

**People's Democratic Republic of Algeria**  
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**Hamma Lakhdar University of El-Oued**  
**Faculty of Arts and Languages**  
**Department of Arts and English Language**



**Exploring the Role of the U.S. in the UN  
Security Council**

**Submitted by:**

DIB Fatima Zahra  
KHAMIDA Hania

**Supervised by:**

Dr. Ouahid ZID ATIK

**Board of Examiners:**

**Title.** Dr. DAHDA Nacir **Full name** \_\_\_\_\_ **President**

University of El-Oued

**Title.** Dr. Ouahid ZID ATIK **Full name** \_\_\_\_\_ **Supervisor**

University of El-Oued

**Title** Dr. MANNAI Chaima **Full name** \_\_\_\_\_ **Examiner**

University of El-Oued

## **Dedication**

First and foremost, I dedicate this work to my father's soul. The man who taught me to always keep my head up, as well as to my beloved mother, who believed in me in my hardest times.

To my dear brothers: Saber, Mabrouk, Nouredine, and Abdelkader.

To my friends who shared their words of love, advice and encouragement to finish this work.

***Fatima Zohra DIB***

This study is dedicated to my beloved parents who have inspired me since my childhood.

To my dear husband for his endless support and encouragement.

To my true friend Hiba who always encouraged and believed in me.

To my brothers and sisters and everyone who knows and loves me

***Hania KHAMIDA***

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## **Abstract**

This study examines the role of the U.S. in the UNSC, analyzing how its strategic use of veto power, unilateral military interventions, and sanctions regimes has shaped global security governance from the Cold War to today's multipolar era. Through a qualitative methodology and a descriptive-analytical approach, the study systematically analyzes of UNSC resolutions, and the U.S. decisions towards UNSC. This approach involves an examination of primary data such as official UN documents to provide a comprehensive overview of the U.S. impact on international security governance. The results confirm a more nuanced picture of U.S. hegemony and institutional power concerning security in the world. The U.S. has a unique and predominant role in the UN Security Council due to being a founding partner, a permanent veto-wielding member, and a financial and logistical powerhouse for the UN.

**Keywords:** U.S., hegemony, UNSC, veto power. Sanctions

### List of Acronyms

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Full Form</b>
<b>BRICS</b>	Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
<b>DPPA</b>	The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs
<b>E10</b>	Non-Permanent Members
<b>ICJ</b>	International Court of Justice.
<b>IHL</b>	International Humanitarian Law
<b>ISAF</b>	The International Security Assistance Force
<b>NPT</b>	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
<b>P5</b>	Permanent members
<b>R2P</b>	Responsibility to Protect
<b>SIPRI</b>	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
<b>U.S.</b>	United States
<b>UNRRA</b>	United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
<b>UNSC</b>	United Nations Security Council
<b>UNICEF</b>	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
<b>USA</b>	United States of America
<b>USSR</b>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
<b>WWII</b>	The Second World War

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## **General Introduction**

### **1. Background of the Study**

The U.S. has historically been a major force in the global development and peace keeping, both before and after Cold war. Due to its status as founding members of the UN Security Council organization which is the main organ of the UN tasked with the responsibility to maintain the world peace. The existence of U.S. in these organizations was to achieve the first objectives of UNSC by using the veto power; which influence the international solving conflicts according to its perspectives and approaches. Thus, it is a mechanism to strengthen its international value.

According to Hanhimäki (2015), The name of “United Nations” was coined by the American President Franklin Roosevelt during World War II. The term was first used in the “Declaration by United Nations” on January 1st, 1942, when 26 nations representatives committed that their governments to joint effort against the Axis power. The leaders of the countries, who had worked together to end the war, felt a strong need for an institution that would help bringing peace and stop future wars. The nations understood that a unified global body as essential to achieve this goals and correct the weakness of league of nations, established after world war I.

In 1945, delegates of 50 nations met in San Francisco in US to create a document acceptable to all countries – the UN Charter –as a guide of the new organization. The delegates at the San Francisco conference represented over 80 percent of the world’s population. They were determined to establish an organization that would preserve peace and help build a better world. Despite some conflicts of opinion, the delegates decided to set together and to overcome

their differences in order to build the new global organization. On June 25th, 1945, the UN Charter was unanimously adopted (Plesch, 2011).

After months, the UN came into being with Fifty-one founding members States on October 24th ,1945. Until now, the UN works under the Charter guidelines and parameters. According to the UN's goals include: Saving people from the devastation of war, reserving human rights; establishing conditions under justice and respect of international law and promoting social progress and better standards of living (United Nations, 1945.).

The UN Charter ratified by five permanent members of the Security Council: The United States, the Russian Federation, China, the United Kingdom (UK), France and by a majority of the signatory Member States. The Charter established six principal organs: The General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Secretariat, and the International Court of Justice. The Statute of the Court is annexed to the Charter. The principal partnered powers of the Second World War to assigned permanent seats on the Security Council. While the General Assembly can discuss any world concern, the Security Council has primary responsibility for peace and security which has fifteen members. Five are permanent, the other ten non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms based on the geographical representation (United Nations, 1945) .

## **2. Statement of The Problem**

The relationship between the U.S. and the United Nations Security Council goes back many years. This institution remains an important source of legitimacy for international action.

Advancing U.S. national interests in an era of global threats depends on effective multilateral action. The core problem is the U.S.'s interests and functions in the UNSC, and how its actions

have influenced the council's decisions and global diplomacy. Despite the significant role of the U. S. in influencing the UNSC decisions, there are gaps in the existing literature on the significant of this role and how it affects the council's functioning. This study investigates the U.S.'s interests in the UNSC and how it has evolved and influenced the decision-making process.

### **3. Research Questions**

This study intends to answer the following questions:

1. What are the interests of the U.S. in the UNSC?
2. How has the U.S. influence evolved over time?
3. How does the US act to threat global peace and security?

### **4.Aims of the Study**

The present study aims to:

1. analyse the historical and contemporary role of the U.S. in the UNSC.
2. assess the impact of the U.S. policies on UNSC decision-making.
3. determine the U.S. actions in shaping global peace and security.

### **5.Significance of the Study**

The current study is significant as it shows how U.S. dominance in the UN Security Council may influence global fairness and effectiveness. By prioritizing its own interests, like protecting allies and blocking reforms, the U.S. weakens trust in the Council and sidelines countries in the Global South. This makes it harder for the UN to tackle urgent issues like

climate change or conflicts in a divided world. This work highlights why reforming the Council to include more voices is crucial for creating a fairer, stronger system of global cooperation.

While the significance points to important issues ("U.S. dominance...may influence global fairness," "weakens trust"), the statement "This work highlights why reforming the Council to include more voices is crucial for creating a fairer, stronger system of global cooperation" leans towards advocacy. While implications for reform are valuable, the primary aim of the dissertation is typically analytical. The significance should focus more on the study's contribution to academic understanding, its practical insights, or its methodological insights, rather than primarily pushing a reform agenda.

## **6. Research Methodology**

This study opts for a qualitative research design to examine the evolving role of the U.S. within the UNSC. Basically, it combines historical with descriptive-analytical methods to capture both the continuity and transformation in U.S. foreign policy strategies and their implications for global governance.

