Afghan war, and the Korean War. Also, it explains the diplomacies and the policy between the two superpowers during the Cold War and ending with the aftermath. The second chapter sheds light on the various conflicts and its contexts mainly after the Cold War, regional and internationalized conflicts in the world. It further highlights the conflicts that have ended and still arising, that have greatly de-escalated and some that have witnessed undue prolongation. Also, the chapter extrapolates the possible reasons for the continuation of Old Cold War conflicts in the world between the US and Russia that remain till the present date.

Chapter One: American Russian Political Tension during the Cold War

Introduction

The Cold War was a time of tension between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or the Soviet Union and the United States, and their respective ideologies. It followed the Second World War and persisted from roughly 1945-1991. It was not declared in the same sense as most wars, rather it progressed over time. Therefore, there are different opinions on the exact beginning of the War.

The Cold War really began with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's speech in 1946 in which he described an "iron curtain" which separated the East and the West, and their respective ideologies. The East was the Soviet Union and its countries of influence and the West included the United States and their allies, the major ones being Canada, France, Britain, and Japan. The War involved the use of expensive resources on both of these sides. The relationship between the two powers started to waver between 1945 and 1947, but by 1947 the Cold War was visible.

The present chapter presents the origins of the Cold War, the ideological struggle of the communism and capitalism, and the conflict of the intellectuals. Also, it points the effective areas of the expansions of each bloc (USA, USSR) such as the Cuban crisis, Afghan war, and the Korean War. In addition, it explains the diplomacies and the policy between the two comps during the Cold War and ending with the aftermath.

1.1. The Origins of the Cold War

After the Second World War in 1945, doubts and distrust dominated relations between the United States and the Soviet Union for decades. Doubt arose once the alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union against Nazis became useless. The rivalry between ideologies and ideas in the post-war world, US President Harry Truman and Soviet Prime Minister Joseph Stalin prevented them from working together. Due to the inability to reach a compromise or find common ground, the two remaining superpowers in the world have come up against each other.

The origins of the Cold War are related to the relations between the Soviet Union and the allies (the United States, Great Britain, and France) in the years 1945–1947. Those relations led to the Cold War that endured for just under half a century (Fink, 2014).

However, most historians viewed the origins of the Cold War as the period immediately followed World War II, Russian's writers argue that it began with the October Revolution in Russia in 1917 when the Bolsheviks took power (Lowis, 1990).

In 1919, Lenin stated that his new state was surrounded by a "*hostile capitalist encirclement*", and he viewed diplomacy as a weapon that should be used in order to keep the Soviet Union's enemies divided. He began with a New Communist International, based in Moscow, which was designed to plan for revolutionary upheavals abroad. It was ineffective, Communist uprisings all failed in Germany, Hungary and elsewhere (Linhen, 2010).

Historian (Max Beloff) argues that the Soviets saw "no prospect of permanent peace", with the 1922 Soviet Constitution proclaiming:

Since the time of the formation of the Soviet republics, the states of the world have divided into two camps: the camp of capitalism and the camp of socialism. There - is the camp of capitalism - national enmity and inequality, colonial slavery, and chauvinism, national oppression, and pogroms, imperialist brutalities, and wars. Here - in the camp of socialism - mutual confidence and peace, national freedom and equality, a dwelling together in peace and the brotherly collaboration of peoples. (1952).

According to British historian Christopher Sutton:

In what some have called the First Cold War, from Britain's intervention in the Russian Civil War in 1918 to its uneasy alliance with the Soviet Union against the Axis powers in 1941, British distrust of the revolutionary and regicidal Bolsheviks resulted in domestic, foreign, and colonial policies aimed at resisting the spread of communism. This conflict after 1945 took on new battlefields, new weapons, new players, and a greater intensity, but it was still fundamentally a conflict against Soviet imperialism (2016).

The idea of long-term continuity is a minority scholarly view that has been challenged. Frank Ninkovich writes:

As for the two-cold war's thesis, the chief problem is that the two periods are incommensurable. To be sure, they were joined together by enduring ideological hostility, but in the post-World War I years, Bolshevism was not a geopolitical menace. After World War II, in contrast, the Soviet Union was a superpower that combined ideological antagonism with the kind of geopolitical threat posed by Germany and Japan in the Second World War. Even with more amicable relations in

the 1920s, it is conceivable that post (1945) relations would have turned out much the same (2003).

1.2. The Ideological Struggle of the Superpowers

1.2.1. Communism vs. Capitalism

The cold war arose due to ideological conflict. The two main ideologies at the time, capitalism and communism were both complete opposites and could not exist with each other. Communism called for complete government control, and lack of civil liberties. Capitalism promoted civil rights and free trade. Thus, the two could not exist together and the Cold War was a direct result of this. Both ideologies looked to expand, and so they both had to fight each other to exist. Communism was such that it was required to expand, to fulfill its idea of a perfect world. The Soviet Union set up special camps to train communists simply to start revolutions. Capitalist also required growth, however it needed this was economic growth on which it was based. It needed to open new markets to trade and sell goods (The cold war arose due to ideological conflict, 02-24-2018).

These differences did not allow either ideology to exist peacefully while the other existed. The Cold War was inevitable as both ideologies needed to expand their sphere of influence in the world.

The Truman doctrine was issued on March 12th, 1947, in an important first step to attempt to fight the growing spread of communism. The UK could no longer provide enough support to prevent the growth of communism. At this stage, Europe had undergone a recession after involvement in World War Two; as communism was growing in the East through the Soviet Union gaining satellite states such as Czechoslovakia and Poland. American soon realized that communism thrived on poor economic conditions, and so it gave loans and military support to Europe.

These loans helped to improve living standards in Europe and reduced the threat of communist governments taking control. At the same time, military support was given to countries in which pro-democratic governments were in place, namely Greece and Turkey. The Truman doctrine's use showed to the world that capitalist America would fight to stop the growth of communism through containment. The world knew that American was fully opposed to communism and would use its might and power to defend democracy against communism, as can be seen through events such as the Berlin blockade, where American supported Berlin fully (The cold war arose due to ideological conflict, 29-03-2018).

Another place in which communism and capitalism would battle in Korea. The Korean War was not based on the issue of power, which ideology would have control and then spread further. The 1950's saw the start of the Korean War, which was fought between the nations of America in the south against the communist North Koreans who were backed by Chinese troops. Communism had recently received a victory in China, and so China had to fight capitalist America (The cold war arose due to ideological conflict, 29-03-2018).

The war started when the communist North invaded the Capitalist South, which was democratic. The western world saw this as a direct challenge to their own way of life and their ideology. They feared the domino effect, where the spread of communism to all of Korea would, in turn, lead it to spread further around the entire world. Thus, the West decided to contain communism and sent troops to aid Korea. Communist involvement was through the use of Russian supplies and the support of Chinese troops. The war only stopped when a world war was at risk.

The Vietnam war was yet another example of war created due to the difference in ideologies between the two nations. As in Korea, the communist party attacked the

capitalist part of the country. This was seen as a direct confrontation by the west, which knew the outcome of Vietnam would have lasting effects, and feared that if the communists achieved victory then communism would expand further and endanger the capitalist west.

Americans feared further movement and used much efforts to stop the spread of communism, resulting in many American casualties (Fourth highest war casualty toll).

The Cold War can be seen as begun by the traditional rivalry between the East and West. This rivalry had been going on for centuries, with the attacks of Genghis Khan, the splitting of the church and World War One. However, all of these events were based on the creation of communism. It is the formation of communism that is the driving force for the split between the two nations, never before had an ideology challenged the west in its beliefs. The division can be seen when the West first tried to stop the spread of communism through the Truman doctrine. Later it makes it clear, through the two wars, that it will do all in its power to contain communism and eventually stop it completely (The cold war arose due to ideological conflict, 29-03-2018).

Thus, ideological conflict can lead to disagreement and clashes. Postwar relations were defined by a series of agreements, including those reached the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. At this time, it became clear that the two new superpowers had different goals. The Soviet Union looked to historical experiences to justify its expanded sphere of influence through military occupation of other countries (belief in expansionism). The United States pursued economic and diplomatic policies of containment to stop the spread of communism and to strengthen its sphere of influence as reflected in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Due to differences between the superpowers, many countries had to choose ideological sides: capitalist liberal democracy or

communism (To what extent can ideological conflict influence international relations?, 2016).

