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**Investigating the Efficiency of the US Containment Policy
during the Cold War: Vietnam as a Case Study**

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for a Master Degree in Literature and Civilization**

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Dedication

We dedicate this work

To our parents for their endless support, motivation, and love

To our friends, relatives, and everyone who cares about us

Words are not enough to express our gratitude for having such people in our lives.

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Abstract

The United States and the Soviet Union adopted different policies during the Cold War to succeed in dominating the world. However, some of these policies were not effective in achieving their goals. For this, this study aims at defining the containment policy from the U.S. perspective, examining the efficiency of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam, and simulating the effect of the old U.S. foreign policy with the modern one in the case of Afghanistan to draw similarities. The present dissertation is a qualitative research based on a descriptive-analytical method and historical method to properly answer the research questions. The study reveals the failure of the U.S. policy in its containment to communism during the Cold War in Vietnam that confirms the hypothesized inefficiency of this policy. It relates this result to several reasons, including the ineffectiveness of the U.S. military and political strategies. The study also reveals that the similarity of the U.S. foreign policy between Vietnam and Afghanistan lies in the U.S. military, political, and ideological strategies applied in the two countries. Hence, the juxtaposition of Vietnam's War policy with the case of Afghanistan confirms the hypothesized similarity.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

ARVN: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam.

CPC: Communist Party of China.

DRV: Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

ERP: European Recovery Plan.

FMACC: Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee.

HUAC: House on Un-American Activities Committee.

JCS: Joint Chiefs of Staff.

NLF: National Liberation Front.

NSC: National Security Council.

PRC: People's Republic of China.

SDS: Students for a Democratic Society.

SEAAC: Southeast Asia Aid Committee.

SEAAPC: Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee.

SEATO: Southeast Asia Treaty Organization.

U.S.S.R: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

WWI: World War One.

WWII: World War Two.

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General Introduction

1. Background of the Study

Many investigations were conducted on the U.S. system and policies, whether internally or externally. These investigations were motivated by the pivotal role that the United States plays in the international stage as an influential leading nation. Furthermore, the United States has been known for its interventions in the internal affairs of other countries, adopting policies that range from forming alliances to waging wars. Containment policy is one of the prominent policies the United States implemented in Vietnam to curb the spread of communism during the Cold War era. The effectiveness of this policy is a quite controversial topic as there is no general consensus between those who opposed it and those who supported it. In his article Gabor (2016) claimed that it was the failure of the containment policy in Vietnam that led to a shift in the U.S. foreign policy. For him, the policy proved its failure and deeply affected the U.S. policy. On the other hand, Wiest (2002) stated that Vietnam was a victory for the United States if it was viewed as a part of the Cold War. This victory can be explained by the fact that the War was not escalated to a third World War, and ended with the fall of the Soviet Union. It is due to these contradictions the U.S. Foreign policy of containment in Vietnam deserves to be a topic of inquiry. Even after Vietnam, the U.S. continued its interventions in the affairs of so many countries. Its longest intervention after Vietnam is Afghanistan. Many politicians argue the similarities between the two interventions. Sheehy (2009), expresses the same opinion, stating that those who lived during the Vietnam War, Afghanistan for them is a fatal case of *déjà vu*. This urged the present paper to expose the similarities between the two wars.

2. Aims of the Study

The study aims to evaluate the impact of the U.S. containment policy in the case of Vietnam War, along with critical analysis of the military and political reasons that prompted

the United States to wage that War. It also examines the similarities between the U.S. policy in both Vietnam and Afghanistan.

3. Statement of the Problem

The U.S. foreign policy has shaped and been shaped by the containment policy, especially regarding the Vietnam War, and it has been for a long time a topic of heated debate and research. Opinions about the Vietnam containment range between those who consider it a successful and those who argue the opposite. For this, the present research discusses the implications of the Containment Policy on Vietnam and questions to what extent it has been effective. In addition, the study examines the similarities, if there are any, between the effect of the Vietnam containment and the current U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan.

4. Research Questions

The present study attempts to answer a set of questions related to the efficiency of the U.S. containment policy in Vietnam during the Cold War, and its relation to the current U.S. policy in Afghanistan. The objectives of the study are directed by the following questions:

- 1- What is the containment policy from an American perspective?
- 2- Did the U.S. containment policy contain communism in Vietnam?
- 3- How is the effect of the containment policy in Vietnam similar to the current U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan?

5. Research Hypotheses

Firstly, this research hypothesizes the inefficiency of the containment policy to demolish communism in Vietnam during the Cold War. Secondly, the failure is related to

several reasons, the inquiry in hand assumes the pitfalls of the military, and the political strategies as the primary causes. Finally, it also argues similar aspects between this incapability of the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War and the current one in Afghanistan.

6. Research Methodology

The qualitative study in hand contains three chapters. The first chapter is literature review, the second is theoretical, and the third is practical. For the first chapter, the historical method is used to introduce past events that are necessary to answer the required research question. For the second and third chapters, a descriptive-analytical method is used to describe and analyze these events. However, the last chapter is based on data analysis as it discusses the effectiveness of the U.S. policy in Vietnam.

7. Significance of the Research

The significance of the current inquiry relies on the fact that it links between the past and the present. Thus, this research relates to the effect of the old U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam during the Cold War with the modern U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan. This is possible through juxtaposing the result of the U.S. policy in Vietnam with the one in Afghanistan, and the analysis of the political and military strategies used in the two countries to finally expose the relationship between them.

8. Structure of the Dissertation

This dissertation is composed of three chapters; the first two chapters are theoretical whereas the third chapter is practical. The first chapter starts with an overview of the Cold War 1947-1991 and its causes. It introduces concepts such as capitalism, communism as well as the containment policy, along with its founding premises. The second chapter, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam from 1955-1975, provides a timeline review to the events of

the Vietnam War from the U.S. military intervention to the withdrawal. It exposes the implementation of the different strategies of containment in Vietnam. Moreover, it mentions the factors that contributed to the U.S. involvement, such as the Pearl Harbor attack, the loss of China, and the defeat of the French. Finally, the last chapter discusses the findings of the two previous chapters. It answers the primary problem of the research about the efficiency of the U.S. containment policy in Vietnam and explores its economic, political, and social consequences on the United States. It provides critical analysis of the U.S. military and political strategies during the War, the presidential decisions by Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, and the ideology used. Finally, the results of these analyses are juxtaposed to the policy used in Afghanistan.

Chapter One:

Cold War and Containment Policy: Historical

Background

Introduction

The present chapter aims at defining key concepts related to U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War era to better understand the discussed conflict. Firstly, the chapter opens with an overview of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1991, including the Soviet Union's expansion, the Iron Curtain, and the Berlin Blockade because it escalated the rivalry between the two powers. It also defines the concept of communism as an economic system in comparison with capitalism, and discusses the two phases of the Red Scare in the United States from 1917 to 1960. Secondly, the main title in this chapter is the definition of the containment policy being implemented by the United States in several countries to reduce the spread of communism during the Cold War age. The chapter defines the premises of this policy that contributed to its foundation, including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the Domino Theory. Finally, the chapter concludes with an overview of the first U.S. implementation of the containment policy in Korea, which was the first case in Asia.

1. The Cold War: An Overview (1947-1991)

After the end of World War II that marks the defeat of Nazi Germany and the empire of Japan in 1945, two powerful countries from the Allies engaged in a war. These were the United States and the Soviet Union. The conflict between the two powers lasted from the end of WWII to 1991 with the dissolve of the Soviet Union. However, throughout these years, the conflict between them was never direct. For this, it was called the Cold War.

The United Socialist Soviet Republic was a federal-state under a communist regime. It consisted of 15 republics headed by a single party, and it was the largest country in the world. The United States, on the other hand, is a liberal democracy based on capitalism with a powerful economy and industry. The relationship between the aforementioned powers from 1945

to 1949 was marked by tensions. However, during these four years, the struggle was mainly ideological.

Even though the Cold War did not witness any confrontation between the two pillars, there were ways in which they confronted each other indirectly. The rivalry between them escalated the War to adopt new ways of confrontation, such as proxy warfare. Karl Deutsch defines proxy wars as:

An international conflict between two foreign powers fought out on the soil of a third country; disguised as a conflict over an internal issue of that country; and using some of that country's manpower, resources and territory as a means for achieving preponderantly foreign goals and foreign strategies. As cited in (Mumford, 2013, p. 41).

In the same way, Mumford defined proxy Wars as “the logical replacement for states seeking to further their own strategic goals yet at the same time avoid engaging in direct, costly and bloody warfare” (Mumford, 2013, p. 41). Hence, the involvement of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War in countries like Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or Greece were all proxy Wars. These involvements were believed to solve internal issues in these countries, but in fact, they were to achieve foreign goals to one of the powers. To illustrate, the U.S. military involvement in many countries like Korea and Vietnam was to fight communism. The Soviet interference in Czechoslovakia and financing the ‘Mujahedeen’ group in Afghanistan 1979 were a part of the Soviet expansionist plans.

All in all, even though this War never witnessed direct confrontations between the two powers, yet several countries were damaged because the United States and the Soviet Union were in a geopolitical race. In other words, the more countries ruled by one power, the more powerful it became.

1.1. Origins of Cold War

The conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States had several origins. However, the main ones happened between 1945 and 1949. During these five years, the United States started to pay attention to the Soviet Union's expansion and urged the need for containment. Consequently, this led to the emergence of the Iron Curtain division, which divided the world into two blocs led by different powers. However, tension reached its peak in the Berlin Blockade crisis from 1948 to 1949. These were the main factors responsible for the 45-year escalation of the Cold War.

1.1.1. Soviet Union's Expansion

The Soviet Union's expansion was an important factor that shaped the policy of the Cold War, especially the U.S. policy. The Kremlin believed the Soviet Union was safe only when it conquered more lands than that of the United States. On the other hand, Washington considered Joseph Stalin as an imperialist dictator, and his expansion threatened the whole world, not only their political interests. For this, it needed to be contained.

Stalin's annexation of Eastern Europe was simply a "fulfillment of Stalin's imperial ambitions rather than the spread of equality, labor rights or welfare" (Ergürtuna, 2018, p. 3). Thus, Stalin's aimed at expanding his dominance to build an international empire rather than reaching the ideological principles of communism. Lynne Viola (1999) argued that Stalin was a dictator; he had no contribution toward stabilizing world peace. Her claim came as a result of the peasants' resistance against Stalin. Several uprisings were organized against him, such as the Pitelinskii Uprising in 1930 and the Vichuga Uprising in 1932.

The interference of the U.S.S.R. in international affairs of other countries such as Iran, China, Korea, Greece, and Turkey confirmed its expansionist intentions. The latter changed

the U.S. policy during the Cold War era. For the U.S. policymakers, the Communist Party of Russia had no political sense; however, they feared the Soviet Union because it was considered as the center of the world revolutionary movement (Bailey, 1950). As a result, U.S. President Harry Truman launched the Truman Doctrine in 1947 to prevent the geopolitical expansion of the Soviet Union.

To sum up, after WWII, the U.S. policy centered on being the only international power, and the Soviet expansion threatened its plan. Thus, this expansion was enough reason for the United States to go into a Cold War that lasted for 45 years.

1.1.2. Iron Curtain

The term Iron Curtain, announced by the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in March 1946, was coined because of the Soviet Union's efforts to break a connection with non-Soviet regions, and to block its satellites after WWII. In his speech, Churchill states: "From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended on the Continent" (Brager, 2004, p. 141).

The metaphor divided the world into two blocs: The Eastern and the Western. The Eastern communist bloc was led by the Soviet Union; it included Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central, and Eastern Europe, whereas the capitalist Western one was led by the United States that included France, Britain, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Canada. This division was one of the origins of the Cold War.

In a nutshell, this term aggravates the situation between the United States and the Soviet Union as it does not define the physical borders between the two blocs, but rather it describes the ideological separation. This curtain lasted for more than forty years, and it was more apparent in Germany.

1.1.3. Berlin Blockade

After the defeat of Hitler and the collapse of Nazi Germany, both the Soviet Union and the United States wanted to practice their authority on Germany to prove their powers. At the Potsdam conference in the summer of 1945, Germany was divided into four sections, to make sure it would not gain power again. The Western section was divided into three sections: French, British and the American section while the Eastern section was solely occupied by the Soviet Union. Even though Berlin, like Germany, lies within the Russian borders, the capital Berlin was also divided into four sections led by the same four powers (Hertle, 2008). The two powers started to confront each other politically due to the different economic plans they had for Germany. Although the United States and its allies agreed on the division of Germany in Potsdam and Yalta conferences in 1945, Western Germany wanted a united economic and political system for the whole country. As a result, all attempts of negotiations to unite Germany with the Soviet Military Administration failed.

With the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, the United States feared that the Soviet Union would economically destroy Eastern Germany. Its only option was to support the separation of Germany; especially with the departure of the Soviet Union from the Allied Control Council in 1948. Eventually, on June 20, 1948, a new currency known as the Deutschmark was introduced by Western Germany as the only legally accepted currency. This sudden procedure made the old Reichsmark and Rentenmark currencies of Germany valueless in Western Germany, but valid inside Eastern Germany, which put the Soviet Military Administration in a difficult situation. In response, the Soviets implemented stamp-like stickers on the old currencies. It became known as the Ostmark or the Eastern mark. It came to auction on June 23, 1948, as the valid currency in all of the Soviet section in Berlin. This action was not tolerated by the three Western powers because they described the Soviet Military Administration's

orders as null and void, and quickly announced that the Deutschmark was the only currency that should be valid for all Berlin (Charles, 1959).