First, the Cold War era, the unipolar post-Cold War period, and the current phase of rising multi-polarity are investigated through historical analysis. This division enables an exploration of how U.S. strategies within the UNSC have evolved in response to shifting international power dynamics.

Second, the descriptive-analytical method adopted in this research centers selected to reveal the interplay between procedural and substantive dimensions of power. The approach seeks not only to describe U.S. actions but also to analyze their normative and legal implications.

Thus, this method enables an assessment of the legitimacy of U.S. actions and their impact on the credibility of the UNSC.

The study draws on a set of primary and secondary sources to ensure comprehensive coverage and analytical rigor. Primary data includes official UN documents such as Security Council resolutions, veto records spanning 1945 to 2023, and meeting transcripts employed during key debates, particularly those concerning Gaza and Libya. U.S. government archives also provide further insight through policy statements, congressional reports, and declassified diplomatic communications. Legal documents such as the UN Charter and International Court of Justice rulings offer a framework for evaluating the legality of U.S. actions.

## **7. Structure of the Study**

This dissertation consists of two chapters. The first chapter, *Historical Background and Legal Framework of the UN Security Council*, establishes the institutional and legal foundations of the UNSC. It traces its post-WWII establishment, the U.S. role in shaping its structure, and the evolution of U.S. engagements. The second chapter, *The U.S. Political Influence Strategies and Actions in the UNSC*, analyzes four key mechanisms of U.S. power. Together, these chapters reveal how U.S. hegemony both stabilizes and destabilizes the UNSC's legitimacy, culminating in a conclusion that evaluates prospects for reforming power imbalances in global governance

**CHAPTER ONE:**

**Historical Background and Legal Framework of  
the UN Security Council**

## Chapter One: Historical Background and Legal Framework of the UN Security Council

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## **Introduction**

The U.S. has been a major participant in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) since its founding, which serves as the worldwide forum for preserving peace and security around the world. This chapter examines the UNSC's legal and historical foundation, focusing on its founding, composition, and the consequent impact of the United States on the framework's creation. It investigates the UN Charter's legal foundations, the U.S. as a founding member and principal financial contributor, and the U.S. history and participation in the UN as a trajectory from a limited role during the Cold War to hegemonic post-Cold War influence, and finally to facing new multipolar realities. Through examining these various—factors, this chapter lays the groundwork to understand the decision-making processes at the UNSC level and America's role within it.

### **1.1 Formation and Structure of the UNSC**

the UNSC is organized to be able to function on a continuous basis, this means that at all times a representative of each member state needs to be present at UN headquarters in New York. Such continuity of operations allows for an immediate response to new threats by the Council. Among others, the most common response it is to usually, in-case of a crisis, first urge disputants to settle their differences by peaceful means (UN charter article 33).

In addition to its regular base in New York, the Council has shown flexibility by holding extraordinary sessions outside of New York City in 1972 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and in Panama City, Panama in 1973. These diplomatic efforts culminated in a first Council Summit Gathering at UN Headquarters on January 31st, 1992. This unprecedented meeting with 13 heads

of state/government and two foreign ministers brought to light the UNSC's central role in the architecture of global security governance.

The Council is the only body capable of wielding international enforcement options such as sanctions, military intervention, and peacekeeping forces aimed at preserving international stability and is therefore the primary international arbiter of peace and security.

### **1.1.1 Establishment of the UNSC**

The establishment of the United Nations may be considered an answer to the failure of the League of Nations in 1945 to control World War II. There were many structural reasons for this failure, among which the absence of major powers, especially the U.S.; but there was also no effective mechanism for enforcing collective security (Kennedy, 2006). According to the UN founding Charter, which includes an ambitious U.S. founding vision, the UN system was founded to promote a full-fledged multilateralism that could effectively maintain international peace and security, promote human rights, and encourage global cooperation (United Nations, 1945).

To put it another way, the UNSC was created to act as the enforcement arm of the UN. According to the stipulations of Chapter V of the UN Charter, the Security Council has a primary responsibility in matters of international peace and security and is subsequently given wide powers (Hurd, 2007). Its structural design tends to represent the power balance as manifest in the post-World War II world whereby five permanent members, namely: The United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic now Russia), the United Kingdom, France, and China, have veto powers vis-a-vis ten other rotating non-permanent members (Weiss et al., 2022).

During the following decades, the activities of the Security Council were extensively characterized by the division that came with the Cold War, whereby most actions were paralyzed

by the veto wielded frequently by the United States and the USSR , U.S. started to use its first veto power until 1970. however, from 1970 to 1991, the U.S. used its veto in 69 occasions but failed to take action at the most critical moment, such as in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For examples of some unity include the Council's endorsement of military action in Korea in terms of Resolution 83 (UNSC, 1950).

The end of the Cold War marked a new era for an increasingly active and evolving UNSC. One of the most assertive actions of this period was Resolution 678 of 1990, which authorized military force to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, demonstrating a bold use of the Council's authority: UN Resolution (1990). By the end of the decade in the 1990s, peacekeeping in the UN got totally broadened and transformed into complex multidimensional missions like the ones in Mozambique in 1992 and Cambodia in 1993. It was also the period when some of the more glaring inadequacies of the UN showed themselves, such as in Somalia in 1992 and its failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994, thereby exposing severe weaknesses in both the mandate and operational capacity of the organization (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2023).

### **1.1.2 U.S. Role in Establishing the UNSC Post-WWII**

The foundation for the post- WWII international order was the establishment of the United Nations Security Council order. Collective security had originally been conceived by president Franklin D. Roosevelt as a stronger system based on the “Four Policemen” idea of having the US, the Soviet Union, the UK and China (later on France joined the model) jointly maintaining peace. The framework was later adapted to include the permanent membership structure of the UNSC at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 (Hurd, 2007). In fact, opposed to the claim that the U.S. has “never been part to” the UNSC, it has actually been a permanent member with veto power since 1945. While geopolitical divisions have hindered the Council’s efficacy,

labeling it as “impotent” ignores its historical involvement in mediating conflicts, sanctions regimes, and the authorization of peacekeeping missions.

This design then institutionalized U.S. hegemony in a way that drew into the very framework of the UN the strategic interests of the U.S., through mechanisms such as the veto power. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945, effectively the formal birth of the UN, the American delegation emphasized the enforcement authority of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. With this chapter, the Council could impose sanctions and authorized military intervention in maintaining or restoring peace (United Nations, 1945). The U.S. supported its idea of letting the Permanent Five members possess the veto power and have it as an assurance of national sovereignty. They said that it was for the protection of "vital national interests" and to have the cooperation of the Soviet Union (Kennedy, 2006).

In addition, it was also open to a vastly sweeping discretionary power by the Council for the UNSC, which gave it the right to take compelling actions in the field of security without prior approval from the General Assembly—would define an idealistic *realpolitik*, nurture that multilateralism, and yet protect American priority (Weiss et al., 2022).