In addition, the hot wars of confrontation are replaced by other competitive methods, such as wars of words, prestige wars, espionage, deterrence, and brinkmanship. The struggle to maintain a balance of power between the superpowers has brought the countries close to war, as demonstrated by the Cuban Missile Crisis. In some cases, the United States and the Soviet Union became directly involved in proxy wars, such as those that occurred in Korea, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, as a method of expanding their spheres of influence or of containing the spread of their opponent's sphere of influence (To what extent can ideological conflict influence international relations?, 2016).

1.2.2. Intellectual Conflict

It is widely accepted that, whatever else the Cold War was, it was also an ideological conflict. At its very core was a war of ideas, and it was marked by constant confrontation and competition between two antagonistic ideological systems. The very conditions of political reflection were fundamentally transformed by the logic of the Cold War. Any attempt to understand and rewrite the history of the Cold War will remain incomplete without consideration of its ideological and intellectual dimensions (Bernd G., Dierk W., 2010).

The war of political ideas and the political mobilization of intellectuals are only one part of the intellectual history of the Cold War. One of the inherent and most striking features of many aspects of the period was the total mobilization of knowledge, that is, the production, organization, and application of knowledge to serve the purposes of the bloc confrontation. The influence of political ideologies or the political activism of intellectuals were but one- albeit, the most visible- element in this

fundamental process, a process that has even shaped the post-Cold War world. Research universities are, for example, essentially products of the Cold War. The Cold War transformed the structure of political knowledge, changed its producers, networks, and institutions, and influenced the mechanisms for distributing and utilizing knowledge (Bernd & Dierk, 2010).

The starting point of the debate are three assumptions with respect to the epistemic and intellectual impact of the Cold War: The Cold War generated a specific set of concepts and ideas of the politics. This does not mean implying that the Cold War started with a tabula rasa in the realm of political thought. Rather, intellectual resources from the past were re-constituted and transformed in a process in which a distinctly Cold War mode of political reflection took shape. Nonetheless, there were continuities of thought. The logic and fundamental structure of the Cold War resulted in new ways of thinking about risk, conflict, and crisis as permanent features of the political; of deliberating the very possibility of politics in the face of imminent nuclear annihilation; of designing schemes for controlling societies and planning the future; of conceiving images of humankind and human development in the modern age. Theories of modernization, game theory, cybernetics, and futurology were among the most distinguished political discourses of the Cold War (Bernd & Dierk, 2010).

The Cold War generated specific epistemic modes, modes of producing knowledge as well as modes for recruiting and mobilizing intellectuals and academic experts. Structural links between knowledge and institutions, the culture, and habitus of experts, or constant shifts in intellectual roles (as scholars, scientists, or public intellectuals became government or alternative experts and vice versa) point to the epistemic modes of the Cold War. "Think tanks", the intelligence apparatus,

foundations, universities, new academic disciplines such as area studies, and scientific or literary networks are places where epistemic communities were formed and mobilized in, for, and against the Cold War. This feature applied both to the East and the West and to the antagonists' relations with the "Third World" (Bernd & Dierk, 2010).

The Cold War generated specific fields and forms in which knowledge was utilized for political goals, with protagonists as diverse as government consultants and dissident milieus actively involved. This functional aspect of political knowledge in the Cold War was demonstrated in different areas, including military strategy and psychological warfare; modernization policies, the formation of postcolonial elites, and intellectual resistance to the modernization paradigm; or the political impact of alternative experts and protest discourse (Bernd & Dierk, 2010).

At the end of the World War II, this opposition is crystallized by the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have become the only major world powers, with the decline of Europeans, and their national security interests, foreign policy, and economic development will soon be in direct conflict. The deterioration of relations is also the result of the climate of mistrust that sets in: The Soviet Union is a closed society, especially under Stalin - which fuels doubts and fears about its real intentions towards the Western powers whose frequent changes of government and politics in successive elections puzzled Soviet analysts. Finally, the nuclear arms race that the two great nations are going to engage in will profoundly structure international relations throughout the cold war.

1.3 Key Areas of the Political Tension and Expansion

The Cold War witnessed a number of regional conflicts where America together with the Soviet Union had hidden hands in these international crises through supporting one side against the other (war by proxy). Here, the researchers will focus on four (04) key areas of the political tension and expansion between the two world blocks, namely: The Soviet-Afghan War, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Cuban Missile Crisis.

1.3.1 Soviet-Afghan War (1979-1989)

As the period of detente during the 1970's continued, the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the United States seemed to intensify and promised to lessen tensions between the rival countries. The invasion of Afghanistan and the imposition of a communist regime seemed to signal that the communists had not abandoned their dream of global conquest. This caused the United States to renew their efforts to halt the communist expansion by supporting the Afghan rebels in their efforts to expel the Russians (Shrier, How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impact the Cold War?, 10/10/2011).

After the Soviet invasion, progress towards furthering friendly relations between the west and Soviets halted and even moved backward. Ronald Reagan, the newly elected American president increased assistance to the Afghan rebels in 1981 and assumed a much more confrontational stance in dealings with the Soviets. In response to the American attitude, Soviet attitudes to the west hardened as well. The Soviets also increased their efforts to pacify Afghanistan in order to avoid losing face to the rest of the world (Shrier, How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impact the Cold War?, 10/10/2011).

As the cold war heated back up after the invasion of Afghanistan, both sides engaged in a series of equivalent escalations of tensions. The Soviets emplaced Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) in eastern Europe and the United States responded by deploying its own IRBM systems in West Germany. President Reagan increased US defense spending in an effort to force the Soviets to do the same, which they had to do if they wanted to maintain the balance of power in Europe. In the meantime, the war in Afghanistan dragged on inconclusively for the Soviets (Shrier, How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impact the Cold War?, 10/10/2011).

The increased Soviet defense spending and the war in Afghanistan combined with a moribund economy forced the Soviets to make difficult decisions. Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to reform the Soviet economy by 1987 with the signing of the IRBM treaty with Washington, while the Soviets tempered their positions in the face of continued US confrontation. In 1989, the Soviets acknowledged they could not win in Afghanistan and withdrew their military from the country. In 1991, the Soviet regime collapsed due to the dual pressure of political reformists and the terrible economy occasioned by the attempt to match US defense expenditures (Shrier, How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impact the Cold War?, 10/10/2011).

Ultimately, the Afghan invasion and the renewed confrontation with the West led to the fall of communism not only in Russia but also throughout Europe. The communist regime was unable to compete with the economic power of the west and in fact became increasingly dependent on western loans in order to stay in power. Communism proved itself a failed model and the renewed cold war strained the communist system more than it could take. Communism was probably doomed

anyway; the Afghan invasion and its consequences only sped up the collapse (Shrier, How did the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan impact the Cold War?, 10/10/2011).

1.3.2 The Korean War (1950-1953)

On 25 June 1950, Communist troops from North Korea crossed the 38th parallel, which since 1945 had been the military demarcation line between the North of the country (under the Soviet influence) and the South (under US influence). The confrontations along the border and the invasion of the South of the peninsula would mark the beginning of the Korean War. The United States, determined to support the authorities in the South, were able to take advantage of a moment when the Soviet delegate was temporarily absent from a United Nations Security Council meeting to commit the United Nations (UN) to defending South Korea. They called on the UN to apply the principle of collective security and to vote for sanctions against North Korea. In June 1950, US air and naval forces landed on the peninsula. Sixteen countries, including the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg, were involved in the creation of an international force under US command. North Korea, on the other hand, enjoyed the diplomatic support of the Soviet Union and military aid from Communist China (CVCE, 2016).