For this, the Soviet Union responded with blocking Berlin's access to the Western sections on June 24, 1948. Consequently, West Berliners started to exhaust all the needed supplies. The U.S. president, Truman, was to make a significant decision either to stay or to leave Berlin. Eventually, he decided to stay there by providing aids to West Berliners through airlifts that carried all the needed supplies such as food and fuel. The first airlift was on June 26, 1948. This decision shows the intransigence of the United States to rebuild the damaged post-war Europe (Miller, 2008). As a result, in April 1949, the American, British, and the French zones were united to facilitate the process of airlifting. These zones constituted the Federal Republic of Germany on May 13, 1949. After 11 months of Berlin blockade and airlift, the United States and its Western allies left no choice to the Soviet Union except to lift the blockade on May 12, 1984. This marked the end of the first Cold War crisis.

To sum up, Stalin's dictatorship and expansionist actions changed U.S. opinion on Germany. Thus, for the United States, independent and united Germany would be a struggle for the Soviet Union. This was enough reason for the U.S. policymakers to help Germany and establish the Truman Doctrine.

1.2. Capitalism VS Communism

Over the years, the ideological, political, and economical differences were the cause of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. The former was a capitalist country, whereas the latter was communist. Communism and capitalism were not only economic systems; they were also political ones. Thus, this was the major incentive for a 45-year War. The two powers aimed to destroy each other because a dominant country meant a powerful economy and politics.

1.2.1. Capitalism

Capitalism first appeared in the 18th century in Europe and developed over the years. It is an economic and political system that focused on individual ownership. For Norberg, “Capitalism means that no one is subject to arbitrary coercion by others. Because we have the option of simply refraining from signing a contract or doing business deals if we prefer some other solution” (2010, p.65). As the quote suggests, capitalism supports the concept of free-market; no individual is controlled by a landlord, an employer, or a government without his will. It patronizes the idea of exchanging goods between two people on the condition of mutual benefit.

Adam Smith is identified as the father of capitalism states the significance of limiting government intervention in the economy. He encouraged the idea of labor division and free trade, because he argues that economic prosperity cannot happen unless the means of production are owned by individuals and not the government (Smith, 2007). In addition, Smith named this belief ‘Laissez-faire’ theory which is the French words for ‘let do’. The latter suggests that the economy can be more powerful if it is owned by individuals, and the only role of the government is to protect the individuals’ rights. Thus, Capitalism is based on the idea of private ownership which means that the individuals are free to import and export goods without any restrictions from the government. This also means that they are free to put the desired prices and deal with whomever they find an interest with.

Capitalism can be understood under three main principles:

1.2.1.1. Wage Labor

This means the payment the person gets from offering labor. The wage labor separates individuals from the means of production, and it is always for the benefit of the landlords, not

the laborers. Thus, the laborers do not usually get paid with the full price of what they have offered; their wage is always dependent on the income of landlords.

1.2.1.2. Private ownership

This principle suggests that individuals can own the means of production for instant factories, companies, or lands. They have the absolute right to have their own property and can implement any goods they want to obtain as long as they are receiving profit. Smith stated, “Sometimes, independent workers possess the means necessary for both their materials and self-maintenance. Thus, being a master and a worker at the same time, as he enjoys both the fruit of his labor and its value.” (2007, p.44). According to him, the idea of owning and working on private property was better than working for the government.

1.2.1.3. Production for exchange

This simply means that a person must pay for the desired products; this falls within the idea of exchanging services with price. The seller and the buyer are free to exchange any type of goods they want as long as they both have a deal. This is what is meant by mutual benefit.

1.2.2. Communism

According to Lansford “COMMUNIS IS A POLITICAL, SOCIAL, AND ECONOMIC [sic] system in which the government is based on a collective society with land, property, and economic activities controlled by the state. It was originally conceived Act” (2008, p. 9). Communism came as a response to capitalism; it is a form of socialism. The main difference between the two concepts is that socialism was an economic system while communism was both economic and political. The latter was shaped by Karl Marx who created its philosophical aspects through his writings. Vladimir Lenin was the one who tried to apply Karl Marx's ideas and introduced them to the Soviet society. Karl Marx opposed capitalism and criticized it many

times. For him, the struggle in history was due to the class division. He argued many times that capitalism divides society into two classes, the bourgeois who controlled the means of production, and the proletariat that allegedly worked for them. The latter idea forms the basis of ‘Marxism’, which unlike capitalism believes in a classless society where everyone is controlled by the government. Therefore, in a communist government, only the government can control the means of production, such as factories, lands, and companies. In this manner, the society is equal, and everyone works for the government. Furthermore, a communist government distributes the goods according to the people’s needs, whereas in capitalism the distribution of goods is according to the individual’s efforts. Unlike nowadays, the communist economic system was dominant in its early days. Russia was the first country to be ruled by the Communist Party followed by many countries such as: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

During the 19th Century, the spread of the communist economics, political, and ideological system terrified the United States of its potential danger. For the U.S. policymakers, if communism wins over capitalism, the Soviet Union will rule the world. This will cost the United States its position and influence. The U.S. fear was known as the Red Scare. Nowadays, China is a great example of a communist society; the government controls the economy, and even the Chinese billionaires work for the government as they cannot venture into any investment without the government’s approval.

All in all, the great difference between communism and capitalism as economic systems can be clearly summarized in four main elements as shown in (table 1).

Table 1. Main Differences between Communism and Capitalism

Capitalism	Communism
Supports private ownership of the means of production.	Supports the government ownership of the means of production.
The goods are distributed to individuals unequally.	The goods are distributed to individuals equally.
It divides society into three classes: upper, middle, and working class.	It creates a classless society.
Everyone is responsible for their action, and they develop individually (individual development).	Everyone represents community; thus, they are responsible for the development of the whole community (community development).

1.2.3. Red Scare

The Red Scare is a term for the U.S. fear of communism spread and its imposing threat. Communists were called the Reds during the Cold War as a reference to their red Soviet flag. It pushed the United States to perform a series of actions that influenced its politics and society. Federal employees were questioned about their loyalty and many other actions the government deemed necessary due to the Red Scare.

Truman's administration in its last years was accused of disloyalty even though Truman's foreign policy aimed at destroying Communism. As a result of his federal loyalty program in 1947, many federal employees were fired, and others were obliged to resign. McCarthy professed that he had a record of State Department workers who were disloyal to the United States; his claims were not supported by any evidence. However, McCarthy had many followers because he charged many diplomats with disloyalty. Nevertheless, this had a bad impact on the democrats. The promotion of the scare caused a considerable loss of teachers, scholars, and media workers (Fitzgerald, 2007).

1.2.3.1. First Red Scare 1917-1920

The first Red Scare appeared after WWI. In 1917, The Russians were angry with the government for its involvement in a costly War; eventually, many protesters were killed. When the army rebelled against their ruler Tsar Nicholas II, a new government took a place, and the Russians were optimistic. However, the government kept the War going despite public disagreement. This contributed to the rise of the Bolshevik Revolution. The latter was led by Vladimir Lenin who promised the Russians peace and land. The Revolution was successful, which promoted the U.S. fear of communism. As a result of this Revolution, labor strikes began in the United States due to the low wages that resulted in the formation of a Communist Labor Party. This was the United States' worst nightmare, and it had to act very quickly to end it. The fear pushed it to be violent. In 1919, many bombings took place in Boston, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Washington D.C., and New York City. The first Red Scare reached its climax when the United States ordered the Palmer Raids that captured the anarchists and the radical leftist. That period was called the Red Summer, and it ended in 1920 (Murray, 1980).

1.2.3.2. Second Red Scare 1947-1960

The Second Red Scare or 'McCarthyism' was named after the senator Joseph McCarthy who was famous for his accusations toward the workers of the State Department. This Red Scare attributes to the U.S. fear of communism that prevailed in its politics and culture from the 1940s until the 1950s. The main cause of the second Red Scare was the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union; it was more prevalent than the first Red Scare that followed WWI and the Bolshevik Revolution (Storrs, 2015). The United States feared the spread of communism would weaken the Democrats' position at home and the domination of capitalist regimes around the world. Consequently, the first reaction was made by the federals who stormed the considerable communist's threats and set various committees for

investigations. The House on Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) was in the U.S. House of Representatives, whose function was to chase the communist supporters. HUAC started to investigate even Hollywood celebrities because they believed in the spread of communism through the media. Many public figures, including writers, actors, and directors were accused of having relations with communists, they were directly put in Blacklist, and many studios refused to hire them (Doherty, 2019).

1.2.3.3. Red Scare Impact

The first and second Red Scare had a huge influence on the U.S society. Many had been charged with felonies they did not commit; they were stripped of their houses, properties, and fired from their jobs. People were victims of false claims; they were looted from their political right to choose their political party. They could not express their desires freely; a federal employee told a social investigator that they dumped even small things they love He claimed that if communists liked an apple pie, people would stop eating it, no matter how much they love it because that will make them supporters of communism. This was the impact of Truman's loyalty program that made people avoid any association with communism, not to be identified as 'guilty by association' even speaking about social or racial problems was forbidden. The Red Scare developed the skeptic thinking in U.S. society; the Americans trusted neither their government nor each other. It did not only fight against communism; it fought freedom of thought and speech in the United States as well (Michaels, 2017).

2. Definition of Containment Policy

It is defined as a strategic foreign policy founded by the United States in the late 1940s to contain the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union. After WWII, both powers sought to spread their ideologies and influence in the world. The Communist Soviet Union attempted several times to expand the scope of communism by arranging multiple invasions in Eastern

Europe and Asia. As a result, politicians coined the term Red Scare to refer to the U.S. fear of communism. Since the United States was deeply concerned with the spread of communism, the U.S. President Truman joined the Korean War to prevent its fall to the communists. Nevertheless, unlike the Americans, the Soviets were well organized and trained in the battlefields.

George F. Kennan, an American diplomat, introduced the principles and notions of the containment policy in an article entitled 'The Source of Soviet Union Conduct'; published by Foreign Affairs journal under the name of Mr. X in 1947 (Kennan & Lukacs, 1997). In this article, Kennan expressed the U.S. needs to adopt the containment policy in its battle against the Soviet Union. He accused the Soviet leaders of spreading communist ideology and explained their working mechanisms. He stated that they were determined and concrete when it came to their expansionist intentions. However, Kennan also mentioned that the United States had to be patient about the implications of the containment policy, the policy would, at last, find an avenue to disintegrate the Soviets and stop their expansion. The article influenced U.S. politics during the Cold War (Heer, 2018). Truman's administration was astonished by Kennan's concepts and was the first to adopt his policy. One strategy of this policy was named after Truman, the Truman Doctrine.

During the Cold War, President Truman tried to contain the Soviet Union's expansion through various plans. To prevent communism in North Atlantic and to increase the U.S. engagement in the area, the United States decided to organize the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, which received an instant response from the Soviet Union called the Warsaw Pact. The containment policy authorized several U.S. proxy interventions during the Cold War, including Korea and Vietnam. However, before it included Asia, the containment policy firstly began in Europe with the implementation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan (Gaddis, 2005).

2.1. Premises of Containment Policy

Kennan founded the containment policy in 1947 that was adopted by the United States during the whole period of the Cold War. This policy aimed to decrease the U.S.S.R expansionist missions in the world. Like any policy, it relied upon political premises, like the Truman Doctrine that provided financial help to some nations, the Marshall Plan that helped Europe to fight communism, lastly, and most notably, the Domino Theory that contributed to the establishment of a new age in the U.S. foreign policy.

2.1.1. Truman Doctrine

The policy of isolationism for the United States ended as soon as Truman's idea was introduced in a congress session on March 12, 1947, in which President Harry Truman requested financial aid. This request changed the whole path of U.S. foreign policy from isolationism to internationalism that lasted even after the Cold War era.

Truman established the grounds of his Doctrine following the Wilsonian philosophy that encouraged the right of self-determination. The Doctrine aims at assisting free people "to work out their destinies in their ways" (Spielvogel, 2015, p. 888). For this, he requested the U.S. Congress to accept his financial aids to Greece and Turkey as they were falling to communism; especially with the withdrawal of the British military and economic assistance from both of them, taking into consideration Kenan's telegram in 1946 that stated the soviet's expansionist intentions and distrust of the West. His request, which amounted to \$400,000,000 financial aid, was approved by the Congress on the condition that Truman's Doctrine should contain communism. Thus, the United States was responsible for keeping peace in Greece and Turkey (Jones, 1997). For Truman and his supporters, the communist system is about totalitarianism that prohibits the individual's freedom. Hence, it threatens the stability and the welfare of people around the world; the international community had to act immediately. As a result,

Rigas (n.d.) argues that the financial aid of Truman was specific, but its message was universal. It meant that the United States would intervene wherever freedoms were threatened. This was the first step made by the United States toward internationalism and the intervention in other countries' foreign affairs.

The Doctrine was to provide financial aid for primary military assistance in both countries, especially in Greece. This method of U.S. foreign policy is a tool for achieving foreign goals while avoiding direct military confrontations. However, Katerina Rigas (n.d.) argued that misconceptions between the known fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy and their reality were considered as a key characterization method. Similarly, Jones (1991) described the Truman Doctrine as the license that allowed the United States to become an international imperialist.

When delivering his speech, Truman states "at the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a free one" (Duiker & Spielvogel, 2012, p.765). Moreover, Evered (2010) relates the effect of this Doctrine to the present policy, specifically, to the Bush administration. In Bush's speech to declare war against Afghanistan in 2001, after the 9/11 incident, he argued "Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists" (Bush, 2001, p. 1142). Thus, the U.S. foreign policy was, and still is, based on a monochromatic perception of the world. Therefore, the Truman Doctrine is the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Although it was formulated during the Cold War era, its impact is still relevant to the current policy.

To conclude, the Truman Doctrine was the first obvious challenge for the Soviet Union. Later, the objectives of the Doctrine were modified to provide economic aid for all war-

damaged European countries to rebuild their infrastructure. This is known as the European Program Recovery or the Marshall plan in 1947.