"American societal perceptions of the UNSC have evolved, reflecting divergent interpretations of its role and implications in global governance". While the Council was initially envisioned as a platform for great power cooperation, it soon fell into Cold War rivalries, as both the U.S. and the USSR frequently favored their own vetoes to block opposing resolutions (Security Council Report, 2023). The post-Cold War period brought more clarity over the power equations within the UNSC, particularly during interventions such as the Gulf War—the U.S. led coalition won the approval of the UNSC. The limits of multilateralism were starkly drawn during

the 2003 invasion of Iraq when the U.S. acted unilaterally, circumventing the Council altogether (Glennon, 2003).

The veto system, largely brought into place to secure U.S. participation and influence in international governance, is today viewed widely as a source of structural imbalance. To critics, it often swamps the voice of the Global South while hampering effective international responses to crises (Thakur, 2016). Nevertheless, the UNSC remains vital to U.S. foreign policy, as it offers a platform to provide legitimization and an appearance of international consensus to all American actions when national interests will weigh otherwise heavily.

### **-1.1.3 Composition and Membership**

The abbreviation 'UNSC' indicates the United Nations Security Council, which consists of fifteen members, five of whom are permanent members with veto power (P5), while the other ten are elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term (United Nations, 1945, Art. 23). The permanent members, China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, have inherited their status from the past since they were victors in the Second World War. Moreover, they continue to exercise great influence regarding global security issues (Hurd, 2007). Non-permanent members are elected through a quota system that means proposals to allocate UNSC seats to underrepresented regions (e.g., Africa, Latin America) to ensure equitable geographic distribution, which is criticized for marginalizing emerging powers such as India and Brazil, which demand a Council more representative and authoritative (Weiss et al., 2022).

#### **1.1.3.1 Permanent Members and Veto Power**

As per Clause (3) of Article 27 of the UN Charter, every substantive resolution can be vetoed by any of the five permanent members (P5) irrespective of the magnitude of overall

endorsement. For instance, since 2011, Russia has used its veto powers in 34 resolutions on Syria primarily in defence of the regime of Bashar al-Assad (Security Council Report, 2023). The veto has been roundly denounced for perpetuating arbitrary inequalities of power and the U.S. rendering the Council ineffective in times of urgent global crisis (Glennon, 2003).

#### **1.1.3.2 Non-Permanent Members**

Although non-permanent members do not have any personal vetoes, they play a role in setting agendas and building consensus, where they are elected according to a geographical quota system, which allocates seats as follows: Africa (3seats), Asia-Pacific (2seats), Caribbean and Latin America (2 seats), Western Europe and Others (2 seats), and Eastern Europe (1 seat), as just a couple of examples. However, even though they are elected, in practice, non-permanent members are certainly less powerful than the P5, usually draft and negotiate the resolutions (Security Council Report, 2022).

#### **1.1.4 Functions and Decision-Making Process**

Permanent Members (P5)—only have formal veto power but also wield considerable informal influence, controlling the drafting of resolutions. For example, Russia has repeatedly vetoed resolutions on the question of Syria, independently of the majority view, with a view to either helping to shape or delaying action altogether (Security Council Report, 2023). The P5 also affect the agenda of the Council and may apply pressure behind the scenes for a particular result (von Einsiedel et al., 2016). The Russia/Syria veto example is used again. While illustrative, find varied examples if possible, or reference it more briefly if used multiple times.

Although non-permanent members E10(Elected Ten) do not have the veto, they still strive for legitimacy in order to enhance their power. For instance, they can act jointly, as demonstrated

in Resolution 2334 (2016) on Israeli settlements, through which the unified E10 opposition was successful in securing an abstention by the U.S. from vetoing (Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the UN, 2016). Moreover, their capacities to speak with authority come from their regional expertise. For example, Kenya played the lead in shaping Council advocacy on African perspectives (Gowan, 2022).

The UN Secretariat plays a role in the formulation of norms and the provision of technical support. Reports and briefings initiated by the Secretary-General invariably introduce new issues into what constitutes the purview of UNSC deliberations. As an example, the 2023 report on climate security framed threats to the environment in terms of peace and security issues, so legitimizing their inclusion on the Council's agenda (UN Secretary-General, 2023). The supporting departments, such as the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (DPPA), assist in the technical drafting of language and in providing analysis relative to the context of the case (Chesterman, 2016).

## **1.2 Legal Foundations of the UNSC**

One of the most important sources of law for the UNSC lies in the statutes of the United Nations, especially Chapters V to VII, which define the structure, functions, and powers of the Council. This would allow a view of the composition of the UNSC, peaceful settlement, and measures to be undertaken when there are threats to peace, breaches of peace, or aggression acts (United Nations Charter, 1945). It provides the legal and procedural framework for the collective action of the Security Council, primarily for maintaining international peace and security. It also embodies the principle of collective security, enumerates rules regulating the legal use of force and outlines rather generally the scope of the operational activities of the Council. Furthermore,

it gives the overarching "purposes and principles" of the United Nations, to which all actions of the Security Council must be aligned (United Nations Charter, 2000).

### **1.2.1 The UN Charter as the Primary Legal Framework**

The Charter of the United Nations, drafted in 1945, is understood to confer a legal basis for the Security Council within the United Nations (UNSC). Chapters V and VI of the Charter delineate the composition of the Council and its role in the peaceful resolution of disputes, while Chapter VII describes the exercise of such authority with respect to enforcement action, including the consequences of imposing sanctions and authorizing the use of military force (United Nations, 1945). Article 51 further states that the use of force in States is generally prohibited and allowed only to repel aggression and under authorization from the Security Council under Chapter VII (UN Charter, 1945). More recent norms such as humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) remain mostly non-binding and of mainly normative character, as exemplified when one looks at the case of *Nicaragua v. United States* before the ICJ (1986).

The UN Security Council shall be responsible for maintaining international peace and security, monitoring states' compliance and starting peacekeeping missions (see Resolution 678–1990 authorizing the use of military force for the Gulf War), and imposing measures in the form of sanctions without military action (United Nations, 1945). Notably, Article 103 in the Charter declares UNSC decisions as superior to all other international treaties; hence, its resolutions become legally supreme. Resolution 2231 of 2015, for example, regarded the nuclear deal with Iran, which trumped previous unilateral and bilateral sanctions (Security Council Report, 2015).

Although the legal authority upon which the Council bases itself is contained within the Charter, this authority is not static; it changes with Council practice, International Court of Justice interpretation, and global realities. For instance, ICJ judgments, notably *Reparations for Injuries* (1949) and *Certain Expenses* (1962), confirmed that the UN has implied powers to address new threats. Such legal adaptability enables the UNSC to address modern problems, including climate security while remaining consistent with international humanitarian law and human rights obligations (Chesterman, 2016; Hurd, 2007).

### **1.2.2 Legal Implications of UNSC Decisions**

Article 25 of the United Nations Charter impels all member states to comply with the Security Council's decisions (UN, 1945). The decisions under Chapter VII are said to have the force of international law in imposing sanctions, carrying out peacekeeping operations, or mandating military incursions. That is whereby such decisions get to be considered binding-with Resolution 678 of 1990, being an important example-which authorized member states to employ all necessary means against Iraq for aggression against Kuwait thereby marking an important watershed in the Gulf War. In addition, Article 103 of the Charter further strengthens the supremacy of UNSC decisions by providing that obligations under the UN Charter will supersede any other conflicting international agreements; thus , fortifying UNSC resolutions under international law (UN, 1945). According to its critics, the Council's laws are largely said to operate in favour of the will of the powerful. For instance, Libya rejected Resolution 748, which imposed sanctions concerning the Lockerbie bombing, and maintained that it violated its national sovereignty.