Although his forces had been able to drive the North Korean troops back to the Chinese border, US General Douglas MacArthur was confronted by a massive counter-attack led by Chinese reinforcements from the beginning of 1951. He, therefore, put to the US President, Harry Truman, a proposal to bomb Communist China, resorting to atomic weapons if need be. The situation became truly dramatic, a new world conflict seemed imminent. But Truman refused to use the atomic bomb and the war continued, despite constant diplomatic efforts to broker a ceasefire. An armistice was finally signed in July 1953 in the climate of international détente

brought about by the death of Stalin four months earlier. However, as the United States continued to offer substantial economic aid to South Korea, whilst the Soviet Union supported 14/28 North Korea, the reunification of the country would clearly be impossible for some time to come (CVCE, 2016).

There is little doubt that the Cold War reached its apogee during this conflict. Indeed, it led to an obsessive fear of Communism in the United States and also had an effect on Western Europe, which felt increasingly weak compared with the two Great Powers on the international stage (CVCE, 2016).

1.3.3 The Vietnam War (1955-1975)

During the 1950s and 1960s, the United States waged wars to stop communism. Vietnam had been a French colony since the 1880s. The Vietnamese fought for independence and won in 1954. The country was split into communist North Vietnam and non-communist South Vietnam. Communists in South Vietnam were called the Vietcong (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017).

In the early 1960s, they tried to overthrow the government. North Vietnam helped the Vietcong. The United States sent military advisers and supplies to help South Vietnam fight the Vietcong.

In 1965, the U.S. sent soldiers to Vietnam. The U.S. troops had better technology and weapons. They had jet bombers, tanks, and helicopters. The Vietcong fought in small groups that hid in the jungle. They controlled most of South Vietnam. The U.S. was spending billions of dollars on the war. Many American soldiers were dying. On television, people saw soldiers fighting dangerous battles and the terrible results of U.S. bombs on Vietnamese people. Some people thought the United States had to fight communism everywhere. Others thought the United

States should stay out of a war between North and South Vietnam (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017).

The government drafted young men into the army. Many did not want to fight in a war they believed was wrong. People had antiwar demonstrations in many parts of the country. In 1969, Richard Nixon was elected President. He started bringing soldiers home. But U.S. planes also increased bombing of North Vietnam and started bombing Cambodia, a country west of Vietnam. In 1973, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, and the United States agreed to a cease-fire. U.S. soldiers went home. The North Vietnamese won the war in 1975. Over 55,000 Americans died in the war. Communism was not stopped in Vietnam(Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company, 2017).

1.3.4 The Cuban Missile Crisis

In a televised speech of extraordinary gravity, the president Kennedy announced that U.S. spy planes have discovered Soviet missile bases in Cuba. These missile sites under construction but nearing completion, housed medium-range missiles capable of striking a number of major cities in the United States, including Washington, D.C. Kennedy announced that he was ordering a naval “quarantine” of Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from transporting any more offensive weapons to the island and explained that the United States would not tolerate the existence of the missile sites currently in place. The president made it clear that America would not stop short of military action to end what he called a “clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace.” (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

What is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis actually began on October 15, 1962, the day that U.S. intelligence personnel analyzing U-2 spy plane data discovered that

the Soviets were building medium-range missile sites in Cuba. The next day, President Kennedy secretly convened an emergency meeting of his senior military, political, and diplomatic advisers to discuss the ominous development. The group became known as (ExCom), short for Executive Committee. After rejecting a surgical air strike against the missile sites, ExCom decided on a naval quarantine and a demand that the bases are dismantled and missiles removed. On the night of October 22, Kennedy went on national television to announce his decision. During the next six days, the crisis escalated to a breaking point as the world tottered on the brink of nuclear war between the two superpowers (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018)..

On October 23, the quarantine of Cuba began, but Kennedy decided to give Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev more time to consider the U.S. action by pulling the quarantine line back 500 miles. By October 24, Soviet ships to Cuba the capable of carrying military cargoes appeared to have slowed down, altered or reversed their course as they approached the quarantine, with the exception of one ship—the tanker Bucharest. At the request of more than 40 nonaligned nations, U.N. Secretary-General U. Thant sent private appeals to Kennedy and Khrushchev, urging that their governments “refrain from any action that may aggravate the situation and bring with it the risk of war.” At the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. military forces went to DEFCON 2, the highest military alert ever reached in the postwar era, as military commanders prepared for full-scale war with the Soviet Union (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018)..

On October 25, the aircraft carrier USS Essex and the destroyer USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Soviet tanker Bucharest as it crossed over the U.S. quarantine of Cuba. The Soviet ship failed to cooperate, but the U.S. Navy restrained

itself from forcibly seizing the ship, deeming it unlikely that the tanker was carrying offensive weapons. On October 26, Kennedy learned that work on the missile bases was proceeding without interruption, and ExCom considered authorizing a U.S. invasion of Cuba. The same day, the Soviets transmitted a proposal for ending the crisis: The missile bases would be removed in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

The next day, however, Khrushchev upped the ante by publicly calling for the dismantling of U.S. missile bases in Turkey under pressure from Soviet military commanders. While Kennedy and his crisis advisers debated this dangerous turn in negotiations, a U-2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba, and its pilot, Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed. To the dismay of the Pentagon, Kennedy forbids a military retaliation unless any more surveillance planes were fired upon over Cuba. To defuse the worsening crisis, Kennedy and his advisers agreed to dismantle the U.S. missile sites in Turkey but at a later date, in order to prevent the protest of Turkey, a key NATO member (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

On October 28th, 1962 Khrushchev announced his government's intent to dismantle and remove all offensive Soviet weapons in Cuba. With the airing of the public message on Radio Moscow, the USSR confirmed its willingness to proceed with the solution secretly proposed by the Americans the day before. In the afternoon, Soviet technicians began dismantling the missile sites, and the world stepped back from the brink of nuclear war. The Cuban Missile Crisis was effectively over. In November, Kennedy called off the blockade, and by the end of the year, all the offensive missiles had left Cuba. Soon after, the United States quietly removed its missiles from Turkey (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

The Cuban Missile Crisis seemed at the time a clear victory for the United States, but Cuba emerged from the episode with a much greater sense of security. The removal of antiquated Jupiter missiles from Turkey had no detrimental effect on U.S. nuclear strategy, but the Cuban Missile Crisis convinced a humiliated USSR to commence a massive nuclear buildup. In the 1970s, the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with the United States and built intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of striking any city in the United States (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

A succession of U.S. administrations honored Kennedy's pledge not to invade Cuba, and relations with the communist island nation situated just 80 miles from Florida remained a thorn in the side of U.S. foreign policy for more than 50 years. In 2015, officials from both nations announced the formal normalization of relations between the U.S and Cuba, which included the easing of travel restrictions and the opening of embassies and diplomatic missions in both countries (History.com Staff, Cuban Missile Crisis, 01/04/2018).

1.4 The Superpowers Diplomacy and Policy

The concept of a superpower was a product of the Cold War and the nuclear age. Although the word appeared, according to Webster's dictionary, as early as 1922, its common usage only dates from the time when the adversarial relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union became defined by their possession of nuclear arsenals so formidable that the two nations were set apart from any others in the world. It came to be wide, though by no means universally, accepted that the very possession of these weapons, regardless of their actual use, made the two nations immensely more powerful than any other (Mastny, 2012).

Superpower diplomacy is thus closely related to nuclear weapons. They gave the U.S.–Soviet diplomatic intercourse its distinct character. During the years when the United States and the Soviet Union were in superpower positions in relation to their allies and clients in different parts of the world, their respective relations with those countries were of a different order and are therefore usually not considered under the rubric of superpower diplomacy. These relationships nevertheless influenced the manner in which Washington and Moscow dealt with one another (Mastny, 2012).

Superpower diplomacy was a product of particular historical circumstances, characterized by bipolarism, the domination of the international system by two exceptionally powerful states locked in an adversarial relationship. Historically, such circumstances were highly unusual. The age of the superpowers began in 1945 with the appearance of nuclear weapons and ended in 1991 with the disappearance of one of the superpowers, the Soviet Union. The subsequent survival of the United States as "the world's only superpower" evolved in a radically different international environment, where bilateralism had ceased to exist and the concept of superpower diplomacy, therefore, lost its original meaning (Mastny, 2012).