2.1.2. Marshall Plan

In February 1946, a long telegram was sent to the U.S. president, from Moscow, by the U.S. diplomat George Kennan in which he expressed his fears about the U.S.S.R. expansionist intentions in Europe. Kennan also expressed the dangers of the spread of communism in Europe and recommended the urgent need for stopping its spread. The telegram was published by Foreign Affairs magazine without revealing the writer's name, which devastated the international public opinion.

The aftermath of WWII on the economy of Europe was profound, and the European nations were unable to resist the Communist expansion. As a result, Kennan asked the United States to help in rebuilding Europe. This help, for him, is not only humanitarian, but it is for U.S. political interests in stopping communism's spread (Arnold & Wiener, 2012). The U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall suggested a European Recovery Plan (ERP) on June 05, 1947, at the University of Harvard. In his speech, Marshall stated the urgent need for the United States to help in rebuilding Europe for international peace and stability. He also mentioned the purpose of his recovery plan stating that:

Our policy is directed not against any country or Doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist (Lyles, 2008, p. 126).

The Truman administration debated the funding of this plan many times in Congress. However, the U.S. political interest, such as stopping the spread of communism, and economic interest, such as finding markets for the U.S. products for preventing another economic depression, pushed them to pass the Economic Cooperation Act in 1948; especially with the Soviet union's overthrow to Czechoslovakia.

The European Recovery Plan is viewed as a containment strategy for the spread of communism in Europe although Marshall's speech did not reveal the real intentions of the United States towards the ideology of communism there. For instance, Acheson (1970) made it clear when he considered that "Marshall aid operated to block the extension of Soviet power and the acceptance of Communist economic and political organization and alignment" (p. 233). In spite of Marshall's suggestion about the participation of the Soviet Union in rebuilding Europe, thus, the Eastern countries were welcomed to join this plan on the condition of reorienting their economies away from the Soviet Union. The latter, with all its regimes, refused to take part in the ERP, as predicted by Kennan, because Stalin described the plan as economic imperialism to Europe (Agnew & Entrikin, 2015).

The U.S. policymakers decided to be in a position of strength. They claimed that diplomacy alone was not enough and actions were required (Cox & Kennedy-Pipe, 2005). From 1948 to 1951, the plan attempted to rebuild Europe by granting loans from the United States to provide all the necessary needs, including food, housing, medical, industrial, agricultural needs, and others. During these years, the United States granted over 13\$ billion to 16 different Western European nations like Germany, the United Kingdom, and France ("The Marshall Plan for Rebuilding Western Europe", n.d., para. 3). The Marshall Plan was successful to some extent even though most Europeans were skeptical about U.S. aids to Europe, and claimed that the United States was helping Europe because it needed markets. During the years of the Plan, the

economy of these European nations increased, especially the one of Germany as displayed in (figure 1).




Figure 1 . Economic Growth in European Nations During the Marshall Plan Years: Rate of real GDP growth, 1948-1951. Adapted from “The Marshall Plan: History's Most Successful Structural Adjustment Program”, by J. De Long, and B. Eichengreen, 1991, *National Bureau of Economic Research*, p.10.

By 1951, in addition to the increase in the European economy, no other country fell to communism after Czechoslovakia. That was a significant success to the U.S. policy during the four years of the European Recovery Plan. Controversially, the latter did not solve all of Europe's problems. The continent was still importing 30% of its food during 1951. Further, economic inflation was a problem for many European countries, and the problem of borders was disrupting the transportation of goods between countries (“The Marshall Plan for Rebuilding Western Europe”, n.d., para.4).

Finally, through this aid, Europe was able to stand on its feet against communism. Therefore, the United States was able to contain the spread of communism in Europe. For that, the Marshall Plan was considered as the concrete application of the Truman Doctrine. Marshall won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1953, and the United States became the hero of the free world.

Winston Churchill called Marshall's aid to rebuild Europe "the highest level of statesmanship" (Zabecki, 2015, p. 113)

2.1.3. Domino Theory

The Domino Theory, announced by the U.S. President Eisenhower at a conference in 1954, was a fundamental principle that shaped U.S. foreign policy in the post-war era. According to Butterly (2012), Eisenhower's announcement did not only determine the path of the U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War but also after it. The effect of this theory is still present in today's U.S. foreign relations.

Eisenhower's theory emerged due to many factors, like U.S.S.R. expansion, the loss of China, the Korean War, and U.S. need for resources and markets. Following the end of WWII, the U.S. focus was mainly on the containment of communism. The Soviet Union control in Eastern Europe and the communist victory of 1949 in China terrified the United States. The latter had to respond quickly. Consequently, With the rise of the Korean conflict in 1950, the United States had no choice except to intervene in the Korean War to decrease the U.S.S.R. dominance and to limit the communist spread. However, it lost the War.

The U.S. policymakers' main claim was the protection of people's freedom and the international spread of democracy. For them, that was not possible only through the containment of communism (DeConde, Burns, Logevall & Ketz, 2002). This latter fact, which was the core of the Domino Theory, legitimized U.S. intervention in many countries like Vietnam. The theory argues that if one country in a certain region fell to communism, thus one domino, the neighboring countries would follow just like dominoes or a chain; eventually, the whole region would be lost. Therefore, if Vietnam falls to communism, the surrounding countries like Cambodia and Laos will also fall. For Hess (2009), this threatens, if not damages, the U.S. international stature, and has global economic and political negative influences. As a result, military

and economic aids were provided to the non-communist South Vietnam to prevent its fall to communism and fight the communist North.

Slater (1993) argued that four main mechanisms help in communism spread, these are overt invasion, externally-sponsored revolution, accommodation, and inspiration. Firstly, what Slater meant by direct invasion was similar to what happened in Eastern Europe, where the U.S.S.R army invaded some of the countries like Poland and Czechoslovakia. In other words, this was also called aggression. Secondly, the funding of the Civil Wars in other countries was one of the Soviet Union's strategies of intervention. The latter is known as externally-sponsored revolutions, and it was the case with the Korean War. Thirdly, he defined accommodation as "efforts of states to avert outright invasion or internal communist takeovers by giving up considerable independence". (Slater, 1993, p. 194). It is also referred to as neutralization or self-Finlandization; in other words, it is when a state faces communist aggression but it does not respond aggressively, rather it engages in balancing behavior. The latter is possible when the country joins alliances with the Soviet Union to strengthen its defenses, and to resist threats to the status quo. Finally, the United States could not let communism win in Vietnam because that would inspire revolutions in the neighboring countries, and communism would be seen as the futuristic trend. This will undermine U.S. credibility and commitment to maintaining international peace and order. It will also allow the preceding of the accommodation process (Rust, 1985).

Theoretically, the theory's aim is ideal and honorable; yet, it is full of gaps. For instance, although externally-sponsored revolutions are used by the United States itself, the Domino Theory fights this strategy. According to Brown and Abrahamian (2001), The United States was responsible for financing a coup against democratic elections in Iran in 1953 and Guatemala in 1954. This paradox between what is theoretical and what is real characterizes the nation's diplomacy.

Furthermore, The U.S. policymakers extended the aim of this theory from preventing the fall of Western Europe to communism to the containment of communism globally. Besides, the United States linked itself to the outcomes of small countries millions of miles away from its borders. Therefore, the question is how could these small countries threaten U.S. interests or national security if that is even possible. The U.S. involvement in Vietnam was to achieve unlikely future threats that could be solved in other peaceful and less costly ways if they had occurred (Slater, 1993).

In conclusion, it is the U.S. immoderate interests that made it imperial power. Hence, behind the obvious idealistic language of the Domino Theory, Washington's ultimate goal was to become the only world superpower. Besides, the theory was itself paradoxical, which questions one of the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy during and after the War.

3. The first implementation of Containment policy in Asia: An Overview to the Korean War 1950-1953

After gaining its independence from Japan with the end of WWII, Korea was invaded by the Soviet Union and the United States. The former conquered the Northern region while the latter overrun the Southern one. They agreed to have a paired administration. However, the tension between the two grew due to the difference in ideologies (Shen, 2013). In 1948, the Korean conflict got complicated, on account of the inability to set a free election throughout the Korean Peninsula. Additionally, the 38 Parallel was considered as a political border between the North and the South that exacerbated the War between the two (Edwards, 2010). The Korean War, or as described by the Americans 'The Forgotten War or The Unknown War', started on June 25, 1950. The latter was a military conflict between South and North Korea that started when the North invaded the South to make it a communist regime. North Korea was supported by the People's Republic of China (PRC) and got material aids from the Soviet

Union. However, South Korea was supported by the United States and the United Nations; both of them crawled huge military forces towards the 38th parallel in Korean (Leffler & Painter, 1994). It was the first time in history that the United Nations plays a role in a war.

The United States' goal of this War was to end the expansion of communism. President Truman was afraid of the Domino Theory that if Korea fell in communism, other countries would follow. Therefore, the United States helped the South to stop the communist Northern invasion, which was supported by the PRC. The United Nations made a counter attack that moved the North Koreans far from the 38th parallel (Devine et al, 2007). Afterward, China with the help of the Soviets responded and drove the United Nations back across the 38th parallel. The Korean War was considered as a proxy War due to this external interference. The United States was afraid that South Korea would be communist because China had intentions to recapture Seoul. Hence, President Truman decided to apply a containment policy in Korea to limit the spread of communism. “The Truman Administration was caught at a crossroads. Before the invasion, Korea was not included in the strategic Asian Defense Perimeter outlined by Secretary of State Acheson”. (Kim, 2003, p. 30). According to the quote, the United States helped Korea to prevent the expansion of communism; otherwise, it would make the Soviet Union more powerful. The U.S. government was aware that the Korean conflict could be escalated to another World War with the participation of the Soviet Union and the PRC. Hence, the U.S. containment in Korea was a reaction to the Soviet Union invasion in many regions in the world, like Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. In May 1949, the two Koreas fought and crawled out the borders between them. It was when the Truman Doctrine first applied in Asia (Leffler & Painter, 1994).

President Truman wanted to end the War as soon as possible; he ordered General Douglas MacArthur to take charge of this case. However, the General did not obey the president's orders as he kept promising the reunification of Korea. Consequently, Truman dismissed

MacArthur of his duties. The U.S. society was not happy with the president's decision and considered the general a hero. The only reason why Truman was not impeached was because of the Joint Chief of Staff of Staff (JCS) support. The United States attempted to make peaceful parleys, yet all of them failed to find a solution. After Eisenhower became a president in 1953, a peace agreement was signed at Panmunjom. It ended the Korean War with the division of Korea into communist North and capitalist South. Therefore, not only the United States failed to reunite the two Koreas, but also to demolish communism there (Edwards, 2010).

Conclusion

The United States feared the expansion of the Soviet Union in the world. It threatened its political and economic interests, and therefore its influence on other nations. For this, the United States claimed that the coexistence of communism and capitalism in the same world was impossible. As a result, the United States implemented a new foreign policy under the name of containment in the late 1940s. From the U.S. perspective, this policy was defined as a strategic foreign policy that sought to contain the expansionist policy of the Soviet Union in Western Europe through economic aids, or the so-called Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In Western Europe, the containment policy succeeded in making the region economically independent from the Soviet Union. However, the latter started to extend Eastwards to include other parts in Asia. Consequently, the United States implemented the same policy in Asia, specifically in Korea, where the containment policy was first implemented in the continent and later in Vietnam. Nevertheless, containment in Korea achieved negative results, which questions the effectiveness of implementing this policy in Asia, although it was founded to meet the European conditions.

Chapter Two:

The U.S. Involvement in Vietnam from 1955-1975

Introduction

In this chapter, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is divided into two phases. The first phase deals with the factors that contributed to the U.S. involvement. Firstly, the Pearl Harbor attack pushed the United States to finance the Viet Minh's efforts against the Japanese colonization, eventually marking the end of the Japanese role in the region. Secondly, the fall of China to Communism in 1949 proved Eisenhower's Domino theory, and frightened the United States of future communist expansion in the region. Lastly, the return of the French colonization in Vietnam and the struggle to control it back, along with fear of communism, plunged the United States in Vietnam struggle unconditionally. During all these events, the U.S. involvement was not direct yet.

The second phase, on the other hand, explores the American-Vietnamese conflict that lasted for 17 years. In this phase, the U.S. involvement became direct, especially with the administration of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon from 1961-1973. Emphasis is drawn on these 12 years where the War witnessed its highest level due to variation of U.S. Presidents and their implemented foreign strategies in Vietnam, such as the expansion, the escalation, and the Vietnamization of the War. This chapter also explores the Viet Minh's efforts to win the War, and the opinion of the U.S. public towards the involvement in Vietnam, which contributed profoundly to the outcomes of this conflict.

1. Origins of Vietnam War

The Vietnam War had many causes that can be traced back to the end of World War II. However, some causes are unarguably responsible for it. Firstly, the pearl harbor attack in 1941 marked the beginning of the U.S. intervention in Vietnamese affairs by supplying the Viet Minh to fight the Japanese. Secondly, the loss of China to communism in 1949 proved the failure of the U.S. support to the Chinese Nationalist Party. Finally, the return of France in

1946 to occupy Vietnam with the help of the United States; also called the First Indochina War. In addition to the French failure to defeat the Viet Minh in the battle of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. All these factors launched the Second Indochina War that witnessed the U.S. intervention in Vietnam for 17 years.

1.1. Pearl Harbor Attack

During WWII, and following the Japanese occupation of the French Indochina, Japan occupied Vietnam from September 1940 until the end of the War in 1945. Japan's goal from this invasion was to block China's domination and cut off all its ways of supply. In addition to that, Vietnam was a strategic place for Japan to strike the allies from there.