Security Council mandates sometimes clash with other international legal standards such as International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and human rights obligations. During the 1990s embargo

on Iraq, much criticism arose over the disproportional injuries to civilians and how the Geneva Conventions may have been violated (Cortright & Lopez 2000). In response, it proceeded toward targeted sanctions like asset freezes and travel bans to collateralize damage in the wake of 9/11. Jurists argue that not only should UNSC sanctions adhere to U.S. cogens norms such as the prohibition against torture, but they should also promote the integrity of international law (de Wet, 2004).

Another sticking point for the Council remains enforcement. The UNSC can enforce measures, but its performance hinges largely on the actions of member states. For instance, resolution 1373–2001 laid down counterterrorism obligations that were inconsistently implemented, most glaringly by states like Pakistan and Yemen, where the domestic capacity to deal with such issues was limited (UNSC, 2001). There are political considerations, which can impede enforcement efforts; for instance, Russia, one of the P5 with political power for vetoes, invoked its veto in opposing UN resolutions condemning the Syrian government for its record on human rights (Security Council Report, 2023). Some writers suggest that for greater coherence and legitimacy, judicial review should be introduced, allowing the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to review Security Council resolutions (Krisch, 2012). Though imperfect, it is still the main institution for the maintenance of international peace and security. Its resolutions continue to be the points of contention around which global legal norms are formed.

### **1.3 U.S. position in UNSC: Foundational Role and Commitments**

The United States, one of the two main architects of the post-WWII global order and a founding member of the UN Security Council, established in 1945 as one of five permanent members, sought to develop a robust global authority committed to global peace, shape multilateral diplomacy and promote democratic governance. The U.S. delegation under Secretary

of State Edward Stettinius was thus at the heart of negotiating the core issues of the UN Charter concerned with the powers and responsibilities of the Security Council during the San Francisco Conference of 1945 (Schlesinger, 2003). Considering the importance of the proposed veto power to participation by major actors, the U.S. considered this vital condition for legitimacy and effectiveness, transferred to the work of the Council, underlined in the creation of Kalijati. Formation of the Security Council in which the United States participated set standards and created precedents that would continue to govern the functioning of the UNSC until the present time.

The United States, despite a few criticisms and instances of inconsistency in relation to interventions that have benefited its strategic interests, has fully backed the Council's core mission of global peace and security. The United States has looked to the UNSC on various occasions to provide legitimacy to interventions viewed in the global interest of peace and stability, including public interventions in the form of peacekeeping and enforcement of sanctions. For the Gulf War (1990-1991), America sought and obtained UN Security Council approval for the expulsion of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and thus multilateralism for its national aims (Luck, 2006). On occasion, the U.S. has voiced opinions to the UNSC in favor of stronger responses to human rights abuses and terrorism, yet these were selective a selection was made against unilateralism and double standards. However, the war in Iraq in 2003 was without Security Council approval, drawing loud obloquy for unilateralism and double standards. Thus, in its operations, the United States views the Security Council as the core body for addressing global threats vigorously and credibly. Whereas it strongly influences UNSC affairs through political, military, and financial means, it dominates negotiations and implementation of relevant resolutions (Bosco, 2009).

### **1.3.1 The U.S. as a Founding Member of the UN**

Right after World War II, the UN was set up to keep peace among nations and ensure cooperation, to which the U.S. A was one of the founding members. Roosevelt was highly instrumental in the failure of the League of Nations; he strongly felt that the setting up of a body to promote peace, security, and cooperation among nations of the world was imperative.

The United States convened the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in 1944 with the purpose of giving birth to the United Nations Charter with much input from the Allied nations. Some of these proposals became the subject of discussion at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, which was convened for the drafting and adoption of the Charter of the United Nations by representatives from 50 nations. The American delegates, particularly Secretary of State Edward Stettinius and Alger Hiss, assisted in the design of the institutional architecture of the UN with particular reference to the Security Council that recognized and enshrined the raw legitimacy of power politics by randomly granting veto powers to five permanent members, one of them being the U.S. The U.S.A would move first to ratify the UN Charter on July 28, 1945, thus ushering in its coming into force in October (United Nations, 2020).

With UN creation opportunities came plenty of idealist and pragmatic ones for the United States. This concept of internationalism was one, on the one hand, which emphasized requirements for cooperation and collective security in the liberal internationalist traditions arising from the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, whereby on the other hand, UN membership allowed the U.S. to really engage globally and further pursue its interests in a multilateral setting. UN headquarters in New York became a credential for American support for postwar reconstruction through the UN's specialized agencies like the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), later efforts with UNICEF and the World Health

Organization. Through these channels, the U.S. sought to use development and humanitarian aid to create a more orderly world (Kennedy, 2006). Founding UN operations illustrated America's commitment to international law, human rights, and conflict prevention, based on the belief that American leadership was necessary for global peace and stability.

### **1.3.2 The U.S. Financial Contributions to the UN Regular Budget**

The United States is the prime donor for the United Nations' regular budget, which facilitates the daily running of the entire organization (United Nations, 2023). Things such as administration, special political missions, and basic functions such as policy formulation and international coordination are funded through the regular budget of the UN. Each contribution from each country is determined by gross national income, ability to pay, and the proportion of the world economy (Smith & Johnson, 2022). Of the total regular budget of the UN, in recent times, about 22% has been accounted for by the U.S. (Congressional Research Service, 2023). This percentage happened to be the highest single-country contribution towards the UN budget. It is both literally and figuratively a contribution of Americans- in terms of size, and what they do for the world (Jones, 2021).

Even though there had domestic political debates on the levels of funding, U.S. officials tended to defend investments in this branch primarily on account of the benefits of the UN in ensuring a greater degree of global stability, furthering U.S. goals for foreign policy, and sharing international responsibility toward peace and development (Brown, 2022). Historically, the U.S. has also called for indirect informal leverage over the organization by funding for staffing and operations at the UN (Thompson & Lee, 2023).

However, funding for the UN from the United States has been rather complicated and also never unconditional. Different U.S. governments have threatened to cut funding as a means of seeking reforms in the UN or objecting to certain resolutions condemning Israel or just general undercurrent in the UN bureaucracy at large. For instance, withholding part of assessed contributions has been done by the U.S. Congress as a technique for instituting managerial reforms or greater transparency (Weiss, 2018). However, this has made other member states cry foul that it is politicizing the financial assistance and reducing the strength of UN multilaterality (Gowan, 2020).

Despite the concern that the UN is less likely than others to succeed in achieving its own objectives, the U.S. government has lobbied consistently to return most of what it cut during the challenging moment for UN work. Besides these, the annual bill introduced by the United States to specialized agencies and peacekeeping operations runs into billions, making it not only one of the founding members but also a major donor to the multilateral system (Global Policy Forum, 2020). In this way, America has greatly negotiated a seat at the table literally a front row when it comes to discussion issues of international concern (Patrick, 2020).