Despite its uniqueness and limited lifespan, superpower diplomacy was important because it altered and distorted previously established diplomatic practices by making the conduct of diplomacy dependent, to an unaccustomed degree, upon a new kind of weaponry that carried with it the threat of universal annihilation. The dependence tended to impose oversimplification upon a profession traditionally known for its subtlety, sometimes raising questions about whether diplomacy may not have outlived its usefulness because of the limitations placed on it by the crudeness and excess of the new power it wielded. Although such predictions proved

wrong, the overriding concern with the management of that power left indelible marks on diplomacy, making it difficult to adjust to an era in which nuclear weapons continued to exist but bipolarism no longer applied (Mastny, 2012).

While the superpower status of the United States and the Soviet Union derived from what the two countries had in common, the understanding of their diplomatic interaction requires constant attention to the differences that distinguished them from each other. One was a pluralistic democracy with a government accountable to the people. The other was a one-party dictatorship ruled by a self-perpetuating oligarchy accountable only to itself. At the same time, both the United States and the Soviet Union defined themselves in different ways as outsiders to the traditional European system of power politics, which they regarded as alien to their respective values as well as detrimental to international order (Mastny, 2012).

Twice in the twentieth century, the United States attempted to reform the international system in accordance with its own, specifically American, model of a democratic federalism. It sought to ensure its primacy because of its superior economic power and presumably higher morality in an international system where the interests of all nations would be secured by generally accepted international institutions and procedures designed to mitigate and manage conflict. Unlike the United States, the Soviet state in its early years sought to overthrow rather than reform what it regarded as an inherently destructive and ultimately doomed capitalist world order. Soviet leaders originally believed in a world revolution that would result in a community of states living in harmony because of their common dedication to Marxist principles, with the Soviet state as the first among equals. They hoped to conduct revolutionary diplomacy in conjunction with

the management of congenial communist parties directed from Moscow (Mastny, 2012).

Although both the United States and the Soviet Union had to adapt their utopian tenets to real life, the idealistic and ideological streaks never entirely disappeared from their foreign policies, making their diplomacy different from that of other countries, irrespective of their later superpower status. The United States, sobered by the rejection by its own Senate of the League of Nations designed during World War I by President Woodrow Wilson and the subsequent descent of Europe into another world war, subsequently attempted to build the United Nations on more realistic grounds, including a directorate of the main great powers. Once the concept of a directorate based on collaboration with the Soviet Union proved not realistic enough, American policymakers became more, though never entirely, receptive to European notions of balance of power based on the pursuit of national interest, as propagated by influential scholars of European origin such as Hans Morgenthau (Mastny, 2012).

Under the dictatorship of Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Union likewise abandoned in practice its earlier revolutionary utopia in favor of a foreign policy that instead embraced many of the traditional goals of Russian imperialism. Under Stalin the Soviet Union became an opportunistic player in the international system, expanding its territory and sphere of influence first in collaboration with Nazi Germany, and, after Germany attacked it in World War II, in collaboration with the Western powers. To what extent Soviet foreign policy became traditional foreign policy despite the communist ideology of its practitioners became a tantalizing question for the United States once the Soviet Union emerged as its main rival and remains a contentious issue among historians and political scientists. The opening of former Soviet archives

after the end of the Cold War has made more of them conclude that Marxist-Leninist ideological preconceptions continued to shape Soviet foreign policy in important ways until its very end, not so much by determining its goals as by providing the conceptual framework through which policymakers viewed the outside world and interpreted the intentions and capabilities of their adversaries (Mastny, 2012).

Accordingly, the Soviet Union was long reluctant to accept the notion that there were two superpowers, which implied commonality with its capitalist adversary as well as the permanence of the hostile system presided over by the United States, with its superior resources. The notion is of Western origin and was always more popular with critics of the superpowers than with either of them. In any case, their superpower relationship had come into being before it was recognized and labeled as such, and neither of the two rivals was able to anticipate correctly what their future relationship would be like (Mastny, 2012).

1.5 Aftermath

The end of the Cold War in 1989 and the subsequent breakup of the Soviet Union changed the global situation fundamentally, leaving the United States as the only superpower. The Cold War justification for foreign military interventions thereby disappeared, but new reasons for such ventures multiplied. In varying scales of magnitude, U.S. armed forces were deployed in Panama (1989), Somalia (1992), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), and Kosovo (1999), the latter including a bombing campaign against Serbia. By far the largest overseas operation was the Gulf War of 1991 against Iraq, which involved more than 500,000 U.S. troops to protect the industrial world's oil supply, but motives for the other interventions varied widely. In Somalia, for example, where no visible U.S. interests were at stake, the goal was to

remove the obstacles to feeding a starving population, and in Bosnia and Kosovo, it was to prevent the outbreak of regional war and prevent mass genocide. Some saw the United States as world policeman, others as a global bully, but none could deny the reality of the nation's power and influence virtually everywhere on the globe (Americanforeignrelations.com, 04-10-2018).

As the world's strongest and wealthiest nation for the last half-century, the United States was responsible for its full share of neo-imperialist hegemony. At times, however, it acted abroad in conjunction with less powerful nations that lacked the American capacity to project force quickly to crisis areas. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Gulf War both saw U.S. military power enlisted in the service of a broad coalition of nations and interests. Operating within a highly competitive global economy, U.S. economic power was great but hardly hegemonic, while its cultural influences were eagerly received in large parts of the world even if deeply resented in others. No single definition can contain the enormous variety of American activities, motives, and effects on the world; certainly, the term "imperialism" cannot(Americanforeignrelations.com, 04-10-2018).

Conclusion

The largely peaceful collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, the reunification of Germany in 1990, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 traditionally signify the end of the Cold War, which had dominated international relations for more than forty-five years. The end of the Cold War has been attributed to a multitude of factors including economic decline, imperial overstretch, military competition, nationalism, the transmission of Western culture, scientific and educational contacts, and the personalities of key political leaders, among others. Both Blocs tried to pursue policies that facilitate the rise of organized dissent in the world, proxy wars, crises and practicing in the different ideologies, all these factors boosted the end of the Cold War. Finally, Historians have suggested that January 19, 1989, maybe the appropriate date to consider as the end of the Cold War.

Chapter Two: Russia, the United States, and the New Cold War

Introduction

The end of the Cold War in 1991 did not usher in the eradication of global conflicts. Instead, a new pattern of conflicts emerged globally in the post-Cold War period after the collapse of the Soviet Union as an eastern superpower.

In doing so, the present chapter explains the various conflicts and their contexts in the post Cold War era, regional and internationalized conflicts in the world. It further highlights the conflicts that have ended and still arising, that have greatly de-escalated and some that have witnessed undue prolongation. Also, the chapter extrapolates the possible reasons for the continuation of Old Cold War conflicts in the world between the US and Russia that remain till the present date.

2.1 The End of the Cold War and the New World Order

As the commentary of the last decade of the twentieth century, the United Nations envisioned a new role in world politics. George W. Bush has become ubiquitous. The end of bipolarity served as a catalyst for changing the meaning of the importance of humanitarianism in world politics. In particular, there is a chance to revive, or perhaps more correctly, late-inception, the UN's founding ambition of collective security based on military enforcement. The Persian Gulf War, which followed a global order of collective security and humanitarian intervention of the UN through the application of military laws. In 1992, UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released a major report on the status of United Nations peacekeeping operations and military intervention: *An Agenda for Peace: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping*. This was followed by a supplement to the *Agenda for Peace*, published in 1995 (MacQueen, 2011).

The phrase “New World Order” has been widely used on the political scene since first publicly coined by former president George Bush. Although quickly adopted as the catchphrase of the 1990s, few people actually agree on what “New World Order” really means (Kessler, 1997).

Since “New World Order,” while elusive in definition, is most frequently used to describe aspects of the post-Cold War international scenario, understanding the true meaning of that phrase is critical to projecting our future strategic environment and prospects for the new millennium. The attempt of this sub-heading is to reveal that true meaning. Historical analysis will be the primary methodology used to reveal the meaning of George Bush’s specific terminology describing his concept of “New World Order.” In a January 16, 1991 speech, he identified the

opportunity to build a New World Order, “where the rule of law [...] governs the conduct of nations,” and “in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the UN’s founders.”. These words will be dissected and historically analyzed to develop a clear picture of “New World Order.” Additionally, the primary mechanisms for implementing New World Order will be addressed; and finally, specific strategic environment and national security implications will be drawn from those conclusions(Kessler, 1997).