The United States entered an active state of war with Japan due to the Japanese attack on the U.S. Naval base at Pearl Harbor in Hawaii on November 07, 1941. Consequently, the following day, President Roosevelt declared war against Japan. The attack aimed at destroying the U.S. aircraft carriers that were responsible for supplying the British against the Nazis and ensured the Japanese expansion in Asia and the Pacific. Even though the attack lasted for one hour and 15 minutes, 2,403 U.S. personnel were killed, and 19 U.S. Navy ships were damaged. However, the intended U.S. aircraft carriers were not destroyed because they were on maneuvers. After six months of the attack, and as a response to the battle of Midway, the United States destroyed Yamamoto's navy in June 1942, which led to the destruction of four Japanese aircraft carriers (Bove, 2018).

The conflict with Japan during WWII boosted the U.S. insistence on limiting the Japanese expansion and power in Southeast Asia. After 3 years of the attack, the Communist Ho Chi Minh, who established the Viet Minh, received military aids from the United States to overthrow the Japanese occupation in Vietnam. As a result of praising the U.S. efforts for democracy, Ho called his army the 'Viet American Army'. Finally, after the drop of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki in August 1945, the Japanese empire signed the official surrender on September 02, 1945, marking the end of WWII.

1.2. The Fall of China

After the withdrawal of the Japanese from China in 1945, a Civil War emerged. The latter was between the nationalist Chiang Kai-Shek and the Communist Party of China (CPC) led by Mao Zedong. To the United States, the Chinese Civil War was another proxy War. The U.S. involvement in China began with its aid to the nationalists.

Throughout the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949), the national government headed by Chiang was known for its corruption. The War against the communists required many supplies. For that, Chiang imposed heavy taxes on the citizens. In addition to that, his government was in debt. As a result, the economic situation in China crushed, leading to many strikes by the Chinese who demanded the establishment of a communist government. Chiang responded with imprisoning, beating, and even killing the protestors. The public opinion turned against him, Chiang started to lose control, and his rule started to collapse. Although the nationalist army was larger than Zedong's army, it was misled. In 1949, the CPC, supported by the Soviet Union, won the War against the nationalists. Mao Zedong declared the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 01, 1949 (Kesselman, Krieger, Joseph & Abrahamian, 2013).

The loss of China to Communism sparked widespread controversy among U.S. policy-makers. In August 1949, the United States issued a famous paper called 'China White Paper', which was a response to the critics who blamed the U.S. foreign policy for the loss of China. In the paper, the U.S Defense Department declared that the failure to contain communism in China was not because of the U.S. aids; however, the Chinese leaders could not succeed in solving this crisis, their army was ill-directed and lost the desire to fight. Therefore, they lost popular support, which was the cornerstone of any government (Daughan, 1973).

Despite this declaration, Senator Knowland accused U.S. foreign policy in China with failure. He argued that the U.S. policy was based upon wishes without actions and this endangered Asia to more potential communist conquests. For him, the Chinese army lacked weapons withheld by the United States. Thus, the U.S. aid justified the loss of China to communism as the real Chinese needs to stop the communist party from winning were not provided (Caridi, 1968). Similarly, Brands (1994) stated that foreign officers informed Washington that Chiang's policy in China was rejected, and Mao Zedong's goal was to win the war. They recommended befriending the leader of the communist party. However, the United States denied these reports. Instead, it claimed that these officers were pro-Communists.

To conclude, the sudden loss of China to communism shocked the United States. This loss did not only prove the ineffectiveness of the containment of communism in China, but it increased their fear of further expansion of communism in the continent.

1.3. The Return of the French: The First Indochina War (1946-1954)

The U.S. policy shifted its attention from Europe to Asia due to the outcomes of the Chinese revolution and the Korean War. With the end of WWII and the fall of the Japanese colonization in Vietnam, France wanted to reclaim its lost colonies in Indochina. Hence, Vietnam entered a war with the French colonization. This was known as the First Indochina War (1946-1954).

Immediately after the withdrawal of the Japanese forces from Vietnam, the Viet Minh took the chance to declare the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) on September 02, 1945, with a high sense of political freedom and nationalism (Koburger, 1991). However, Dommen (2001) argued that France considered Indochina as a French territory that needed restoration. The War began with the return of French forces to Vietnam in December 1946. After settling in Saigon, they rapidly captured the main cities in South Vietnam. Meanwhile, the North did

not witness a French military presence, which was an advantage to the Viet Minh to grow strong.

For Armstrong (2004), the resistance of the Viet Minh did not only exhaust the French army, but even the policy. Although in 1947, the U.S. Under Secretary of State Acheson declared that they were willing to offer good offices to the French, without any other intentions; yet the French feared the U.S. intentions and rejected Acheson's proposal after two weeks. In the summer of 1948; however, after the French military offensive in Tonkin against the Viet Minh, the United States urged France to settle the situation in Indochina without any pressure.

By 1949, the Southern Vietnamese nationalists began to collapse. With the loss of China in October of the same year, and with the notion of the Red Scare, the United States was close to direct intervention in Vietnam. After the CPC won the War, Mao's forces reached the Vietnamese borders. From the U.S. perspective, the whole continent of Asia was in danger. In February 1950, the United States received a formal French request demanding help. However, there was a plan programmed by the U.S. Defense Department to aid the French in summer 1949. According to a study sent to the U.S. President by the National Security Council (NSC) 48/1, on December 30, 1949, stating the objectives of the U.S. policy towards Asia in four main points: Firstly, the development of the Asiatic nations and ensuring their stability and conformity. Secondly, the development of military forces in non-communist Asiatic regions for internal security and preventing the spread of communism. Thirdly, to weaken the power of the USSR in that area not to harm neither the U.S. security nor the Asiatic one. Finally, preventing any kind of alliance in Asia. The latter can threaten both U.S. and Asian security, peace, national independence, and stability. (Dingman, 1977).

NSC 48/2 is another study made by the U.S. Department of Defense. It emphasized the objective of the U.S. policy towards Asia and declared its provision to political, economic, and

military assistance to the targeted Asiatic nations to support the resistance of the non-communist governments in the region. The U.S. authorities programmed a funding program for Asia, and a special committee was appointed by JCS to decide on allocations of funds. Only in March 1950, a study known as NSC 64 was publicized to the JCS. The NSC 64 targeted the region of Indochina specifically, and it was approved by President Truman in April of the same year. It stated the measures taken by the United States to protect its security interests in Indochina which included Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. These were given the name of Associated States by the United States. For the latter, Indochina was a key region to control communism expansion as it was the determined area in danger. Consequently, the NSC 46 came as a result of the Viet Minh growth, the attempts of CPC to intervene, and the failure of France to control the situation (Calkins, 2013)

Acheson, the Secretary of the State and Defense, advised the President that the choice confronting the United States was either to finance France in Indochina or to confront communism spread all over the continent and perhaps farther Westward. In the spring of 1950, the program of Indochina aid was implemented. The first aid for Indochina was \$15 Million. Similarly, Dr. Jessup and Dr. Griffin, as cited in Armstrong (2004), argued that the only way to save Southeast Asia from communism is to help solve the Indochina situation by providing financial help. In May, Acheson announced the assistance program in London. Additionally, he and Minister Schuman argued that France could not stand alone against the Viet Minh while her resources were draining in defense of Western Europe. Therefore, since they are allies, it is a must for the United States to help France in her struggle against the Viet Minh.

On the policy level, special committees were to supervise the program of assistance. The first one was declared in March by JCS under the name of the Southeast Asia Aid Committee (SEAAC). However, its name was changed in June to become the Southeast Asia Aid Policy Committee (SEAAPC). The SEAAPC was responsible for coordinating political,

economic, and military policy of assistance in that area. In addition to the SEAAPC, the Foreign Military Assistance Coordinating Committee (FMACC) was responsible for coordinating the military involvement in Southeast Asia. Both SEAAPC and FMACC operated together to make this assistance organized and successful (Stector, 1983).

To conclude, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949, the Korean conflict in 1950, the growth of the Viet Minh, and the inability of France to hold the situation were enough reasons for the United States to assist France. However, U.S. assistance sought to achieve one foreign objective that was to stop the spread of communism in Asia. This principle supports President Eisenhower's argument about the Domino theory.

1.4. Dien Bien Phu

After the French bombardment of the city of Haiphong and the battle of Hanoi in 1946 that marked the beginning of the First Indochina War, the Viet Minh army started to grow fiercely. By 1953, France's situation in Vietnam became dreadful due to the control of the Viet Minh upon a large area of the country. This area included the North of Vietnam and the countryside; Laos was yet to be controlled. The French army's mission was to stop this expansion and destroy the Vietnamese army (Levine, 1995).

In March 1953, and after more than six years of war, France and Vietnam had a stalemate. However, in November 1953, the French army placed nine strongholds in a small town called Dien Bien Phu, located in Tin Keo, Northern Viet Bac province. The latter was chosen on purpose because it contained all access routes to Laos, and the French aimed to protect these routes from the Viet Minh. The nine strongholds were scattered along with the town, the stronghold of Gabrielle in the North, Beatrice in the Northeast, Isabelle in the South, Anne-Marie in the Northwest, and all of François, Claudine, Eliane, Dominique, and Huguette were in the

center. This was known as the Navarre plan, which was named after the French General Henri-Eugène Navarre (Logan & Nguyen, 2012).

The Battle began on March 13, 1954, when the Viet Minh damaged the French airfields that were used for bringing supplies to the strongholds. The Viet Minh army received Russian weapons and machinery from the Soviet Union and the PRC. From March to May, the battle continued between the French and the Viet Minh. However, the French position was horrible due to the interruption of lines of supplies. The French ceased fire on May 06, without the use of the white flag, not to consider it surrender, at 5:30 p.m. after the order of the General Congy. The order was respected in all stronghold except for the Southern one Isabell, where the ceasefire took place on May 08 at 1:00 a.m. (Bonner & Wiggin, 2005).

General Navarre's plan failed because the French army did not take into account the Viet Minh's guerilla-style of combat. Over the 56 days of the battle, the Viet Minh was able to destroy all of the French fortresses, including 62 French planes, 30 Canons, six tanks, and 60,000 parachutes were taken (Logan & Nguyen, 2012).

The French army was in an advanced position compared to the Viet Minh. It outnumbered the Viet Minh because it did not consist of French soldiers only, but also Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and other African colonial subjects with some nationalists Vietnamese. It also used U.S. artillery; however, it lost the War. On the other hand, according to Fall (2002), The Viet Minh army had about 600 Russian Molotov, and 2,50 tons-trucks that were capable of crossing rivers and barely crossable roads, but most of all the Vietnamese depended on bicycles for supplies that were humanely modified to be heavily loaded; each one carried 440 pounds. In addition to 1,360 of Chinese ammunition, 4,620 tons of petrol products, 46 tons of spare weapons, and 2,260 tons of consumable goods, including 1,700 tons of rice for the army to eat (Billington, 2004). The French underestimated the Vietnamese stamina and their loss

was because of a lack of logistics in depth. According to McCoy, Read and Adams (1973), to transport untransferable heavy artillery through the Vietnamese mountains was the confidence of the Viet Minh that the French ignored.

In a seminar in March, The Vietnamese commander Gen Vo Nguyen Giap claimed that the victory at Dien Bien Phu meant that a third world country with limited resources and backward economy could defeat “a Western power with large economic and military potential and sophisticated weapons” (“Dien Bien Phu -- a turning point”, 2004, para. 15).

In conclusion, with the refusal of the French government to give accurate numbers of deaths, missing, or wounded, the Dien Bien Phu battle’s casualties are still unclear. However, it was estimated that around 11,000 French military personnel were sent to fight at Dien Bien Phu; 36% of these were Indochinese, 26% were foreign legionnaires, most notably German, 19% were North Africans, and 19% were French (Windrow, 2004).

1.5. Geneva Accords

On May 08, 1954, an international conference held in Switzerland, and the conferees; America, Britain, France, China, Russia, and Vietnam were to determine peace settlement on the Vietnamese and the Korean conflict. In this conference, according to Officer Patti, who worked with Ho Chi Minh, each polar wanted to impose its interests.

France was tired of wars and wanted peace, the United States failed to support France in its mission, and therefore lost its first fight against communism. Like France, Britain supported peace because of the war-affected its interests in the region. Communist China wanted to prove its equal status with the United States on international matters. The DRV wanted to be seen as a sovereign and independent country. However, of all conferees, only the United States was purely ideological. The Secretary of State Acheson and Director of Central

Intelligence Dulles talked only about the containment of communism in Southeast Asia and ignored the efforts of the DRV to overthrow the French colonization that constitutes a major part of the conference's objective (Billington, 2004).

The negotiations between the powers continued, and the final declaration of the conference was on July 21, 1954. The most important decision for the Vietnamese was the agreement of the French government to withdraw its troops from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Secondly, Vietnam was to be recognized as a free and sovereign country (Bui & Chanoff, 1999). However, there was an issue concerning the unity of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh knew that the plan of a united Vietnam under the role of the Viet Minh would not be accepted by the United States, and in fact, it may lead to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. As a result, the conference proposed a division to Vietnam on the 17th parallel into North and South; until the organization of national election after 2 years. In the meantime, there shall be no foreign intervention in Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh agreed to continue ruling the North, even though he was sure of his victory in the coming election. However, the latter was never held in conformity (Billington, 2004).

To conclude, the Geneva accords in 1954 marked the end of the French colonization of Vietnam; thus, achieving a significant Vietnamese dream. However, the Vietnamese utopia did not last for long because the U.S. intervention has just begun.

2. Vietnam War: The Second Indochina War (1954-1973)

After the official withdrawal of the French troops from Vietnam, the failure of the U.S. plan to assist the French army, and the division of Vietnam into North and South in the Geneva conference, the United States decided to intervene in the Vietnamese conflict. The help of the PRC to Ho Chi Minh and his army in the North affirmed Eisenhower's Domino Theory, which pushed the United States to establish its puppet government in the South to prevent the spread

of communism in the region. The War between the North and the South has been dubbed ‘the 17-year war’.