### **1.3.3 U.S. Relations with Permanent and Non-Permanent Members**

In seeking a theoretical comprehension of U.S. relations with the other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council—China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France—one sees a rather complicated intermix of competition and cooperation. Although the United States will side with the UK and France on most core security issues, it often finds itself at odds with Russia and China, especially over issues of intervention, sanctions, and sovereignty. Both nations have traditionally resisted the United States and favored non-interference, such as in the case of Syria, where they repeatedly vetoed U.S.-backed resolutions on the country's

outcome, a clear answer to a U.S. intervention (Bosco, 2009). This whole issue marks a serious premising dynamic of geopolitical rivalries within the P5, which can basically inhibit the performance of the Security Council.

Unlike this, with the 10 rotating non-permanent members of the Security Council, the focus of U.S. relations was tying itself more towards the traditions of diplomacy and strategic alliance. The U.S. actively engages in persuading these members to grant votes and legitimacy on proposals, especially on times when the P5 consensus seemed weak. Henceforth, these non-permanent members become instrumental either for the legitimization of actions taken by the United States or its blocking through collective opposition as during the 2003 Iraq War debate (Patrick, 2015). Hence, the United States often spends great diplomatic energy bringing them around within the Council.

#### **1.3.4 Strategic and Positional Commitment**

Thus, the present practice is that the United States historically pursues a policy of further strengthening the United Nations Security Council as part of an overall effort at global stability and an effort to pursue specific U.S. foreign policy interests. The entire rationale of this course of action is that by being at the core of the UNSC, the Council itself happens to be the most significant forum through which international action is legitimized, coalitions formed, and global challenges addressed in a multilateral context. Along with being a permanent and veto-holding member in the Council, the U.S. has also got vested interest in eliciting other countries to uphold the international standards set in achieving desired ends and therefore goes ahead seeking support from other members to key security missions for instance on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, counterterrorism, and peacekeeping. The huge commitment in pushing for U.S. adoption of Resolution 1540 at the UNSC regarding international actions against the

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by non-state actors is another example of American commitment to national and global security (Boulden, 2009). The United States also uses this Council for developing international public opinion during crises, like in the Gulf War and after the events of September 11, establishing the Council as indispensable in reinforcing a rules-based international order as per U.S. interests (Luck, 2006).

In this regard, the United States has both positional and symbolic interests in the UNSC. Its presence indicates U.S. commitment to global governance and intent to have a say in how that global order might be constructed in future. As one of five permanent members, it gains considerable strength vis-a-vis the other permanent and elected temporary members in the Council and thus projects itself favorably in the Council on issues such as human rights, the rule of law, and state sovereignty. This positional rule comes with its downside, since the U.S. also has to navigate through the interests of all other members, most of the time needing to rally around some sort of consensus to push an initiative. Although the United States has been criticized occasionally for being engaged selectively or taking unilateral actions, it views its very role in the UNSC as crucial for providing international peace and security (Bosco, 2009). For all the stubbornness of this doctrinal position, it has led subsequent administrations to invest huge diplomatic resources, forge alliances, and keep that veto power in strong form as part of America's all-out strategy to lead the global security system (Patrick, 2015).

#### **1.4 The Evolution of the U.S. Role in the UN Security Council**

U.S. participation in the UNSC has also changed since 1945, influenced by world politics and U.S. interests in foreign policy. The U.S. initially promoted the use of the UNSC as a collective security tool for averting a second world war (Schlesinger, 2003). Although Cold War tensions frequently rendered the Council inert, reducing humanitarian interventions while

implicating peacekeeping and sanctions with anti-communist goals (Schlesinger, 2003). After the Cold War, the U.S. began to take a more prominent role, as evidenced by a U.N. Security-Council supported military response to the 1991 Gulf War (Luck, 2006), though post 9/11 the U.S. again moved back and forth between multilateral initiatives like imposing sanctions on Iran and North Korea, and unilateral strategies, including the unpopular 2003 Iraq War (Weiss, 2018). Despite different handling through the years, the U.S. is still a major UNSC player that drives resolutions, holds veto power and can shape global order, showing how even with a changing multipolar world, the UNSC continues to be relevant for U.S. foreign policy (Bosco, 2009).

#### **1.4.1 Cold War Era**

In the Cold War era, the superpowers of that time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, engaged in any form of ideological competition possible in the Security Council. Two permanent members with veto power, the antagonistic vetoes by both nations have predominantly been exercised to protect their geopolitical interests and oppose actions that threaten their interests. In this light, veto power became a characteristic of the era dominated by the so-called superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, which grew accustomed to using its negative voting powers to reject anything that it deemed a Western initiative in the UN system (Meisler, 1995). The United States was initially reticent to wield its veto but, as competing interests turned into rivalry, especially on issues of decolonization, the Middle East, and U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and Southeast Asia, it began to scrutinize the Soviet veto decisions much more closely.

Over the years, the period from 1946 to 1990 was one of the deadlocks where more than 200 draft resolutions were vetoed or blocked through paralysis by the two superpowers namely (Luck, 2006). So many other vital international issues similarly faced such vetoes or opposite positions that made actions of the Security Council impossible; for instance, as witnessed by the

1956 revolution in Hungary, when Czech troops were called to help during the Prague Spring of 1968 or U.S. interference in Vietnam. Thus, the timeliness of its paralysis always failed to be proved by relevance and the ultimate decisive intervention on pivotal issues in global security.

Member states would thus come to view the Security Council as anything but an impartial forum for the resolution of disputes—as a battleground of great-power politics—undermining its legitimacy and authority. In the 1980s, for example, Israel would enjoy the protection of American vetoes in respect of condemnation by the Council such as over actions in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories (Bosco, 2009). The Soviet Union would do the same with resolutions condemning its sponsorship of Marxist regimes in Africa and Asia and regarding Eastern Europe. In both situations, those vetoes and blocks ensured that many urgent matters slipped into either the General Assembly or were addressed by ad hoc coalitions outside the UN system. Hence, its effectiveness in dealing with international strife was constantly tagged null.

Despite the lack of functionality, the United States sought to bring itself into the leadership in the transactions of the UNSC, pushing its interest by way of building coalitions, adroit diplomacy, and selective engagement whenever possible (Schlesinger, 2003). During the Cold War, a pattern of selective multilateralism became entrenched, whereby the U.S. would stimulate Council activities in alignment with its own interests and veto any endeavors it deemed contrary to those interests. The period, therefore, saw the UNSC operate both as a venue for geopolitical contestation and as a possible channel for international cooperation.

#### **1.4.2 The Post-Cold War Era: Unipolarity and U.S. Dominance**

Instead of arranging the text in the above manner, just make small changes in the sentences. After the end of the Cold War, a unipolar international system came into the way, with

the States taking unheralded levels of global influence and authority, in particular referring to the Security Council. The United States did not have to contend with a rival capable of routinely vetoing its initiatives after it became the sole superpower when the Soviet Union dissolved in 1991. The power vacuum thus created allowed Washington to drive the agenda of the Council in pursuit of liberal internationalist objectives such as collective security, the spread of democracy, and humanitarian intervention. A very important defining moment was made in that era by UNSC Resolution 678, which authorized the use of force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait during the Gulf War.