The most widely discussed speech in 1991 about the application of the phrase (a New World Ordre) came at the end of the Cold War by George H. W. Bush. He used the term to try to define the nature of the post-Cold War era, and the spirit of great power cooperation that they hoped might materialize. He also discussed the economic growth and the ability of the individual to affect change in the following speech:

Mr. President and Mr. Speaker and members of the United States Congress:

I come to this House of the people to speak to you and all Americans, certain that we stand at a defining hour. Halfway around the world, we are engaged in a great struggle in the skies and on the seas and sands. [...] What is at stake is more than one small country; it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind, peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Such is a world worthy of our struggle and worthy of our children's future. [...] The end of the Cold War has been a victory for all humanity. A year and a half ago, in Germany, I said that our goal was a Europe whole and free. Tonight, Germany is united. Europe has become whole and free, and America's leadership was instrumental in making it possible.

[...] We will watch carefully as the situation develops. And we will maintain our contact with the Soviet leadership to encourage continued commitment to democratization and reform. If it is possible, [...] (Bush presidential speech in front of the congress, 1991).

2.2 Growing Tensions in Russia's Relations with the NATO

When the Cold War ended, hopes were high for a new partnership between Russia and the West. But the relationship soon soured, repeating a cycle of attempted cooperation followed by disappointment. A deep sense of Russian shame over lost influence in the world was coupled with the grievance over Western indifference to Russian interests and what many Russians saw as the Western betrayal. This was matched by growing Western disappointment that the Kremlin did not choose to join the Western world order and a belief that Russian leaders were unreliable and (in the case of Putin and his allies) perhaps even criminal (Marten, 2017).

While Russians today often blame NATO enlargement for these tensions, the change in alliance structures did not start in the West, or on NATO's initiative. Instead, it began in the final days of the Soviet Union, when Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (the so-called Visegrad states) decided to withdraw from the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact.

In 1990, Charter of Paris, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last Soviet leader, officially recognized those states' right to leave the pact and choose their own security arrangements. The Visegrad states desperately wanted to join NATO, but several years passed before the United States and its allies were willing to entertain that possibility. Then in December 1991, on the initiative of its Russian, Ukrainian, and

Belarusian republics, the Soviet Union dissolved into fifteen independent countries, several years before NATO considered any new expansion (Marten, 2017).

As the 1990s were on, Washington and its allies hoped that NATO enlargement, alongside enlargement of the European Union (EU), would secure democracy, human rights, and security reforms achieved in East and Central Europe, rewarding new members for their progress along a path that Moscow could have chosen to take, but did not.

Russia was instead unstable, with violent upheaval in Moscow's streets during the constitutional crisis of October 1993 and two brutal civil wars in Chechnya, at a time when the West feared ethnic conflict and state failure above all else. NATO's biggest worry at that time was not an expansionist Russia but Russian anarchy and collapse. The Kremlin never established democratic control over its military or intelligence services, leaving the Russian state untrustworthy in Western eyes. President Boris Yeltsin became more authoritarian with time, modifying the Russian constitution to enhance his power, a trend that Putin continued. NATO was willing to add new members only if they could contribute to the security of the alliance, and most U.S. and Western political leaders feared that offering Russia membership would instead undercut the alliance. U.S. officials nonetheless believed that they worked hard during the 1990s to create a prominent place for Russia in the new security architecture of post-Cold War Europe, pursuing what they called a "two-track policy" of cooperation with Russia alongside NATO enlargement (Marten, 2017).

The West participated in constant high-level negotiations with its Russian counterparts on arms control and other issues. Russia was included in NATO's new partnership for peace institutions, designed to enhance cooperation among military

forces across the former Cold War divide through joint training and planning, as well as to share best practices for democratic oversight of military organizations. Partnership for peace was devised in part to ease Russian fears about NATO's intentions by creating new channels for communication among military officers and defense officials and providing a window into NATO operations. Russian forces served side by side with their U.S. and NATO counterparts in peace enforcement operations in Bosnia and Kosovo as part of this partnership for peace arrangements (Marten, 2017).

Despite disagreements about whether the West made implicit promises to Russia about not enlarging NATO, in 1997 both sides signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA). The goal of the NRFA was to encourage Russian acceptance of NATO's enlargement by highlighting Russia's importance in European security, giving Moscow a voice and special consultative standing with NATO, but no veto over NATO enlargement or actions (Marten, 2017).

Although Russia was never happy about NATO enlargement, the primary concerns expressed in the 1990s, and even in the early years of Putin's presidency, were not that NATO posed a military threat to Russia. Instead, the fear was that Russia would be cut out of crucial security decisions and be isolated from the West and that this would aid the rise of extreme nationalists inside Russia (Marten, 2017).

One issue propelling Russian nationalist sentiment was the notion that Gorbachev had made unilateral concessions to the West: the Warsaw Pact alliance in Eastern Europe disintegrated without incident, Germany reunified peacefully with Soviet help, and individual Soviet republics became newly independent states. In contrast, NATO became more assertive. It used military force for the first time in 1994 when it enforced a no-fly zone in Bosnia during the Yugoslavian civil wars in an "out-of-

area” operation that had Russia’s approval in the UN Security Council but was not clearly connected to NATO’s self-defense mandate.

In the ensuing months, NATO carried out airstrikes against Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia, and Russian support became increasingly grudging. Distrust grew in 1999 when NATO intervened in the Kosovo crisis without Security Council approval and against Russian wishes, again for humanitarian reasons and again against Serbia (by this time considered one of Moscow’s allies). NATO believed it was acting ethically to protect threatened Kosovar civilians, and Russia eventually participated in the postwar peace enforcement operation in Kosovo, as it had earlier in Bosnia. But this time NATO showed that it no longer respected one of the only global power tools left for a diminished Russia: its Security Council veto. The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 without Security Council approval magnified Russia’s sense of irrelevance and frustration.

In 2011, Russia was dismayed anew when Security Council, authorized NATO air strikes to protect civilians in Libya morphed against Russian wishes into an effort to support rebels who then toppled and killed leader Muammar al-Qaddafi (Marten, 2017).

Meanwhile, NATO seemed, in Russian eyes, to welcome almost every state except Russia as a new member: the former Warsaw Pact states, starting with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, and continuing with Slovakia and the Black Sea states of Romania and Bulgaria; several additional countries in the Balkans, historically viewed as a Russian protectorate; and the three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (former Soviet republics never recognized as such by the West). It was clear to at least some prominent Russian analysts that as soon as NATO began enlarging, the Baltic states, eager to resume their European

identity and throw off the Soviet yoke, would also be welcomed in. Putin himself said in 2002 that their membership would be “no tragedy,” as long as no new military infrastructure was placed there. But their membership expanded NATO’s presence on Russia’s borders and left the heavily militarized Russian province of Kaliningrad surrounded by NATO territory (Marten, 2017).

Government-funded Western organizations also provided advisory and financial assistance to local civil society groups leading revolutionary political efforts, which displaced leaders who had been friendlier to Moscow, in two other post-Soviet states: the 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine.

Although neither Georgia nor Ukraine has yet been offered a NATO Membership Action Plan -the first step toward joining the alliance- NATO declared in 2008 that both countries “will become members.” (Marten, 2017).

Later that year, a brief war between Georgia and Russia left Russian forces occupying the contested Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Then in 2014, during the Euromaidan protests in Kiev, secret recordings publicized by the Kremlin revealed U.S. officials discussing which Ukrainian politicians to support as replacements for the discredited former leader whom Putin favored, Viktor Yanukovich.

The (2014) Ukraine crisis came to symbolize everything the Putin regime feared about the West, including the encroachment of the European economic and political model into the traditional Russian sphere of influence, Western support for anti-Putin regime change, and the potential loss of Russian military assets in the Crimean port of Sevastopol. These fears undoubtedly contributed to Putin’s decisions to seize Crimea and disrupt the Donbas. It is unlikely that either Georgia or Ukraine will be

invited to join NATO anytime soon, since both states have continuing political, economic, and security weaknesses that would make them liabilities to NATO rather than assets. But Russian troops remain in the internationally recognized territories of both states, at least in part to prevent them from achieving the kind of security and stability that is required for NATO accession (Marten, 2017).