2.1. The Affirmation of the Domino Theory

Since the end of WWII, the U.S. Foreign policy sought to contain the communist ideology first in Europe, then in Asia. It is due to the domino theory, that constituted an integral part in the U.S. battle against communism, the U.S. involvement in Vietnam came to action. This involvement began with the U.S. assistance to the French colonization in Southern Vietnam to defeat the Northern nationalist.

The North, being supplied by the PRC, posed a major threat to the U.S. policymakers who feared the fall of Northern Vietnam to communism. According to Levy (1991), on September 02, 1953, the secretary of state John Foster expressed concern over the fact that China was supporting the communist parties in Indochina and the possibility of sending a Red Army to conquer the region. Further, he argued that such actions were considered as aggression, and the United States cannot let this go without serious consequences even though Ho Chi Minh did not yet claim communism at that time.

Following the 1954 Geneva conference and the massive loss of France against the Viet Minh, Vietnam was divided into North, led by the communist Ho Chi Minh, who declared himself a communist at the very conference, and the South, led by the capitalist and anti-French Ngo Dinh Diem. The latter’s government was supported by the United States to prevent the fall of Southern Vietnam to the Northern communists (Gabor, 2016).

To defend the Southeast Asia region from the communist aggression, and to recover its losses in the fight against communism by supplying the French, the United States established a new organization called the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). It came as a result

of a series of meetings held in Manila that began on September 08, 1954, with French, British, Australian, New Zealander, Thai, Filipino, Pakistani and American representatives, all aiming to defend the region from expansionist communist threats. However, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos were banned from participating in the meetings due to the decision of the Geneva conference as they were within the targeted area that needed protection (Merrill, 2002). According to Kattenburg (1980), the establishment of such an organization confirmed the validity of the Domino theory and expressed the necessity of continued efforts for containment in the region for preventing the fall of future dominos.

In conclusion, the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and its support for communism in the Indochina region was the primary cause for the fall of Northern Vietnam to communism. For the U.S., this did not only validate Eisenhower's Domino theory but launched the second Indochina War.

2.2. The Seventeen-year' War: The US Involvement

According to the orders of the Geneva conference in 1954, a transparent national election was expected in 1956 by the Vietnamese government despite its division into South and North led by different leaders and ideologies. However, Diem with the United States, co-operated against Ho Chi Minh not to win the elections in South Vietnam. This cooperation led to the beginning of a 17-year war (Berkin, Miller, Cherny, Gormly & Egerton, 2010).

According to Barr (1991), when Ho Chi Minh was prevented from his legal right to win the elections in the South, he decided to go for a Civil War. By 1960, the Vietminh changed its name to the Vietcong. The latter attempted to devastate the situation in South Vietnam by turning the people against Diem and his army. Consequently, and fearing the loss to a communist force in 1961, the United States under President Kennedy increased the military advisors in South Vietnam from 900 to 11,000. According to Levy (1991) in an interview in 1963,

Kennedy argued that it was the U.S. military aid that would keep the government well-structured; reducing it would cause the collapse of South Vietnam.

For the previous U.S. presidents that proceeded Kennedy, like Truman and Eisenhower, their interventions were focused on financial and political support to Diem's government; that was a puppet government. Nevertheless, Kennedy's foreign policy was based on increasing military aid in Vietnam as the Vietcong was growing and negatively impacting the South. He continued in increasing the U.S. advisors till they reached 16,000 by 1963.

The real U.S. intervention began in 1964-1965 with the administration of Johnson, when the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution came to action on August 05, 1964. The latter, according to Bessette and Pitney (2013), gave the President the authority to send military troops to Southern Vietnam. This escalated U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The escalation came as a result of the communists' efforts to win the War. On August 05, 1964, a group of Northern Vietnamese boats attacked the U.S. ships in the Gulf of Tonkin. Although the ships were not damaged, the United States was surprised by the Vietnamese courage. After passing the Tonkin Resolution in three days, which increased the president's power in taking actions when necessary, airstrikes were ordered by the United States against North Vietnam's oil storage depots and air bases.

Johnson also launched what was called 'The Operation Rolling Thunder' in March 1965, which was an air war against North Vietnam to paralyze the transportation of equipment and supplies coming from North Vietnam to the Vietcong in the South (Cuddy, 2003). Larson (2018) stated that the Southern Vietcong depended on the supplies, equipment, and armed forces coming from what was called the Ho Chi Minh trail. This trail was the linking point between the Northern communist force and the Southern one, as shown in (figure 2). This

operation was a response to the Vietcong's attack on the U.S. Air force in Pleiku in South Vietnam leaving eight American deaths and more than 100 injuries.




Figure 2. The Ho Chi Minh Trail. Adapted from “*The Vietnam War*”, by M. Hall, 2018, Routledge, p.27.

For President Johnson, if the United States loses control in Vietnam, World War III would emerge (cuddy, 2003). Protests in the United States started to appear against the involvement in Vietnam. The public was confused about the Thich Quang Duc incident in 1963. The latter was a 66-year-old South Vietnamese Buddhist monk who protested against the Catholic

Diem's government and discriminatory policies by setting himself on fire. His photos on fire were published by many magazines in the United States causing chaos inside the community (Critchfield, 1968). In 1964, protests started to take place in New York when 1,000 students burned their selective service registration cards opposing the war in Vietnam. However, the largest protest in the United States during the Vietnam War was organized by the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) at the University of Michigan. The first anti-war lecture was delivered there, a rally was organized by the SDS in Washington D.C, and over 30,000 people attended those anti-war lectures at the University of Berkeley in California. Famous figures like novelists like Norman Mailer, Socialist leader Norman Thomas, Alan Watts, civil activist Bob Moses, and the prominent figure of Free Speech Movement Mario Savio also attended these lectures. As a result of these protests, for Rosinsky (2008) the U.S. Congress passed an amendment to the Selective Service Act that was signed by President Johnson in August 1965 to become a law. The latter considered burning selective service cards as a crime that could lead to a five years' sentence of imprisonment and a fine up to \$10,000.

Neglecting its public opinion about the War, the United States continued to send troops in Vietnam. By 1965, they exceeded 200,000 troops. The number increased to 389,000 in the following year, more than 6,000 Americans were killed, and 30,000 were injured (Meeker, 2007). Nevertheless, the U.S. public continued protesting in 1967, and thousands of demonstrations took place in New York City in front of the United Nations building; 100,000 people attended. These demonstrations were led by Martin Luther King, Jr, in which he delivered a speech criticizing U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam.

General Westmoreland, who commanded the U.S. troops in Vietnam, delivered a public statement expressing his optimism about the War in Vietnam for obeying Johnson's orders. Controversially, he reported to Johnson his grave concerns about the situation in Vietnam and its casualties. Similar to General Westmoreland, the Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara

clarified his worry publicly about the vainness of bombing North Vietnam, and the strategy followed. Besides, he argued that this strategy would bring unlikeable consequences at home and abroad. After his declaration, McNamara was released of his duties by President Johnson. Neglecting all the opposing opinions, the U.S. military presence in Vietnam increased to 485,000 by 1967 (Haugen & Musser, 2011).

The Tet Offensive, one of the important events in the Vietnam War, was a series of coordinated attacks from January 30, 1968, until September 23 of the same year. These Attacks were between Ho Chi Minh and his Southern allies against the United States. Ho Chi Minh aimed at gaining power in Southern Vietnam and sending a message to the United States to reconsider its involvement there. The attacks targeted the U.S. bases damaging their ammunition stores and aircraft. They also attacked the U.S. embassy in Saigon where several U.S. diplomats were killed. the Presidential palace and the headquarters of the Southern Vietnamese army were attacked as well where 32 Americans died and 85 injured, including Commander Westmoreland (Barr, 1991). Additionally, on March 16, 1968, hundreds of Vietnamese civilians including women, children, and elder men in the village of My Lai. This was known as the massacre of My Lai; one of the most brutal massacres committed in the War (Oliver, 2006). Ho Chi Minh's aim of regaining power in the South failed because the United States managed to fight back all of these attacks; nevertheless, the Tet Offensive attacks sent a clear message to the United States.

As a result of the protests, and the rise in the number of American deaths in Vietnam, President Johnson was advised by his military advisors to find a way to end this War. He declared publicly in a television broadcast addressing the Americans and Vietnamese that he was ready to negotiate peace as a first step towards the de-escalation of the war in Vietnam. He also announced that he would not participate in the election of 1968. The latter was of the republican Richard Nixon's share.

For Hosch (2010), President Nixon's policy in Vietnam, with the help of his adviser for National Security Affairs and Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was based on "peace with honor" (p. 167). This marked the beginning of peace talks in Paris that took place in 1969. When the number of American deaths exceeded 33,629, he announced his plan of Vietnamization. The latter was a gradual withdrawal of the United States, starting with 25,000 troops, and training the South Vietnamese troops to stand against the communists. (Joseph, 2002). The U.S. public was not satisfied with Nixon's plan. As a result, new demonstrations started at the age of Nixon. For instance, more than 600,000 Americans attended a protest in Washington, D.C. in 1969. The protests came as a result when Life magazine published photos of 242 American dead soldiers who were killed in Vietnam in a single week in May 1969. These events coincide with the death of the communist Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh in the same year. According to Hunt (2015), under these circumstances, Nixon had no choice except to promise the United States to withdraw 50,000 troops from Vietnam by 1970.

In 1970, contrary to what was expected by the U.S. public, Nixon declared publicly that the United States and South Vietnam invaded Cambodia for the destruction of bases that provided help for the National Liberation Front (NLF), i.e., the Vietcong. The U.S. community was disillusioned, and protests increased in the United States. Demonstrations against the U.S. invasion of Cambodia were organized by students at the University of Kent, Ohio. When the national guards tried to disperse the protestors, chaos ensued. The national guards opened fire killing four students, two of which were not even among the protestors, and wounding nine; one student was paralyzed for life. A similar incident happened in Jackson state college in Mississippi where the police shoot two students; 14,000 protestors were arrested during the same days by the police in Washington D.C. This aggravated the situation in the United States (Hilmes, 2014).

Another scandal in Nixon's administration was the publication of the Pentagon Papers. The latter was a top-secret document collected by the U.S. Department of Defense that contained information about the U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. The document was leaked by the U.S. military analyst Daniel Ellsberg and published by The New York Times newspaper. By the end of 1971, both of the House and the Senate voted for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam (Willis, 2010). The peace talks in Paris 1969 were not easy; negotiations continued without progress. For 02 years Kissinger and the representative of North Vietnam Le Duc Tho could not agree on peace. Only in 1972, a peace agreement was reached by the two pillars. The agreement included an armistice in Southeast Asia and the withdrawal of the U.S. troops within 60 days. In addition to the exchange of prisoners who were caught in the War, and the U.S. support to Thieu's government in the South (Hillstrom & Sawinski, 2001).

Nixon promised to support Thieu's government if North Vietnam violated the agreement. However, between March 30 and October 22, 1972, the NLF organized an offensive, known as the Easter Offensive, or the 1972 Spring-Summer offensive, against the South Vietnamese army, and the remained U.S. troops. As a result, Nixon ordered to bombard North Vietnam forcing its loyalty to the agreement (Andradé, 2001). Finally, on January 27, 1973, a peace treaty, similar to the one in 1972, was officially signed by both sides. It officially ended the Vietnam War for the United States and ceased fire between North and South Vietnam. More than three million Americans served in the War, 60,000 of which were dead, over 15,000 were wounded, and no less than 1,000 were missing in action (McGowan, 2010).

Nevertheless, the fighting continued in Vietnam between the NLF and the South Vietnamese. Clifford (1970) argued that the inability of the South to win over the North, despite its huge number and advanced equipment, was because of its poor strategies. Thieu's government was not supported by the United States even though, President Nixon wanted to keep his

promise to Thieu, and requested the Congress for military aid in Vietnam in 1974. However, Congress rejected any U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam. Consequently, South Vietnam was easily captured by the communists in a short time. As Barr (1991) claimed, “South Vietnam territories began to collapse like a row of falling dominos” (p. 87). On April 30, 1975, the government of South Vietnam surrendered, Saigon was occupied, and the remained U.S. diplomats were evacuated from the embassy. Afterward, the North and the South were united under the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Hanoi became the capital, and Saigon was renamed Ho Chi Minh City. This put an end to the Vietnam War (Hosch, 2010). After that, Ho Chi Minh’s picture appeared on the Time magazine; heading the Victor. Thus, the United States walked out of Vietnam as the loser.

To conclude, The Vietnam War was the biggest U.S. failure in the containment of communism due to many military and strategic reasons. When the United States knew that the War was lost, it negotiated the Paris talks to withdraw from Vietnam without admitting defeat; thus, withdrawing with honor. Simply, the U.S. pride could not bear the loss of many U.S. presidents who preside during the War.

Conclusion

The applied U.S. strategies in the Vietnamese War, be it economic, or military proved their failure to contain communism during the phase of economic aids to France and the direct military intervention phase. All the U.S. presidents who presided during the Vietnam War from Truman to Nixon contributed to that. The U.S. failure was related to many factors, including the Vietcong’s ability to win the War. In other words, and from the U.S. perspective, how could a third world country defeat the world’s power? This arrogance cost the United States its objective of containment, and its pride. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and Cambodia, the two regions fell to communism. However, the U.S. foreign policy was the first to blame for

this loss. For that, the next chapter is dedicated to analyzing the pitfalls of the U.S. policy during the Vietnam War.