The resolution demonstrated the ability of the U.S. to mobilize international support through the Council leveraging its authority for legitimizing military actions (Luck, 2003). However, the post-Cold War period was also one of tensions and contradictions in U.S.-UN relations. Whenever the U.S. considers it politically prudent or necessary to seek overall political and ideational consensus under the aegis of the UNSC, it will do so. However, when such consensus acts against this interest, the U.S., rather, prefers to act unilaterally. The most glaring example is the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which proceeded without specific Security Council approval, partly due to opposition and unfulfilled threats of vetoes from France, Russia, and others. This tense situation created in U.S.-UN relations is now fodder for a global debate on the legality of unilateral military action without UNSC approval (Patrick, 2015). In this atmosphere of unease, the U.S. embraced the Council for those issues of matching strategic priorities such as sanctions against North Korea and Iran, and counterterrorism efforts under Chapter VII. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, American power was dominant, which was further challenged at an increasing rate. This juncture gave the United States an opportunity to protect its national interests while it shaped international norms in the making toward security, intervention, and

global governance (Bosco, 2009). It set the stage for ongoing discussions about power, legitimacy, and the need for reform within the Security Council.

#### **1.4.3 The Rise of Multipolarity: Challenges to U.S. Influence in the UN Security Council**

The development of multipolarity in the twenty-first century has created a harsh new reality for American attempts at retaining its influence in the UNSC, thereby changing the landscape of world governance. Since the post-Cold War phase in which American unipolarity was presumed to operate, the rise of other major powers, particularly China, India, and Russia, has settled such powers in opposition to American strategic interests in the area of international security. This change is seen every day in the workings of the UNSC, wherein the United States increasingly finds it difficult to dictate discussions or set the agenda to its liking. China has regularly exercised its veto to protect its strategic interests in resolutions touching on the South China Sea and North Korea; similarly, the Russian Federation has sought to frustrate American objectives through its actions in the UNSC in regard to issues touching on Ukraine and Syria, thereby countering any Western initiatives aimed at military interventions and guarantees to regional stability (Weiss, 2018). Therefore, we see that the arrival of a multipolar order has cast into more contestation and restraints wherein the decision-making environment has increased resistance to the will of the United States from other powerful actors.

This transition further imposes limits on the United States' position within the UNSC and highlights the declining influence of the United States to prescribe security policy without the support of others. Thus was born not the age of American primacy but of a negotiated order, corresponding to understanding of competing powers. On fundamental matters of climate security, current peacekeeping mandates, and the resolution of regional conflicts, American positions often diverge from those of China and Russia. The declining influence of U.S. moral

authority since the 2003 Iraq War has diminished its ability to argue for leadership on global issues in any persuasive way. Given that the United States remains a major player in the UNSC, it now must contend with an international environment characterized by fragmentation and increasingly interlinked competition. In this evolving context, the United States will need to effect a strategic turn in its approaches toward global leadership, taking full advantage of institutional cooperation, multilateral engagement, and consensus -building (Patrick, 2015; Luck, 2006).

### **Conclusion**

Since World War II, the Security Council has played a key role in international peacekeeping operations. In order to put U.S. control in perspective, this chapter examines the system's establishment, legal underpinnings, and organizational structure of the UNSC. The U.S. was a founding member and had a critical hand in developing the UNSC structure mandates and principles, including writing the UN charter and obtaining a permanent seat. However, its ongoing financial support provides evidence of a sustained interest in this institution. The engagement over time is examined from Cold War stalemates, through post-Cold War supremacy to the current multipolarity. This context will be important to analyze the role of the U.S. within the UNSC moving forward. The understanding of the legal structure of the Council, its institutions and how they interact with change in geopolitical conditions is thus key in evaluating U.S. options and how that country has influenced decision-making. Ultimately, this provides a baseline from which a deeper understanding of the U.S. interpretation and influence over UNSC policies can be developed.

**CHAPTER TWO:**

**The U.S. Political Influence Strategies and Actions**

**in the UNSC**

## Chapter Two: The U.S. Political Influence Strategies and Actions in the UNSC

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## **Introduction**

The United States is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, thus politically influential but in different ways. These include the use of veto power, military interventions, economic sanctions, and debates over institutional reform. The analysis first delves into a study of U.S. veto application, engaging with its legal, historical, and even contentious examples that have elicited international reactions. Later sections on American guidance of peacekeeping missions and military interventions indicate that the U.S. has both determined the direction in which mandates are authorized and remains the object of criticism. This is followed by an analysis of Washington's use of UNSC sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy, balancing strategic aspirations with humanitarian interests. Finally, the chapter examines the U.S. position in current reform discourse and how proposed changes to structures may impact its privileged role. The combination of these two dimensions highlights the complex reality of American power within the UNSC.

### **2.1 The U.S. and Veto Power: A Tool of Influence**

In the exercise of the veto power, the U.S. has emphatically protected its strategic interests in the UNSC over decades. In its position as one of the five permanent members (P5), the United States possesses an extraordinary veto on any issue of substance; it means that a resolution can be vetoed by the U.S. regardless of whether a majority of votes exist—along with the veto of the other four members in favor of it. This mechanism has provided an extraordinary opportunity for Washington to moderate responses to conflicts in the world such that, at certain times, the UNSC has served as an instrument for the foreign policy objectives of the United States. The veto has worked as a shield to protect allies such as Israel from resolutions condemning their actions and

to block any initiatives that may have curtailed American foreign military or diplomatic actions abroad (O'Neill, 2021).

Between 1972 and 2023, the United States' application of the veto exceeded 80 times, nearly half of which were in matters regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, evidencing the U.S.'s long-standing commitment to protecting one of its closest regional allies (Security Council Report, 2023). Beyond formal vetoes, Washington has often threatened the veto to pre-emptively alter or water down the contents of draft resolutions, ensuring that they reflect American interests before any vote (Luck, 2018).

منسّق: مصوّطة

The use of U.S. vetoes in this manner creates devastating long-term implications for vital foreign policy goals. First, it undermines the ability to build coalitions: the constant vetoes in support of Israel isolates the very partners in the Global South that are important to counter China/Russia –thus Washington will have to ‘pay a diplomatic tax’ on issues that trump Israel’s significance, such as Ukraine. During U.S. vetoes of Gaza ceasefire resolutions (2023) 37 states abstained on U.S.-backed measures regarding Ukraine, which in turn undermined efforts to contain Moscow (Security Council Report, 2024). At the same time, the abuse of veto power promotes further institutional fragmentation by pushing Arab states to channels via China, and supporting the rise of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) + countries as a counter-weight to the West (Weiss & Daws, 2018).

Second, it limits use to resolve conflicts. The U.S has blocked more than a dozen attempts to condemn these types of settlements since the year 2000, allowing the ground on the ground to render the two-state solution impossible to achieve (UNCTAD, 2023). This ensnares Washington in perpetual crisis control and gives away diplomatic off-ramps, paradoxically undermining the

very ally one is trying to protect and ceding the mediation space to one's rivals. This creates a cycle of self-defeating short term "victories" that erodes the foundations of U.S. systemic power.