2.3 NATO Struggles With Conflicting Views on Russia

In the group's "Declaration on Alliance Security," issued as a blueprint for rethinking NATO for a new century, there is only one paragraph on Russia, which describes the status quo and states emptily, "*We stand ready to work with Russia to address the common challenges we face.*" The Obama administration talks of pressing the "*reset button*" with Russia, but NATO remains sharply split over how quickly to get back to normal business with a Moscow that seems to be an aggressive outlier, refusing to retreat from occupied parts of Georgia, intimidating opposition figures and breaking up protests, complaining about the current security structure of Europe and using its enormous gas supplies as a political weapon against a NATO aspirant, Ukraine (Erlanger, 2009).

"It is no secret that when it comes to Russia, there is a wide range of views within NATO, from the very cautious to the forward-leaning," said Jaap de Hoop Schiffer, the current secretary general. *"Until we narrow that range it will be difficult to engage Russia effectively."* But Russia, too, he continued, *"needs to decide whether it recognizes NATO's desire for partnership, or whether it will continue to look at NATO through the prism of a cold war that is long behind us."* (Erlanger, 2009, p. 11).

Mr. de Hoop Schiffer put in the nicest terms NATO's contradictory positions toward Russia. Organized as a bulwark against Soviet expansion in Europe, NATO

did not disband at 40 members, when the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union soon followed. Instead, NATO expanded to the former Soviet-bloc countries of Eastern Europe and beyond, to include the Baltic nations, which Moscow had annexed, and it now wants to expand into the former Soviet republics of Ukraine and Georgia (Erlanger, 2009).

In a recent article in the journal *The National Interest*, Richard K. Betts of the Council on Foreign Relations and Columbia University describes NATO's own identity crisis, with three competing functions and self-images: first, "*the enforcer, the pacifier of conflicts beyond the region's borders;*" second, "*the gentleman's club for liberal and liberalizing countries of the West;*" and "*the third is the residual function of an anti-Russia alliance.*"

Mr. Betts compares NATO's personality disorder to the film "*The Three Faces of Eve,*" and calls it "*a potentially corrosive mix, particularly as they relate to Russia,*" with the potential to further divide the United States from its European allies. While former Soviet-bloc states are much warier of Moscow, "*old Europe*" is more sanguine, and both are dependent on Russian energy, especially natural gas (Erlanger, 2009).

The European Union is vital for Russia, too. It accounts for roughly half of Russia's two-way trade and 80 percent of its exports while providing 75 percent of the foreign investment, according to figures cited at a Berlin conference of the American Council on Germany and the German Council on Foreign Affairs.

Russia has responded with a mixture of bluster and, lately, some conciliatory words. Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin has described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century, and President

Dmitri A. Medvedev has insisted that Russia reserves “a zone of privileged interests” covering the post-Soviet space. But a Russia badly hit by the economic crisis has welcomed President Obama’s change of tone (Erlanger, 2009).

“Atmospherics help and the noises are better now than for a long time,” said Andrew C. Kuchens, director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, pointing to an agreement to negotiate on the most concrete and easiest problem between Washington and Moscow: strategic arms reduction, which could lead to more complicated conversations on missile defense and especially Iran.

Still, Mr. Kuchens noted, Russia is pressing for fundamental change in Europe. It has called for a new “security architecture” to replace NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, both of which it labels relics of the cold war.

Russia wants at least a reshaping of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and is blocking other international organizations, like the European Court of Human Rights, all of which Moscow considers to be biased in applying standards of human rights and democracy (Erlanger, 2009).

Poland and other former members of the Soviet bloc, think Moscow, having digested parts of Georgia, is simply trying a traditional game of playing European countries against one another and dividing Europe from Washington, while some countries, like France, Germany, and Italy, think that Russia’s ideas should be explored. And as usual, many Europeans fear that Mr. Obama and Washington will drive the relationship with little reference to Europe (Erlanger, 2009).

Ivan Smolyansky, Russia's deputy ambassador to NATO, said the West should not overreact. "There is a new sense of self-assurance in Russia, but do not confuse it with aggressive nationalism," he said. "We see in the West a lot of mistrust of my country. But this is a self-confident Russia open to negotiation." The Russian foreign minister, Sergey V. Lavrov, said in a speech at the German Marshall Fund's Brussels Forum last month that "NATO is not just threatening Russia." Its new security agenda, he said, includes *"more and more scenarios where force could be used, not necessarily with the sanction of the United Nations."* Russia wants "fairness," Mr. Lavrov insisted. *"We just do not understand why NATO is expanding. We do not understand why this military infrastructure is being moved to our borders."* Russia has no interest in joining NATO, he said. Still, Russia regards NATO as a reality and wants to cooperate with it, he said, in *"Afghanistan, joint control of the airspace, quite a number of things, compatibility of peace-keeping forces, a lot."* (Erlanger, 2009).

On Saturday, NATO leaders agreed, as expected, to resume regular meetings of the NATO-Russia Council, the talking shop set up in 2002 that satisfies neither side. Meetings were suspended after the brief Georgia-Russia war last August; they will restart despite the occupation of the breakaway Georgian enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Erlanger, 2009). But the Russians have recently proposed two substantive topics to discuss in the council, a senior European official said. The first, Georgia, was rejected by NATO, but the second, Afghanistan, is promising, the official said. Already, Moscow has agreed to let Germany resupply its NATO troops in Afghanistan by rail through Russia. And as for Russian ideas about a new security architecture, there seems to be little substance (Erlanger, 2009).

2.4 International Law and Foreign Policy: Geopolitics and Clash between Russia and America

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, Russia, and NATO have been unable to develop a mutually-acceptable European security system. Many in America and Europe have taken the view that as the victors in the Cold War, Washington and its allies alone should define the structures of European security and that any role for Moscow is a concession to Russia. This is a mistake because it will not be possible to establish enduring security, peace, and prosperity on the whole of Europe on the basis of a security system that antagonizes Russia. Russia is geographically within Europe and its decisions can have a significant impact on Europe and European security whether or not Russia belongs to any particular institution or arrangement(Graham, 2011).

While President Medvedev's proposed security treaty is not the solution, refusing to discuss a new security system effectively excludes Russia from European security and encourages Moscow to balance against the United States and NATO. This does not advance U.S. national interests. The existing system also leaves many disputes and frozen conflicts unresolved. Both the United States and its European allies should welcome a new mechanism of conflict prevention, interdiction, and resolution in Europe, including post-conflict stabilization, that would be less prone to deadlocks similar to those seen in the UN Security Council over Kosovo, and that could be employed in a timely manner to prevent conflicts similar to the August 2008 war in which Russia sided with Georgia's separatist provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Integrating Russia into the European security system in a mutually-acceptable manner, or even consulting more frequently and intensively

with Moscow, could contribute valuable to security and stability in a strategically and economically critical region (Graham, 2011).

A more effective security architecture in Europe could also help win Russian cooperation in other areas, including vis-à-vis China. Moscow is very unlikely to take any chances with Beijing when it is simultaneously insecure to the West. Yet, China's rapid economic growth, along with its increasing regional and global political influence, seems likely to be a central challenge facing the United States and Russia in the coming decades. America's critical task in managing China's rise is to shape the international environment in ways that will encourage Beijing to work within and adapt to the existing global order rather than seeking to redefine it substantially at America's expense. This, in turn, requires the United States to work closely with the world's other major powers, including Russia. Needless to say, pursuing such discussions with Moscow will not be easy; any effort to work with Russia to manage China's rise will require patient and careful diplomacy, clear demonstration of the potential benefits to Russia, articulation of an approach that will not alienate Beijing, and a deeper sense of trust that currently exists (Graham, 2011).

Despite significant disagreements over policies and the proper role of the United Nations, Washington has been successful at times in winning Moscow's support for U.S. goals in the UN Security Council, something that has generally facilitated China's support as well. This serves important U.S. national interests by enhancing the international legitimacy of American action. It also enlists Moscow and Beijing in pursuing American objectives and seeks to avoid the establishment of an enduring anti-American voting bloc in the UN Security Council, something that would return the body to its Cold War-era dysfunction (Graham, 2011).