Chapter Three:

The Implementation of Containment in Vietnam and its Repercussions on Afghanistan War

Introduction

This chapter attempts to critically analyze the findings of the previous chapters to set this research's final result. It firstly opens with a critical analysis of causes that contributed to the U.S. failure in Vietnam, starting with military strategies from 1965 to 1968, during which the War was at its highest levels. It provides a clear examination of air and ground Wars followed by President Johnson's and Nixon's strategies of Vietnamization and Americanization. Secondly, on the political level, the decisions made in the administration of Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon are critically reviewed due to their major contributions to the War. Further, the ideology is another reason that contributed to U.S. failure and is critically analyzed in this chapter. Finally, the role played by the U.S. media had to be analyzed for its profound impact on the outcome of the Vietnam War. As a result of the failure of the previously mentioned elements, U.S. politics, economy, society, and prestige were negatively influenced. For this, the second section in this chapter deals with these consequences. The final title, an illustration of modern failure, juxtaposes the U.S. failure in Vietnam with the Afghanistan War, providing a brief analysis of the political and military strategies implemented in the latter.

1. Causes of Failure: Analytical View

1.1. Critical View to the U.S. Military Strategies during the War (1965-1968)

It is questionable how a world power, with a strong army and developed weapons that won World War II against the Nazis and destroyed the Japanese empire, could not win the Vietnamese guerilla fighters. In other words, the developed U.S. military strategies, style and policies were inappropriate in the Vietnamese context. Hence, discussing a military failure is a discussion of political failure.

Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret (1976) argue that the U.S. military strategies in Vietnam witnessed three weaknesses. Firstly, the passive defense strategy in 1965 limited the access of U.S. troops to some areas outside South Vietnam. This means that the North Vietnamese moved freely across the 17th parallel, receiving the necessary supplies from different portals, including Laos. Additionally, it allowed the Vietcong to organize offensives without burdens. Thus, the restrictions imposed upon the U.S. Army due to the passive defense strategy were for Vietcong's favor. Secondly, the aforementioned strategy required a huge number of combat troops and their logistic bases to protect South Vietnam. This resulted in heavy demands upon the U.S. personnel. The latter meant more expenditure to fund these troops. Therefore, the more escalation in Vietnam, the more losses for the United States. Finally, most of the supply lines for the U.S. bases in South Vietnam were linked to vulnerable railroads. Hence, most of the supplies sent to the Americans were either attacked and stolen by the Vietcong, or by the Southern Vietnamese themselves.

Indeed, the implication of the American passive strategy was catastrophic, yet the U.S. focused on limiting communism spread in Vietnam; specifically, the South. It did not fight communism itself because they simply feared the Soviet and the Chinese direct intervention in the region. Furthermore, this strategy was not the only one responsible for the U.S. military failure. During the escalation of the War from 1965 to 1968, which is considered as the peak of the War, the Americans fought the enemy by waging a war of attrition. The latter means to exhaust the enemy until he surrenders. This military method is shaped by two fundamental military strategies. The first is air War, and the second is ground War based on search and destroy strategy (Hess, 2009). However, the attrition warfare did not solely exhaust the Vietnamese, but also the Americans.

1.1.1. Air and Ground Wars

Air War is represented in the so-called ‘The Rolling Thunder Operation’, which is an air-bombardment against North Vietnam to weaken their supplies to Southern insurgents. The first operation began in 1965 by orders of President Johnson, who was advised by the Hawkish politicians to take military measures in Vietnam. By implying that policy, Congress expected the Vietnamese to surrender, or at least to negotiate. However, it showed no progress with the Vietcong. The Vietnamese representative Phan Van Dong opposed the negotiation option. As a result, in 1967, the United States increased bombing tonnage from 63,000 to 136,000, and then to 226,000 (Den Ouden, 2011). However, for Den Ouden, external factors such as heavy rains and fog during the monsoon season impacted the bombing operations in Vietnam and forced its reduction. The U.S. aircrafts also faced resistance from the Soviet air defense system. The United States lost 6 billion dollars between 1965 and 1968. Furthermore, he estimates that for each dollar lost by the Vietcong, the U.S. lost 9,60 dollars because the U.S. weapons and planes were so expensive. As a result, the impact on the U.S. economy was profound, and the strategy of air Wars proved ineffective. Reversely, the Vietnamese determination for winning gave them propaganda of withstanding, which for many critics demonstrated the ineffectiveness and immorality of the United States in Vietnam.

When air Wars proved ineffective, The Americans changed their strategy to ‘search and destroy’ in 1968. According to Davidson (1988), four mechanisms constituted this strategy: finding, fixing, fighting, and destroying the enemy. The first task was the hardest for the U.S. Army; it was hard to recognize the guerilla fighters because they could not be distinguished from the civilians. Secondly, the Vietnamese jungles and forests were good shelters for the Vietcong to hit and hide. They avoided confrontations and fought whenever they wanted at grounds they chose in their favor. Thus, harsh Vietnamese nature played a significant role in

the outcomes of the War. Since the target could not be found, the subsequent steps of the strategy to fix, fight, and to destroy were impossible. Therefore, the whole strategy failed.

As claimed by Summers (1999), the implication of the attrition war in Vietnam was wrong. He explained that the objective of attrition warfare was to exhaust and finish the enemy. However, the United States did not consider the rate of deaths. In comparison to Vietnam, the United States lost less than half of the Vietnamese human losses. He estimated that only in battles, the latter lost 3% of its population. However, which side lost more lives is not as important as the importance of the Vietnamese readiness to deal with these casualties. They, simply, wanted an independent united Vietnam no matter what the cost was.

The U.S. military policy could not adapt to the appropriate warfare style in Vietnam to demolish the enemy. Hence, military failure in Vietnam is a failure of understanding and adaptation. The U.S. Army is trained in conventional warfare that is so different from the guerilla used by the enemy. They continued to fight in the wrong way, attempting to make their strategies fit the Vietnamese context. In this sense Clausewitz argues:

No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it (1976, p. 579).

Americans claimed that the War was winnable with their modern weapons and firepower. However, the Vietnam War proved to them the insufficiency of military technology without a coherent and operational strategy for winning the War.

1.1.2. Americanization

Americanization was one of many strategies used in Vietnam. It started in late 1965 and was about sending U.S. advisors to train and prepare the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). For the United States, without their help, the Vietnamese army had no chance to stand against the NLF. However, like the other strategies, and due to many reasons, Americanization proved its failure in Vietnam.

The officers sent to Saigon were shocked by the amount of U.S. efforts to win the War. However, most of these efforts were unorganized. According to Herring (2002), the U.S. forces in Vietnam worked against each other instead of supporting one another due to the lack of coordination. Therefore, all the U.S. money, weaponry, and most importantly lives were wasted in Vietnam. However, it continued to send troops as long as there was no progress regardless of the losses. By 1967, a half-million U.S. soldiers were fighting in Vietnam. For this, the strategy was called Americanization.

The problem of refugees is yet another weakness of the Americanization strategy. Four million South Vietnamese were homeless as a result of the increase in U.S. troops, and the continuation of Vietcong's attacks. Consequently, Washington spent \$30 million annually to care for these refugees. Nevertheless, due to the lack of planning, most of the money was not spent on the refugee issue. Therefore, four million Vietnamese were left rootless, and their camps also became shelters for the Northern insurgents. For this, tensions between the United States and South Vietnam raised. Though the Southern Vietnamese despised the U.S. brutality in fighting, they appreciated their help. In the same sense, Herring (2002) argued that the U.S. domination was what the Southern Vietnamese resented. Thus, the U.S. help became more about demoralization. Similarly, Palmer (1974) claimed that "Americanization of the War further damaged the relationship between the United States and the South Vietnamese by giving

the impression that the U.S. lacked confidence in the South Vietnam government and forces”
(p.42)

The Americanization of the War proved to be ineffective in many ways. It only worsens the situation not only for Vietnam but also for the United States. The latter involved in an unending war and all of its strategies for peace failed. Yet, the U.S. refused to lose; consequently, it implemented another strategy called Vietnamization.

1.1.3. Vietnamization

The strategy of Vietnamization intended to cover the failure of the Americanization. This policy was introduced by President Nixon and his advisor Kissinger, it aimed at withdrawing, with honor, the maximum of U.S. troops in Vietnam within a year. However, the Vietcong's resistance changed the course of events to the United States.

Nixon's policy of Vietnamization in 1968 falls within the spectrum of a wider policy that is peace with honor, which simply means to withdraw with pride. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapter, to the United States the War meant to supply the Southern Vietnamese with weaponry, and to ensure their good training to fight the Vietcong without the help of U.S. troops on the ground. The latter were supposed to be withdrawn gradually. In other words, the War became the responsibility of the South Vietnamese. Furthermore, Saigon was growing stronger than before, and it could stand alone within two years. Nixon promised Thieu that he would not abandon him. With all this, the U.S expected Hanoi to reconsider negotiations with them, rather than with Saigon (Herring, 2002). However, Hanoi did not reconsider negotiations because South Vietnam could not fight without the U.S. help on the battlefields. South Vietnam considered the Vietnamization plan meaningless; as a result, the United States simply abandoned the promise. The Thieu regime was angry with the U.S. decision of withdrawal; he claimed that they had been fighting long before the U.S. arrival to Vietnam. In fact, with these

decisions, the United States lost its only ally in Southeast Asia. Thus, the first phase of Nixon's plan of peace with honor did not display real progress because Hanoi could not take another round of failed negotiations. The anger of Thieu's government was also an obstacle for the good end that the United States expected.

Afterward, Nixon entered a new phase of his plan; the expansion of the War. In this phase, Nixon extended the War to Cambodia and Laos by bombarding the communist sanctuaries that helped the NLF with supplies. Hosh (2010) argued that Nixon's orders to bombard Cambodia and Laos were secret because the U.S. public opinion opposed the whole policy. He also claimed that the operations did not bombard all the communist sanctuaries. Furthermore, in 1970, Nixon with the help of the ARVN invaded Cambodia for the destruction of the Communist bases. He thought that if he cut the communist supplies, Hanoi would surrender. Nevertheless, up to that point, Hanoi did not show any intentions of surrender because the delegates of North Vietnam and the boycotted the peace talks in Paris.

In the following year 1971, the United States invaded Laos for the same reasons as Cambodia, hoping to bring Hanoi to the table of negotiations. However, the invasion made no progress. During the administration of Johnson and Nixon, all the U.S. military strategies failed. Hanoi decided to negotiate peace only when it realized that it could no longer rely on her allies for diplomatic pressure, and eventually signed the peace agreement in 1973 due to the heavy losses in Vietnam. Thus, it was not the U.S. strategy that pushed Vietnam to sign the peace treaty.

Finally, by invading Cambodia and Laos, Nixon was not only buying time for his policy to succeed, but he was also determined not to lose the U.S. credibility and prestige in the War (Zhai, 2000). In this context, in 1969, he stated, "let us understand: North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that" (Nguyen, 2008, p. 148).

Consequently, during the last years of the Vietnam War, the U.S. objective shifted from the elimination of communism to preserve its global reputation as an undefeatable world power.

1.2. Political Strategies: Presidential Mistakes

During the Vietnam War, the United States was ruled by different presidents. Yet it failed, and by all means, it was a destructive war. Many thought that with the change of president, the situation would be different. However, each president had his contribution, which included critical errors. Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon were the presidents who changed the stream of the War. Many important decisions were taken during their administration, but not all of them positively supported the War.

Like all the previous presidents Kennedy was afraid of the expansion of communism, yet his decisions were different from that of Truman's or Eisenhower's. The following is an example of Kennedy's mistakes committed during the Vietnam War. When his administration began, the U.S. contribution remained indirect and was only limited to economic aids. However, Kennedy preferred to expand the War through direct military involvement. His administration created the idea of the limited partnership, which was introduced by the military adviser Maxwell D. Taylor with the cooperation of Diem in November 1961. It permitted the United States to make powerful decisions in Diem's government. Afterward, President Diem was not satisfied with the U.S. interference, which led to the conflict between the two presidents. During the Vietnam War, Kennedy's misleading was noticeable, yet what made his situation worse was the assassination of President Diem after he organized a coup in South Vietnam. This event made the public very upset with Kennedy as he was blamed for Diem's death (Nguyen, 2012).

After Kennedy's assassination, Johnson assured the office, and the War took another direction. Johnson escalated the War, which increased the U.S. presence in Vietnam. His first

mistake was to consider that Vietnam's situation is similar to the Korean one, neglecting the fact that the Vietcong forces were more organized, and had already proved that by defeating the Americans despite their small number. Johnson involved at least 50.000 American soldiers in the War although he was advised not to go through (Murrin et al., 2014). As a result, the Public was upset by Johnson's war-related decisions. They started protesting against sending their youth to Vietnam, asking him to take them back to their homes. However, Johnson refused to send the soldiers home to avoid being the first U.S. president to lose a war. He was influenced by his top officials who were assuring the public that the victory in South Vietnam was imminent (Honders, 2018) . However, with the reveal of the Pentagon Papers, these claims were misleading. The United States was in a dilemma due to its wrong involvement. Consequently, the War turned into a swamp. Johnson's negligence towards the public created more rage. His public image was lost, and Americans started to display their dissatisfaction with his rule, claiming that he was an egoistic ruler who did not care about their innocent soldiers who faced death in Vietnam. As a result, he later announced that he would not nominate for another reelection.

On the other hand, Nixon created deep rifts due to the increasing frustration with U.S. involvement in Vietnam within U.S. society. This led to the emergence of Nixon's Vietnamization strategy that aimed at reducing U.S. involvement by shifting the military responsibility to the South Vietnamese forces. This made the Public very content. However, to achieve better outcomes, Nixon spent more money to train the South Vietnamese and provide them with military equipment (Pape, 1998). This program was a terrible confusion that required huge amounts of money. Nixon also decided to strike Cambodia to cut all supplying roads used by the Vietcong. He ordered the bombardment of the Vietcong's secret trails and supplies hideouts. Nevertheless, the bombs did not damage the underground supply bases. Subsequently, Nixon lost both his citizens' and the congress' support due to his involvement in

Cambodia. The escalation in Cambodia provoked demonstrations in many states in the United States, which forced the National Guard to open fire killing three and wounding 11 demonstrators. (Generous, 1985). Furthermore, the long-term results of Cambodia's invasion included the overthrow of its military government. Nixon was largely criticized by media for many scandals, including the Pentagon Papers. He was another president who was chosen by the Americans to end the War, but like the previous presidents, he manipulated the public.