This practice has met enduring criticism for undermining the legitimacy of the UNSC, subordinating the principle of collective security to the geopolitical calculations of the great powers (Voeten, 2020). Yet, defenders argue that, in fact, a veto is necessary to prevent reckless or destabilizing interventions taken without consensus by the major powers thus preserving a minimum threshold of agreement on any actions taken in the name of international peace and security (Weiss, 2016).

### **2.1.1 The Legal Basis and Function of the Veto**

In Article 27(3) of the UN Charter, it is stated that "Decisions of the Security Council on non-procedural matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of nine members" (United Nations, 1945). This means all five permanent members' concurring votes are necessary. This system was devised to promote great-power unanimity in action and to ensure that if any P5 member were to cast a substantial vote against any substantive measure, then no substantive measure could proceed, effectively stabilizing international security decision-making in a most precarious postwar environment (Schlesinger, 2003).

Veto power, alternatively regarded as a procedural constraint, also serves as a politico-diplomatic instrument for the United States to protect its interests from resolutions that may either go against its national interest or bring it at odds with international opinion regarding, for example, Israel, military interventions, or economic sanctions (Hurd, 2018). Defenders applaud the veto as an impediment to making the UNSC ineffective, particularly in times of deep geopolitical divide (Luck, 2021), while opponents hold that it furthers undemocratic control,

منسّق: الخط: دون غامق، خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: دون غامق

"consolidating structural advantages for under-represented states in global decision-making (Fassbender, 2020)."

منسّق: خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق

"While recent U.S. vetoes are numerically quantifiable, its true influence lies in the implicit threat of veto orchestrating outcomes through backroom negotiations to preempt unfavorable resolutions (Hurd, 2018)."

منسّق: الخط: دون مائل، خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق، دون مائل

منسّق: خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق

منسّق: الخط: دون غامق، خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة

منسّق: خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق

Quite often, U.S. veto threats have resulted in the modification or watering down of drafts to accommodate American goals, as was the case in Libya in 2011 and Syria from 2014 to the present (Nikitin, 2019). This means that the veto operates within a dichotomy: as an avenue for blocking, while simultaneously functioning as a negotiating instrument to entrench U.S. primacy in global security governance. Yet the continued exercise of this veto power, especially regarding Palestinian statehood and Israeli settlement policies, lays the foundation for the legitimacy debates surrounding the UNSC, with critics pointing to the situation whereby U.S. vetoes favor incumbent national geopolitical interests above the tenets of international law and collective security (Weiss & Young, 2021).

منسّق: المسافة البادئة: السطر الأول: 0 سم

منسّق: الخط: دون غامق، خط اللغة العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق

### 2.1.2 Historical Trends in U.S. Veto Use

In as many as 83 instances from the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 to 2023, the United States has made use of its veto power. During the era of Cold War years, the veto used to come into play by the United States against resolutions backed by support from the Soviet Union for case issues about conflicts like Nicaragua, Angola, and also apartheid-type-related issues in South Africa (Voeten, 2020).

The veto ended up as a weapon for American Cold War rivalry, expressly paralleling the large tensions that configured the East-West divide in global politics. Since the end of the Cold

War, “The U.S. employs its UNSC veto exclusively to shield strategic allies (notably Israel) or block resolutions threatening its military, diplomatic, or economic interests. In fact, between 2000 and 2023, the United States cast about 30 vetoes on the Israeli-Palestinian issue more than any other P5 member has done in the period (O'Brien, 2022).

“The most drastic turn in U.S. unilateralism occurred with the Trump administration from 2017-2021, when he “vetoed” Resolution S/2017/1060 from December 18, 2017 which criticized U.S. acknowledgment of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and “unilaterally” exited the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) in 2018, bypassing the diplomacy of the UNSC. The U.S. also further alienated itself from the global community by making a failed attempt to achieve a unilateral “snapback” of UN sanctions on Iran, which 13 member states deemed illegitimate in 2020 (draft S/2020/797).” Bolton, 2020; UNSC S/PV.8747.

“Instead, while the Biden administration avoids vetoes of UNSC resolutions that would criticize Israeli military attacks in Gaza, such as Resolution 2728 which requests a ceasefire and or a cessation of hostilities in March 2024, it protects Israel from being held accountable by either vetoing typically or using strategic abstentions or weakening vague wording to politically protect Israel (UN News, 2023).”

“These trends reveal how much domestic politicking and presidential doctrines shape what strategies lie behind the veto and confirm it as far from being a neutral procedural mechanism as can be imagined. In fact, as Luck (2021) puts it, vetoes have become instruments of geopolitics rather than an impartial reasonably governing the world and thus molded by national interests and party political concerns.

منسّق: الخط: دون مائل، خط اللغة العربية  
وغيرها: دون مائل  
منسّق: مصوّطة

منسّق: الخط: دون مائل، خط اللغة العربية  
وغيرها: دون مائل

منسّق: الخط: دون مائل، خط اللغة العربية  
وغيرها: دون مائل

منسّق: الخط: دون مائل، خط اللغة العربية  
وغيرها: دون مائل

منسّق: خط اللغة العربية و غيرها: غامق

منسّق: الخط: دون غامق، خط اللغة  
العربية وغيرها: 12 نقطة، غامق

### 2.1.3 Controversial U.S. Vetoes and Global Reactions.

Numerous U.S. vetoes have met with international adverse reactions, exposing the rift between countries' rights and the world's public opinion as a whole. The most important of these was the veto in 1976 against a resolution under the auspices of the United Nations condemning Israel's occupation of Palestinian territories a widely regarded precedent for subsequent decades of U.S. diplomatic protection of Israel at the UN (Khalidi, 2020). Again, in 2011, the U.S. vetoed a resolution critical of Israel's ever-expanding settlements and drew international condemnation, further building the charges of double standards in the U.S. Middle East policy (Peters, 2022). More recently in 2023, the United States singularly cast its veto over a proposed ceasefire resolution in Gaza, drawing sharp outrage from human rights organizations and states within the Global South (Amnesty International, 2023).

Responses to U.S. vetoes have typically been divided among the familiar geographical lines. Either the West's allies join in defense of the U.S. or privately ignore it, while countries contesting such as Russia, China, and many Arab League members condemn American vetoes for being obstructions to international justice (Security Council Report, 2023). The Non-Aligned Movement and the African Union have long lobbied for a limitation or abolition of the veto itself, arguing that the measure has destroyed the Security Council's legitimacy and credibility (Weiss & Young, 2021).

U.S. officials insist that the veto is used as a hedge against unfavorable or destabilizing resolutions, but increasingly, the U.S. has found its use to be frustrating and has gained considerable support for alternative measures. The most important of these is the Uniting for

Peace procedure, a method through which the General Assembly can be convened in an emergency session to adopt recommendations when the Security Council cannot act because of a veto exercised by one of the permanent members (O'Brien, 2022). The increasing recourse to this mechanism indicates rising global dissatisfaction with the status quo and reflects a deeper crisis of authority within the UN's most powerful organ.