A more proactive U.S. approach to the discussion of potential trouble spots with Russia could lay the groundwork for accelerated Security Council deliberations and improve prospects for U.S.-Russian agreements in the future, including in areas of disagreement (Graham, 2011).

2.5. American-Russian Political Tension in the Context of Regional Crises

The United States' relationship with Russia, in different regions of the world during the past few years, has been conducted in the context of regional conflicts. The Middle East and Eastern Europe had been proverbially unstable: wars, revolutions, civil wars, regional and international rivalries, but patterns and structures were still discernible. There was a system of states conflict, and, of course, there was the Russia-U.S. new Cold War (Rabinovich, 05-04-2016). In this context, the present heading will focus on a number of regional crises starting from Georgia War, Syrian War, and finally Ukraine Crisis.

2.5.1. Georgia War (07-12 August 2008)

The conflict between the White House and Grand Kremlin Palace, which by far is more dangerous and intense than that of the Cold War era, seems to have reached its peak. The (2008) Russo-Georgian War was a clear instance of Russian military confrontation with one of the allies of the United States. It was between Georgia, Russia and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Russia and Georgia were both formerly constituent republics of the Soviet Union.

During the battle, Russians troops drew very close to Tbilisi, Georgia's capital, forcing Mikheil Saakashvili, former president of Georgia who was a US ally to surrender. Then, the dialogue between Georgia (US) and Russia began at two levels. On the surface, was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) special moves for expansion to the East and the adoption of military configurations in the

Baltics. However, the underlying agenda for the US was to bring down Russia's political system through its neighbors like Ukraine(En.mehrnews.com, 04/18/2018).

The tension between Moscow and Washington, as mentioned, is rising, and both states more than ever before have been boasting their power to the extent of elimination of the other. Failed plans such as "Anti-Proliferation: to limit the expansion of nuclear weapons technology" and Nuclear Disarmament: to reduce the total number nuclear devices in existence, ideally down to zero," are clear examples of the conflict.

NATO plays a pivotal role in the recent dispute between the two states. In the summer of (2017), NATO troops held a large scale defensive drill, "Iron Wolf (2017)", on the border separating Poland and Lithuania, to deter Russian aggression. In response, Russia conducted Zapad (2017) military drills with Belarus in September of the same year in Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad bordering Poland and Lithuania. It was Russia's largest exercise since the Cold War with 12,700 troops in the drills (Modernitydiplomacy.eu, New American-Russian Conflict: A Confrontation beyond Cold War, 17-03-2017).

In 2017, Russia tested its new hypersonic missile, (3M22 Zircon), an anti-ship missile with five times the speed of sound. Meanwhile, Moscow's objective is to challenge NATO and the US naval and military capabilities. However, on a larger scale, Russia intends to frighten the US and the EU and create a sense of fear and insecurity through boast of power, a sense of *"warning that a war is on the way."* Obviously, here NATO will change the balance of power to the benefit of Russia.

On the other hand, the recent decision by the US and NATO members in the establishment of two command centers in America and Germany against Russia, and enhancement of NATO and US nuclear weapons in German's territory reveal Washington's long-term military strategy against Moscow.

The concerns have put Washington's and NATO's at an alert level for a possible military attack on Moscow. Despite recent warnings from influential political figures like former Soviet Union President Mikhail Gorbachev, the late and ongoing conflicts between the US and Russia can lead to a condition far grimmer than the Cold War era ((Moderndiplomacy.eu, New American-Russian Conflict: A Confrontation beyond Cold War, 17-03-2017).

In this mayhem, factors such as *"multiplicity of actors," "increasing the rate of international actors' vulnerability," "modernizing nuclear weapons,"* will enhance the cost of the new confrontation between Washington and Moscow. As the conflict between Washington and Moscow is on the rise, many analysts believe the world will be going through a repeat of tensions of the Cold War era or even worse.

NATO's (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and Russia's new type of military drills both represent a radicalization of the climate between the two sides and a shift from "political" dispute to "military" conflict ((Moderndiplomacy.eu, New American-Russian Conflict: A Confrontation beyond Cold War, 17-03-2017).

Although the real conflict is between Washington and Moscow, NATO's European member states will inevitably get affected by the dispute, the result of which can severely threaten the European Union's (EU) security. European countries were hit the worst post-World War II and Cold War and were the main

victim of the wars devastating effects due to their geopolitical position. Today, given the deployment of American's nuclear missiles in Europe and Russian's on Western European borders, Europe can once again become the "main battlefield" between the White House and the Kremlin. Even if no war breaks out between the United States and Russia, European countries will experience the aftermath of the conflict on their economy, which is pretty much dependent on imports and exports and will be hit by a tsunami of immigration. Nowadays, the likelihood of the European Union collapse, due to internal and external threats, has increased more than ever before which is a matter of concern for many EU leaders (Moderndiplomacy.eu, New American-Russian Conflict: A Confrontation beyond Cold War, 17-03-2017).

In a wrap, European states do not hold certain theoretical and practical framework or policy in regulating relations with Moscow and Washington, thus many of them have become involved in the conflict between the two powers, a process that can be very dangerous for the European Union. What can salvage the European continent which is stuck in the middle of the US and Russia's tug of war is the formation of a coalition of EU member states that are also part of NATO to mediate in the growing crises between the United States and Russia (Moderndiplomacy.eu, New American-Russian Conflict: A Confrontation beyond Cold War, 17-03-2017).

2.5.2. Syrian War (2011-present)

If it was truly about Syria or defeating the ISIS, the mess that we see in the region today would have been solved relatively easier. The unfolding of recent events, including the US strategic bombing to 'save' human lives, is a classic Cold

War era style of politics and continuation of proxy wars all over again. We have seen this too many times before, during the Cold War in Afghanistan, Korea, Vietnam and Latin America. What started as a movement for democracy in Syria back in 2011 became entangled into regional power politics between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Israel on one end, against Iran, Assad regime and Hezbollah on the other. Fast forward to 2017, the global superpowers, the US, Europe, and Russia, are all densely involved in backing their proxies (Nadim, 2017).

If it was about defeating ISIS, how long would it have taken for these global powers and NATO, with a military budget worth trillions of dollars, to wipe off untrained and ill-equipped ISIS fighters? The problem is not defeating ISIS, the global powers are locked down into an impasse over post-ISIS power structure in the region, meanwhile allowing time to ISIS to gain momentum, conduct propaganda, recruit militants and attack Western cities. The global power 'politics' or hypocrisy is such that under the label of 'fighting' ISIS, regional powers have been putting their own interests first. Turkey, for instance, has been more inclined on bombing Kurdish forces instead of targeting ISIS fighters. Saudis have been aiding ISIS indirectly to thwart off growing Iranian influence in the region. Americans, on the other hand, are supposedly fighting against ISIS, yet supporting the Saudis at the same time (Nadim, 2017).

The security emergency that the threat of ISIS has provided is helping both regional and global powers to reframe the post-ISIS power structure in their own favor. The tragedy for Syria and its people is that it is a country where global superpowers have unfortunately come in direct confrontation with one another over their 'national interests'.

The events in Syria reveal a lot about the global power structure and the international order. First, they demonstrate that despite all the advancement and progress of human society, the global South continues to remain under the hegemony of the North. Despite the entire rhetoric over decolonization since the last Great War, the fact is that the Middle East and numerous other former colonies have remained under the shadow of superpowers' 'national interests'.

Post-WWII, the superpowers did not have colonies, instead just their 'national interests' in regions as far as Afghanistan or Syria. Naturally, any movement for self-determination or against the foreign-sponsored rulers in those regions in the 21st century will be a direct threat to the 'national security' of such powers. The war as we see in Syria is, thus, really the war of foreign 'national interests' colliding with one another (Nadim, 2017).