All U.S. Presidents who governed during the Vietnam War shared a common ambition of communism containment. However, some of them did not prioritize that objective. The War was more personal in the reign of Johnson and Nixon. It aimed at destroying the Vietcong's resistance; during their rule, the increase of U.S. troops in Vietnam witnessed its peak as explained in (figure3).




Figure 3. The Increase of US Military Troops in Vietnam from 1960 to 1967.

The study points out that the mistakes committed by these Presidents did not only influence their position and public image but also affected the U.S. political and economic systems.

1.3. Criticism of the US Ideology

After the end of WWII, the containment of communism that opposed the capitalistic system became a necessity for the United States. The latter became responsible for freeing any nation under communists' attacks to defend the world's democracy. However, in reality, the U.S. subjugation to many nations such as Korea, China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Vietnam was for its political and economic interests.

Ideology is a set of political and economic principles that people act and react to ensure their political and economic rights. It is controlled by the ruling class's interests in a given government. Thus, ideology is powerful enough to make the majority of society follows the minority. The U.S. policy during the Cold War era is highly ideological, claiming to defend people's rights in the name of humanity and democracy. Hence, in the beginning, the U.S. citizens supported their policy. Nevertheless, the American involvement in Vietnam was not for Democratization, but rather for winning the battle against communism. Hence, ideology justifies the American barbaric actions in many countries, including Vietnam; there are personal interests behind every American intervention.

Although Den Ouden (2011) argued that the U.S. ideology of communism containment and the achievement of world peace was present during the first phase of the War that lasted from Truman's to Eisenhower's administration (1945-1961). However, in the second phase, from Kennedy's to Nixon's administration (1961-1973) the U.S. struggle was no longer ideological. Therefore, it cannot be held responsible for its failure. Opposingly, the current study argues that it was the ideology of containment that got the United States from the very beginning involved in the costly War. The United States had to be the capitalistic counterpart of the Northern communist regime. Even when it was losing the War, it continued to pour money and troops into Vietnam seeking victory with weak and uncoordinated strategies. In other words,

would the United States escalate, expand, and Vietnamize the War if the enemy was a non-communist state? Additionally, with the continuation of the War, the U.S. ideology failed to persuade South Vietnamese with the false American utopia, which drowned the United States more into the struggle. Hence, the United States abandoned the ideological operations in Vietnam and lost its public support for the War. Besides, in the second phase of the War, the United States took some ideological decisions when it prevented the Vietcong from crossing the demilitarized zones.

Pike (1972) states the reason why the United States “is in Vietnam, has been in Vietnam, and, for that matter, now largely is disengaging from Vietnam [...] is that it seeks to serve its national interests” (p. 53). Pike’s claim is obvious, every nation puts its national interests and security above all else. Nonetheless, the problem lies in the methods adopted to attain the interests of the nation. Additionally, if the U.S.’s national interests in Vietnam were explained as a set of political and economic goals, the U.S. policy would not be criticized for its paradoxical claims. Diversely, in reality, the U.S. national interests were explained based on moral beliefs, such as democracy and human rights. This caused heavy criticism of the U.S. policy in Vietnam, and it could no longer hold fighting.

Aside from the ideological promises and the political interests that concentrated upon the containment of communism, the United States had economic interests in the Southeast region long before the Cold War. President Roosevelt’s speech in 1923 discussed the economic national interests in the region, stating the need to be involved in the development of commerce of the Pacific. He also argued that the United States and Japan had enough spare rooms for commercial processes in South-East Asia (Russell, 1967). Hence, because the U.S. interests were motivated by profit, it searched for commercial markets in the Pacific. These markets were found due to Vietnam’s vulnerability. During the Cold War, a large part of the U.S. economy relayed on the military industry; especially armaments productions. Therefore, it would

not be in the United States' favor if peace prevailed in the World. Additionally, for Alva (1972), although the United States had its reserves of oil, it was less costly to import it from Indochina because of cheap labor there. As a result, from 1950-1966, the U.S. foreign investment capital increased from \$ 11.8 billion to \$ 54.6 billion.

In short, it is concluded that the U.S. ideology serves its foreign policy. Ideological terms such as 'democracy' and 'humanism' are conspiracies used to legitimize or cover the U.S. intervention overseas. The questions that the United States could not answer are: whose rights? And at what costs? However, Vietnam demonstrates the failure of both the U.S. policy and ideology.

1.4. The Role of Media and Press on the US Public Opinion

The Vietnam War was a vicious war that the United States waged; it led to the division of the U.S. society. In the beginning, there were supporters and opponents to the policy in Vietnam. But, over time, the Public was against the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and large-scale anti-war protests were held across the United States. These events were closely covered by the media, and this later contributed to the outcomes of the War. For that, the Vietnam War was called 'the media's war'.

The Vietnam War and media were connected. The historian Barkin (2003) stated that the Vietnam War and television were inseparable which indicates that the War was delivered to the people through the media. Furthermore, it was the first war that was transmitted by a daily color television broadcast, and until nowadays, many articles are still being written about it. In the early years of the War, the U.S. media presented a positive and optimistic view of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam because its only source of information was the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense who veiled the truth. They only declared the numbers of dead Vietnamese soldiers, with no reference to the U.S. deaths, to indicate the success of their armed

forces in Vietnam. In other words, the U.S. media's first coverage of the Vietnam War was prejudiced.

Although Kennedy argued that he would neither censor the media nor interfere with the press, yet he failed (Belmas & Overbeck, 2014). Smith (1999) argued that Kennedy tried to ban the New York Times Newspaper from publishing news about the situation in Vietnam, due to an article that exposed possible loss of the U.S. forces against the Vietcong. This shows the repression faced by the U.S. press; No news was allowed to be published without authorization from the government. Consequently, many claims were made by politicians about the non-cooperation of media. It revealed the negative side of the Vietnam War by broadcasting live images of the horrifying battle fields, the dead bodies, the bloody jungles, and the sufferings of the miserable U.S. soldiers.

The media started to create suspicious and feud relationship between the U.S. public and the government; it demonstrated how confused the U.S. soldiers were about what they were doing, and how many innocent Vietnamese civilians were killed for no reason. Through the media, the public was able to see the violent side of the War. As a result, they lost faith in their government and started to understand that the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War was needless. This irritated the government officials because they were not satisfied with the media portrayals to the situation in Vietnam. As a consequence, many U.S. Presidents tried to threaten journalists and TV hosts to prevent them from interfering in their business and influencing public opinion. For instance, President Johnson cursed the CBS president Morley Safer and launched an investigation because he posted pictures of U.S. Marines burning huts in a village in Vietnam. Johnson himself claimed that if the media witnessed the other wars in which the United States took part, the public would not be fine (Hallain, 2010). In 1965, many protests against Johnson's escalation of the War were covered by the media. Consequently, his position was weakened, and; eventually, he announced that he would not seek another term.

In Nixon's administration, many daily articles and television broadcasts addressed the U.S. negative situation in Vietnam. For this, Nixon had to immediately react to the question. As Greenberg (2004) argued, Nixon directly asked the Supreme Court to stop the publication of articles about Pentagon Papers in the New York Times and Washington Post. It was obvious that the Pentagon Papers were written by General McNamara who exposed U.S. failure in Vietnam. The government kept challenging the two newspapers in court, although almost twenty other newspapers published information taken from the Pentagon Papers. According to Spear (1986), Nixon ordered wiretaps on several journalists; one of them was CBS reporter Marvin Kalb who revealed the secret bombing of the U.S. in Cambodia. He also wanted information about who leaked this top governmental secret. After many attempts made by Nixon to win over the fourth estate, the latter's impact on the public was profound. Nixon had no choice except to order the withdrawal of the first U.S. troop from Vietnam in 1969.

One of the main causes of the U.S. failure in Vietnam was the media because it handed public the full image of the U.S. brutality and aggression in Vietnam. It also exposed political scandals of U.S. Presidents on television platforms. The public opinion was formed by the media more than politicians or the presidents' words. The Americans were tired of lies, especially after the publication of the Pentagon Paper in Nixon's administration, which revealed the truth about losing the War to the Vietcong. Hence, they became aware that their country was only risking their sons' lives in Vietnam.

The role of media in the U.S. policy was and still is significant. However, the media cannot always be a valid source of information. It can portray a whole distant image from the truth. For instance, even though the Afghan people seek to defend their country, the media portrays them as terrorists and relates Islam to terrorism.

2. The Impact of the War on the United States

The Vietnam War was long and costly; more than three million people died during this War. The goal of the United States in Vietnam was to contain communism, yet it was its biggest failure. After the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, many indirections appeared in the U.S. society and policies. The political, social, economic, and prestigious impact will be addressed in the following.

2.1. Political Impact

During the Vietnam War, the United States was governed by five presidents who contributed differently to it. The last three presidents, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon took the War in a different direction, and their actions greatly affected U.S. politics. Melanson (2015) argued that after the War, the United States searched for a new policy. As a result, the U.S. foreign policy changed; deterrence was no longer important, and containing communism was forgotten due to the intense effect of the War on the United States.

The main political impact of the War was the loss of the U.S. government's credibility. The President who came after the War had difficulties to retain the trust of both the U.S. public and Congress. However, because of the mistakes committed by the aforementioned U.S. Presidents, Congress restricted the president's powers. Hence, the President is no longer able to order U.S. involvement in wars without congressional approval. Additionally, Gibbons (2018) claimed that the War affected the political parties of the United States because the Democratic Party split after the War. In 1964, many identified themselves as Democrats in opinion polls. Afterward, the majority of the working class including some Democrats, considered themselves political independents or Republicans because they blamed the Democratic Party for starting the War even though it was supported by the Republicans in Nixon's age. Until today, the U.S. political parties are divided over the conflict in Vietnam.

2.2. Social Impact

The U.S. society was heavily affected by the Vietnam War. Serfaty (1972) argued that Americans were very critical to war events, and they displayed more activism against War policies. They disagreed with their government's decision to be part of that War due to the vivid image they saw on T.V. For that, they protested against their involvement in Vietnam. The War provoked the skeptic view of the U.S. citizens towards their government; simply because they were misled by the press, especially with the publication of the Pentagon Papers that revealed the truth to the public. Consequently, Americans' vision of politics changed a stereotype about the politicians was established that everyone involved in politics was not honest. Moreover, many soldiers suffered after the War, Helmer (1974) claimed that most of the soldiers who served in Vietnam were all treated from drug addiction due to the hard times they spent in the battlefields. Their friends were dead and chattered in front of their eyes; they were traumatized by the horror they witnessed. Thus, because of these psychological problems, most soldiers became drug addicts. Additionally, Americans started to question their country's value and position in the international community. The country that claims to be democratic and peace-seeking, is the same country that committed the brutal massacre of My Lai massacre in 1968. Eventually, they lost their pride and were ashamed of being Americans.

2.3. Economic Impact

In the first years of the War, the U.S. economy was stable because there was no military involvement yet. Even though the United States financially helped the French army, yet the aid did not affect its economy. However, when the military involvement began in Kennedy's administration in 1961 and proceeded until 1973, the U.S. economy was affected.

Campagna (1991) argued that the U.S. economy was not affected during the Vietnam War, by Kennedy's, Johnson's, and Nixon's economic policies. Although they sent U.S. troops

there, yet their economic policies were balanced. Many people were hired in the U.S. Army. This led to a decrease in the unemployment rate. As a result, the costly monetary policy later led to inflation. He also argued that the tax hikes led economists to worry about the outcomes; they thought that it would hinder the U.S. economic growth. As a result, a tax cut should be imposed to save the economy. Controversially, Riddell (1970) stated that inflation was the most important effect caused by the Vietnam War on the U.S. economy as shown in (table 2).

Table 2. Inflation in the US During the Vietnam War Period, 1960-1971

Year	Change In Consumer Price Index, December to December, Unadjusted	Change In CPI, Year-to-Year, Adjusted	Change In Producer Price Index, December to December, Unadjusted	Change In PPI, Year-to-Year, Adjusted	Annual Change in GNP Implicit Price Deflator
1960	1.5	1.6	1.8	0.8	1.6
1961	0.7	1.0	-0.5	0.0	0.9
1962	1.2	1.1	0.1	0.3	1.8
1963	1.6	1.2	-0.2	-0.3	1.5
1964	1.2	1.3	0.5	0.4	1.5
1965	1.9	1.7	3.3	1.7	2.2
1966	3.4	2.9	2.2	3.2	3.2
1967	3.0	2.9	1.6	1.2	3.0
1968	4.7	4.2	3.1	2.8	4.4
1969	6.1	5.4	4.8	3.7	5.1
1970	5.5	5.9	2.2	3.5	5.4
1971	3.4	4.3	3.2	3.1	5.0

Note: Adapted from “Inflationary Impact of the Vietnam War”, by T. Riddell, 1989, *Vietnam Generation*, 1, p.03.

This inflation was due to the U.S. increase of soldiers and advisors in Vietnam. Budget deficits were caused by domestic social spending and military expenditures, which eventually contributed to inflation. Instead of exploiting factories to produce consumer-oriented products, military equipment were manufactured. The amount of money the United States spent on its Army weakened the Dollar because funds were going overseas, without return. The effort invested in this War impacted the production capacities, which resulted in imbalances in the

industrial side. The United States witnessed an economic crisis in 1970 that led consumers to lose confidence in their government.

Finally, during the Vietnam War, from 1961 to 1968, the U.S. foreign policy was responsible for the 1970s economic crisis. The War was vicious and long; it forced the U.S. citizens to suffer physical, emotional, and economical damages as well.