Second, the continued crisis in Syria reveals that the priority of global powers isn't to defeat the ISIS but to ensure that the 'right' power setup is arranged during the post-ISIS regional order. This securitization of foreign policy has allowed a swift increase in military and defense spending under the label of 'threat from the ISIS'. The innocent taxpayers have little clue that it is not their 'security' that is at risk but the security of 'national interest' somewhere in the rural Middle East that is under threat.

Third, and very important is the obvious lesson that must be learned, weakening down of institutions and governance setup through foreign occupation, bombing and destruction allow space to breed terrorist organizations. Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and now Syria all represent how the recklessness of superpowers

have destroyed institutional structures, giving space for militant organizations, such as the ISIS to seize control.

As long as the crisis in Syria is not separated from thick Cold War politics, priorities not settled and 'national interests' of the foreign powers continue to dominate the strategy and discourse, Syria is going to tread the path of destruction, and on its way may even trigger a wider war that may not just be fought in the Middle East, but also on the streets of developed countries as we saw in Paris (Nadim, 2017).

2.5.3. Ukraine Crisis (21 November 2013)

The Soviet Union is not coming back. However, the Russian Federation is reasserting itself and a new Cold War has already opened. The first front in this war is Ukraine. How the United States responds now will influence how Russia acts and how Europe evolves for the rest of this century. Punishing Russia economically is a poor consolation if Americans still allow Ukraine to collapse financially and militarily.

Nearly a year since Russia invaded Crimea, only half the \$118 million Washington approved has even reached Ukraine. When U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry was in Ukraine, he pledged an additional \$16 million in non-lethal assistance. With the latest ceasefire, the International Monetary Fund has unlocked \$17.5 billion in monetary assistance, but even that amount is threatened by ongoing hostilities. And it will not deter Russia from turning its sights on other countries in the region(In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

The European Union is outspending the United States, deploying military advisers, and leading repeated efforts at a ceasefire and some peace deal, negotiations that bear little promise, because Russian President Vladimir Putin did not invade Ukraine in order to achieve peace. As in the old Cold War, much of the onus falls on the United States, because it possesses the overwhelming military and economic strength, and also Americans do not live in Russia's shadow, relying heavily on its natural gas and its food exports.

Due to aggression against Ukraine, Russia's economy is imploding, investors are pulling out, and the ruble has lost nearly half its value in the past year. But Ukraine's economy is even worse off, not as a result of its own misdeeds, but purely due to Russia's invasion and intimidation; shooting down the Malaysian airliner has actually worked out very well for Moscow, as no one now dares overfly Ukraine (In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

Failing to deliver even on modest commitments of non-lethal aid, not to mention general assistance or "lethal" military aid, has implications far beyond the fate of Ukraine. Despite strong rhetoric and sanctions against Russia, and amid training and mobilization of NATO forces around the region including the Baltic States, Washington has yet to provide any significant assistance to Ukraine.

Ukrainians are willing to fight to keep Russia from annexing their territory. Helping their fight will likely escalate the confrontation and sharply increase Ukraine's casualties. President Putin may never back off from bullying and occupy his neighbor. But having received promises from the West over the years, and for taking the risks of asking to join us, Ukrainians deserve support in their fight. America should be backing Ukraine indeed and not just in word. Strategically,

failing to do so tells Russia that U.S. threats and recriminations mean little beyond economic hardship. And Russia has survived much worse in living memory. Should Putin decide to annex a few Baltic islands or expand the borders of Kaliningrad (the Russian enclave between Latvia and Lithuania), it is possible NATO would use all necessary measures to defeat him. But so far, all the West has done is allow him to enter and annex Crimea, and to occupy Eastern Ukraine, with no military response (In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

As Russian mercenaries overrun regions of Ukraine, there has been little recourse to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Ukraine abandoned its nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russian, U.S. and British security guarantees.

Ceasefires are pointless in Ukraine because Putin wants anything but. He didn't choose to violate Ukraine's borders in order to reduce hostilities. He struck in order to return Ukraine under Russia's yoke. The more Ukrainian cities are decimated and civilians killed, the more Ukrainian soldiers are captured and humiliated, the better for Putin politically.

If this is the start of a new Cold War, then waiting for Putin to wear himself out is no strategy. The relatively stable balance of power held in post-war Europe until the Soviet collapse, but the late-1940s were marked by Soviet opportunism and U.S. military response, notably in Greece. During the rest of the Cold War, America had troops and nuclear weapons based in Western Europe, and the historic Berlin airlift defied Moscow's intention of cutting off West Berlin. And actual hostilities across Europe were very limited (In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

Without the specter of nuclear brinkmanship and capitalist-communist rivalry, this new “cold war” will definitely be lower grade than the original. But conventional forces and nationalist ethos are hardly benign.

Putin needs to bring Ukraine low for several reasons. First, he won't abide Russia's historical and strategic kin becoming the West's client. Second, he won't agree to concede Russian economic privileges there, in perpetuity. Third, he can't afford for Russians to see a genuinely democratic and Western-integrated Soviet successor state, much like their own, providing prosperity and security to its people, lest Russians start thinking Ukraine's mini-revolution was a good idea. Fourth, Putin sends a message to the region and world, that Russia will not be trifled with, and that veiled Russian threats are backed by unambiguous Russian guns; do not mess with Russia (In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

Putin is sending a message to the world about the arbitrariness of national sovereignty and free markets, and Washington is responding with a message of powerlessness and empty rhetoric. The West will not bring Russia to its knees within any meaningful timeframe, nor can we really afford to. Nor do we need to: Russia really is too big to fail, and so is a Western investment in its future.

There is still time to avoid cycles of confrontation with the Russian Federation and a reasonable chance for resumed economic and cultural cooperation, but only if the United States backs up its own red lines. At the very least, Washington needs to show its committed to upholding European sovereignty and free markets where it can, at any cost. If it won't, then the cost ends up being much higher, for everyone (In Ukraine, U.S. Is Forfeiting New Cold War,04-02-2015).

Conclusion

In the New Cold War world, the relationship between peace, security, and rights has become much more complex between the US and Russia. This is in part due to the decline in the polarization of the political order and the changing zero-sum conditions which have been associated in that order with security and rights. A series of other trends have contributed to this changing relationship as well, not the least of them being a greater consciousness of the environmental dimensions of peace, security and rights and the growing dynamic of international trade and finance in a world no longer featuring a major alternative to such high powered and externally focused developmental capitalism. Regarding the latter concern, the rights of individuals in a civil and political sense have become more dynamically linked with economic rights and issues of employment and development nowadays.

General Conclusion

In Brief, the cold war was the struggle between USA and USSR to dominate the world order. It was a struggle driven by ideological considerations. USA was acting as a champion of liberal democracy while USSR was striving to encapsulate the world with communism.

The cold war is generally considered to be ended decisively in 1989 with the victory of USA as USSR underwent disintegration with the subsequent dismantling of communism from the global political narrative.

However, defying the idea of many experts of political science and global politics who predicted that world will remain unipolar after cold war with the USA acting as a global leader, present trajectory of global politics is leading towards the emergence of bipolar or multipolar world order with some degree of the revival of cold war era global politics.

In terms of similarities, in cold war era, the world was divided into two camps led by two superpowers, USA and USSR. Likewise, presently, when it comes to military or hard power dimension of geopolitics world is getting divided into two camps, one led by USA (in form of NATO) and other led by Russia.

In terms of differences, acquiring the ideological supremacy was the primary objective of both the superpowers USA and USSR, in cold war, whereas, in case of new cold war, ideological considerations are absent. China wants to gain economic supremacy while Russia wants to check and subdue the military dominance of the USA in global politics.

Moreover, both USA and USSR were having matching strength and powers in economic and military fields during the cold war. The race for development of science and technology particularly space technology, Star Wars, etc. was an integral part of the cold war.

Whereas, presently there is no symmetry between USA and Russia when it comes to economics and symmetry is lacking between USA and China when it comes to military dominance though China is trying vigorously to match the military capabilities with the USA.

In addition, the events of cold war were manifested in various proxy wars, confrontations like the one during Cuban missile crisis, race for development of nuclear weapons etc. However presently, with the emergence of asymmetrical and non-conventional warfare techniques, trade and tariff wars, hacking and other non-conventional warfare devices are used to subdue each other's power and strength in the new cold war.

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