2.4. Prestige of the United States

During the Cold War, with the emergence of a geopolitical race between the Soviet Union and the United States, each country sought to maintain its reputation as an undefeatable dominator and world power. In the Vietnam War, just like any other U.S. involvement, the United States was expected to win at any cost. However, it failed and focused on the preservation of its credibility instead.

The United States declared itself the protector of nations against communist aggression, and responsible for maintaining the international order. Therefore, the Vietnam War had to be won in any case. In the beginning, losing the War was never quite possible. However, with the resistance of the Vietcong and the failure of the U.S. military and political policy in Vietnam, losing became a clear possibility. The latter can be justified with the U.S. policy of 'peace with honor' in Nixon's Administration. At that stage, the United States had already lost the War, and what was important then was not to lose what was left of its reputation and prestige. That was important to maintain its leading position in the international community. For this, the loss of Vietnam to communism is a loss of U.S. prestige in the world.

For Herring (2002), the U.S. loss of its prestige in the War against communism would bring about a profound consequence everywhere. In 1973, the U.S. forces started to withdraw from South Vietnam, putting an end to the containment policy in Asia. Consequently, some conservative politicians and intellectuals in the United States started to question the U.S.

credibility in the international field, assuming that enemies around the world would be encouraged to challenge the United States since it could not contain communism in Vietnam. Accordingly, the Mayaguez incident in Ford's administration seemed to be such a challenge (Lamb, 2018). The incident took place in the Gulf of Thailand, it started when Cambodian gunboats blocked and bordered the U.S. cargo ship SS Mayaguez after a month from the U.S. withdrawal on May 12, 1975. Even though the U.S. Air Forces were able to restore the kidnapped ship by the Cambodians on May 15, 1975, the Mayaguez incident was an offense to the U.S. defense and credibility.

On the U.S. level, the prestige issue created chaos inside the Congress between the dovish and the hawkish during Nixon's administration. The former were Democrats who opposed the war in Vietnam and demanded an immediate retreat. They argued that the Vietnam War was only draining the U.S. resources and prestige. While the latter were Republicans who supported the intervention in Vietnam and opposed withdrawing even when the United States was losing the War. They stressed the preservation of the U.S. national and international image over the economic, military, and live losses (Den Ouden, 2011). This debate did not reach any consensus until Nixon decided to withdraw with honor. This indicates the extent of the War effect on the U.S. policy.

To conclude, the U.S. international prestige is lost in Vietnam, and all the attempts failed to save it. This fact affected the U.S. defense with the Mayaguez incident, the domestic policy with the division inside the congress, and citizens who develop a skeptic view towards their government's abilities.

3. An Illustration of Modern Failure

After the failure of the United States in Vietnam, the U.S. foreign policy witnessed a change in direction. Yet, the latter did not stop the United States to intervene in other country's

affairs. In the post-Cold War era, it intervened in many countries like Kuwait, Iraq, and most notably Afghanistan. The involvement in Afghanistan was similar in many aspects to the one in Vietnam, which disputes the efficiency of its modern foreign policy.

3.1. Military strategies

The U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan began after the incident of September 11, 2001, under the administration of President Bush the junior. The U.S. policy claimed that Oussama Ben Laden, the ruler of Al Qaeda, was responsible for the attack of 2001 on the South Tower of the World Trade Center in New York. The United States demanded the Taliban to deliver Oussama Ben Laden to justice, but it refused. Consequently, President Bush considered Al Qaeda as a terrorist organization and an enemy of the West. He ordered an immediate military intervention with the cooperation of the Afghan government to eliminate this organization and to remove the Taliban from power as it provided a suitable atmosphere for Al Qaeda's terrorists attacks. Accordingly, the first U.S. troop arrived on October 07 of the same year (Mazhar & Goraya, 2013). However, according to the U.S. Department of Defense (2019), the Taliban had more control over territories than in 2001. It is, thus, proven that the failure of the U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan was similar to that of Vietnam in the used military, political, and logistic strategies.

The counterinsurgency warfare applied in Afghanistan simply based upon turning the masses against the insurgents. In other words, the United States and the Afghan government aimed at winning the hearts and the minds of the public to isolate the insurgents (Kilcullen, 2006). To earn the population's support, the United States created Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 2002. Each team constituted of 150 personnel of different military ranks aimed at ensuring security to the public, working with the Afghan government against the Taliban, and facilitating U.S. social reconstruction there (Lopez, 2007). Nevertheless, the counterinsurgency

plan proved its failure due to many reasons. Firstly, 150 personnel were not enough to cover large areas, enabling the Taliban to contact the public. Secondly, not all the lands were accessible by these teams, especially those controlled by warlords. Finally, the relationship between the Afghan population and the Taliban members was ambivalent. However, with the growth of the Taliban force, this strategy was neither isolating the Taliban nor winning the Afghan public. Therefore, as in Vietnam, the U.S. military strategy of counterinsurgency in Afghanistan has not shown any achievements.

Similar to the policy in Vietnam, the United States has spent \$39 billion to provide the social needs of the Afghan population. However, the Afghan leaders were corrupted and the money was not spent on the targeted issues. As a result, the rate of poverty and hunger increased in Afghanistan, obliging the population to join the Taliban army. In addition to that, the Afghan despised the Ghani government for being a puppet government for the United States. Hence, the United States failed to gain the hearts of the Afghans that contributed to the failure of its whole policy there.

3.2. Political Objectives

The main goal of the Vietnam War was to prevent the Viet Cong from overthrowing the Government of South Vietnam. However, by 1968 President Johnson's policy shifted the U.S. foreign policy from that goal; the War was escalated to the neighboring areas like Cambodia and Laos. Similarly, the U.S. objective in Afghanistan was to prevent future attacks by al Qaeda and the Taliban that threatened the Western world. However, the lack of U.S. logistic objectives in Afghanistan was one of the reasons for its failure. The involvement after the incident of 11 September was emotional rather than strategic. The United States had no clear objectives except to avenge al Qaeda and the Taliban. This irrational action cost the United States a 19 year-war in which a lot of lives and money were lost. And just like in Vietnam, the

U.S. policy widened the zone of the War, especially during President Obama's administration when the border areas of Pakistan were targeted. Those border areas are still targeted by Trump's administration (Karim, 2018). Recently, in January 2020, the U.S. Department of Defense declared that ceasefire negotiations were held in Doha between the Afghan-American diplomat Zalmay Khalilzad and the Taliban. In February 2020, the United States signed a conditional peace agreement with the Taliban to gradually withdraw its troops from there if they committed to the agreement.

3.3. Ideological aspect

The War in Vietnam was a part of a deeper ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union where communism and capitalism were confronting each other. The power that controlled more territories meant that its ideology was more dominant in the world. The conflict in Afghanistan is also ideological; nevertheless, the U.S. ideology in Afghanistan was different from that of Vietnam. According to Huntington (2011), the ideological aspect of the Afghanistan War is a part of a different paradigm that he called 'the Clash of Civilizations' or 'the Clash of Value systems'. The latter is based on religion and culture rather than political philosophy (Karim, 2018). Just like it associated tyranny with communism, the U.S. ideology associated terrorism with the Islamic culture and religion that contributed to the idea of Islamophobia.

3.4. Prolonged War and Public opinion

Even though the war in Afghanistan is longer than the Vietnamese one, the two Wars are classified among the longest U.S. interventions. The latter fact means that the longer the war lasts, the more losses in terms of money and human lives. Consequently, sustaining the U.S. public opinion during the two Wars was a difficult task for the U.S. government. Similar to Vietnam, the Americans protested against the war in Afghanistan every year. Nonetheless,

Bush, Obama, and Trump like Johnson and Nixon do not consider the demands of their citizens concerning this matter. All of them failed to make their populations support the governmental decisions about the two Wars (Karim, 2018).

This study argues that in both interventions, the United States asserts its absolute force over others. The latter is what Cain and Harrison (2001) define as imperialism, in other words, the United States grounds its foreign policy on imperialism. Thus, the containment policy in Vietnam and the counterinsurgency policy in Afghanistan fall within the spectrum of U.S. imperialistic strategies. In all its interventions, the United States has one objective that is to spread its influence around the world, whether economically, culturally, or military. Furthermore, ideology is one of the tools used by the U.S. policymakers to hide and justify their imperialistic intentions, which is in return supported by the media. The U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is well justified to the world because simply both of the U.S. ideology and media link Afghanistan to terrorism. Consequently, this allows the United States to continue its exploitations of other countries' oil and natural resources and still appears to be the hero.

In conclusion, this study found out that despite the different military and political strategies used in Afghanistan than that of Vietnam, the general objectives and outcomes of the two Wars are identical. Therefore, the Afghanistan War is the modern Vietnam War with similar ideologies, but different terms. The only difference in ideology is that, earlier in Vietnam, the United States was protecting people from the tyrannical communist system; however, now in Afghanistan, its ideology is concentrating on terrorism that is linked to Islam.

Conclusion

The analysis of the U.S. military and political strategies in Vietnam showed a lack of coordination and logistic studies. All the decisions made by U.S. presidents since the military intervention in Vietnam were not achieving the targeted objectives, but drowning the United

States in an unwinnable war. Therefore, this research found out that in addition to the political and military strategies, the effect of the U.S. ideology, media, and public support were the causes of U.S. failure in Vietnam. This loss influenced the economic and social levels and impacted the U.S. domestic politics due to the changes that happened in the aftermath. Further, what the United States resented the most was the loss of its international prestige. Despite this failure, the U.S. imperialistic interventions still exist in our modern-day, like the case of Afghanistan. The study resulted that the U.S. foreign policy in Afghanistan failed due to the same reasons in Vietnam. Therefore, the two interventions are similar not only in terms of the number of years and the American public support, but also in the military, political, and ideological aspects.

General Conclusion

General Conclusion

The current part is an attempt to recapitulate the main findings of this research to answer the questions. In so doing, and to better understand the mechanisms of the U.S. foreign policy that was implemented in Vietnam during the Cold War, some terms were necessary to define, including the Cold War, communism, capitalism, containment policy, and its underlying premises. The study also deduced the factors that helped in the foundation of this policy, including the Soviet Union expansion, the Iron Curtain, and the Berlin Blockade. Moreover, it dealt briefly with implementing the U.S. containment policy in Europe, through examining the Marshall Plan, and Asia in the case of Korea, and found out that the containment policy failed in Korea because it was designed to fulfill the European requirements.

Regarding the Vietnam War, the study examined the events of the First and the Second Indochina Wars and revealed the failure of the U.S. containment policy economically and militarily in the two Wars. This confirmed the suggested hypothesis about the ineffectiveness of the U.S. containment to Vietnam. Later, after analysis, the study revealed that the military and political strategies used by the United States were perceived to be the main causes of failure. It also investigated the effect of U.S. media and ideology during the War, and discussed several presidential mistakes made by U.S. Presidents who presided during the Vietnam War. In addition to that, the current analysis concluded that the U.S. failure in Vietnam effected its prestige, and several social, political, and economic aspects.

After the juxtaposition between the Vietnam and Afghanistan War, the research in hand found out that, similar to Vietnam, the Afghanistan War failed in its primary objective because of the ineffectiveness of the U.S. military and political strategies. This confirms the suggested hypothesis about possible similarities between the two interventions and justifies the choice of

the Afghanistan War as an illustration. Hence, since the same outcomes are achieved in both wars, the U.S. foreign policy failed in the past and the present.

This dissertation questioned the U.S. ideology in both interventions. It ascertained that during the Cold War, the U.S. ideology sought to fight communism to achieve world peace, like the case of Vietnam. However, in the contemporary world, the ideology changed to take Islam as an enemy of the West, as is the case with Afghanistan. Additionally, the result of the research demonstrates the use of ideology as means to justify the U.S. interventions in the world, and therefore its imperialistic intentions, emphasizing briefly the fact that the containment policy falls within the umbrella of imperialism.

The lack of studies linking the past U.S. foreign policy with the current one, the rarity of objective and neutral sources that deal with the aforementioned issue, and the change of events regarding the Afghanistan case are the obstacles confronted in this research. The contribution of this study is the proposed similarities between the U.S. policy in Vietnam and its contemporary one in Afghanistan.

Finally, the current study recommends future studies to conduct a comparative study between Vietnam and the Afghanistan War. It also recommends to question the veracity of the change that happened to the U.S. foreign policy after the Vietnam War and to trace the development of the U.S. foreign policy from the Vietnam War to the current era.

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الملخص

تبنت الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية والاتحاد السوفييتي سياسات مختلفة خلال الحرب الباردة من أجل النجاح في السيطرة على العالم، لكن لم تكن هذه السياسات فعالة في تحقيق أهدافها. ولهذا، تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى تعريف سياسة الاحتواء من منظور الولايات المتحدة، وكذا بحث مدى نجاعة السياسة الخارجية للولايات المتحدة في فيتنام، بالإضافة إلى محاكاة أثر السياسة الخارجية الأمريكية المنتهجة قديماً مع السياسة الخارجية المطبقة حالياً في أفغانستان من خلال تحديد أوجه التشابه بينهما. وتعدّ هذه المذكرة بحثاً نوعياً يقوم على المنهجين الوصفي التحليلي بالإضافة إلى المنهج التاريخي للإجابة على أسئلة البحث. كما تكشف الدراسة فشل السياسة الأمريكية في احتوائها للشيوعية في فيتنام خلال الحرب الباردة مما يؤكد الفرضية المقترحة و يرجع هذا الفشل لعدة أسباب، بما في ذلك عدم فعالية السياسات العسكرية والسياسية للولايات المتحدة. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، وجدت هذه الدراسة أن التقارب في السياسة الأمريكية الخارجية المنتهجة في كل من فيتنام وأفغانستان يكمن في كل من الإستراتيجيات الحربية، السياسية و الأيدولوجية المنتهجة في كل منهما. وعليه أكدت مقارنة كل من سياسات حرب الفيتنام و أفغانستان الفرضية المقترحة.