## **2.2 U.S. Leadership in Peacekeeping and Military Interventions**

The U.S. practice of controlling the agendas of UNSC peacekeeping operations exhibits a similar pattern of duality whereby the U.S. engages in the multilateral process to promote its security objectives, yet also asserts a right to act unilaterally when it sees fit to circumvent the Council. Plus, as the largest contributor funding the UNSC, with 27.89% of its 2023 peacekeeping operations budget, and the only one with veto power that designs missions such as MINUSMA in Mali, and UNMISS in South Sudan, the Washington Consensus turns institutional legitimacy into a form of conflict containment that fits its interests (United Nations, 2023; Security Council Report, 2023). But, the facade of multilateralism hides the tension, such as when U.S. was granted permission by NATO to proceed with operations in Kosovo in 1999 without obtaining UNSC authorization because of the resistance of the Russians and Chinese, or when the U.S. undermined the role of the UN Security Council in Afghanistan by establishing the bilateral “coalition forces” . This contradiction, between being multilateral steward of security and acting as a sovereignty- asserting hegemon, has had the effect of also undermining the credibility of the Council and presenting peacekeeping as simply a tool of U.S. Primacy instead of being a process of neutral collective security (Krasno 2020; Malone 2022).

The United States has often taken the lead in the drafting and lobbying for the most significant UNSC resolutions endorsing peacekeeping missions within conflict areas such as the

Balkan, African, and Middle Eastern settings. Many have come to be viewed as more reflective of the broader geopolitical interests of the U.S. in taking an active leadership role in such interventions while avoiding those involving activities Washington perceives as secondary to national priorities (Doyle & Sambanis, 2020). The participation of the United States as an enthusiast of multilateral peacekeeping in principle has, therefore, left its record open to criticism based on inconsistency, selectivity, and, at times, the undermining of the impartiality of the UNSC as a conflict management apparatus.

Such a duality, being the most powerful patron of the Security Council and being a selective participant, has continued to fuel debate on legitimacy, neutrality, and effectiveness of UN peacekeeping operations under the heavy influence of American leadership.

### **2.2.1 The U.S. Role in Authorizing Peacekeeping Missions**

Since the establishment of a permanent seat and veto power on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) by the United States, which has always been in charge of steering the direction and character of UN peacekeeping missions. The financial contributor amounting to 27 percent of UN peacekeeping operations is the largest in the world and wields massive power over mission mandates, deployment of forces, and rules of engagement (UN Peacekeeping, 2023). Such kind of financial and political clout has allowed Washington to place priority over interventions anywhere strategic interests lie—for instance, during NATO-led operations in Bosnia (1995) and Kosovo (1999), while ignoring humanitarian crises in lesser geopolitically significant regions, like parts of Central Africa (Patrick, 2020). The U.S. has consistently advocated for ‘robust peacekeeping’—a doctrine permitting proactive force to protect civilians and enforce mandates (Brahimi Report, 2000). grounded in action under Chapter VII, permitting the use of force outside traditional peacekeeping operations" (Weiss, 2016). This has resulted,

according to the critics, in a selective and often opportunistic approach to intervention. Among other many accusations according to some critics, one piece of evidence is that the United States declined to endorse an aggressive intervention during the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and only poorly reacted to the atrocities in Darfur from the middle of the 2000s onwards (Barnett, 2019).

But the U.S. has also exerted influence over contemporary peacekeeping legacies in terms of shaping their ideological moorings, contributing to doctrines like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), which arose from the lessons learned in the wake of Rwanda and Srebrenica (Morris, 2021). This was the doctrine that was applied during the 2011 intervention in Libya, which was much aided by the American leadership in pushing through UNSC Resolution 1973, which authorized military action to protect civilians (Kuperman, 2015). However, as in Libya, the very failure of operations led many experts to conclude that U.S.-action-led operations have serious limitations, which now span over long periods, have gaps in post-conflict planning, and have effectively undermined multilateral peacekeeping's credibility (Dodge, 2023).

So much so that the United States has deployed almost all its unilateral and extra-UN security initiatives, such as the coalition operations in Syria and targeted drone strikes in Somalia. All these actions are mostly carried out in gray, legal, and normative zones (Alston, 2020). At some times, these actions even bypass the UN security framework and erode its authority, as they highlight the tension between America's expressed commitment to collective security and their habit of circumventing multilateral systems when national interest dictates.

### **2.2.2 U.S. Influence on Military Interventions**

U.S. national interests and global security agendas have always influenced the character and scope of military operations that are undertaken under the mandates of the United Nations

Security Council (UNSC). On the legal stage, Washington was central in creating precedents for the enforcement of collective security, especially through its leadership during the 1991 Gulf War. The United States led a coalition under UNSC Resolution 678 to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, thereby creating a legal-operational model for any future military interventions sanctioned by the Council (Hurd, 2018).

After 9/11, the U.S. had again secured UNSC authorization for the military operation in Afghanistan through Resolution 1386 authorizing the establishment of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The U.S. justified this intervention under both collective security and Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows armed self-defense against attacks (Jones, 2020). The invasion of Iraq in 2003 marked a departure from the pattern above. The Bush administration, having failed to obtain an explicit second resolution authorizing the invasion, went ahead with it unilaterally, thereby showing one of the limits of international consensus when juxtaposed with vital U.S. security imperatives (Gordon & Shapiro, 2022). This instance created an alarming precedent of great power exceptionalism, signaling the United States's willingness to bypass multilateral mechanisms that stand in opposition to its national interests.

Beyond outright military interventions, American influence has defined the normative environment for what could be construed as legitimate intervention. Counter-terrorism and non-proliferation have been the U.S. focus within the UNSC, which resulted in costly sanctions regimes toward adversaries such as North Korea (Resolutions 1718, 2270) and Iran (Resolution 2231) (Nikitin, 2021). But this power was exercised devoid of fairness. Pertinent examples range from Washington's attitudes toward its adversaries, sanctioning them vigorously, and at the same time shielding its allies, especially Israel, from scrutiny in cases of settlement expansion and Palestinian rights (Lynch, 2019).

The Syrian conflict serves as another example of ~~patter~~patter. Whereas Russia and China have routinely vetoed UN Security Council resolutions that sought to condemn the Assad regime (16 vetoes from 2011 to 2023), the U.S. consistently utilized its own veto authority to prevent Russian drafted resolutions, which largely condemned the opposition groups in Syria. Among them were S/2017/172 of April 2017 calling for probes into the chemical attacks but not implicating the regime in them, and S/2018/321 of March 2018 labeling anti-Assad groups as ‘terrorists’ in order to justify strikes on U.S. allied factions. Simultaneously, the U.S. decried the atrocities of Assad, thus creating a catch-22 position of defending rebels from an onslaught of Russian accusations while also holding the regime accountable for their crimes (Weiss, 2016: UNSC Voting Records). Such occurrences show that great power politics often overshadow humanitarian ones, creating accusations that the US is using the UNSC as a pawn to legitimize interventions it would like to pursue and hinder those it would like to avoid. This selective engagement has further undermined the Council's credibility as an unbiased authority in enforcing international peace and security.

### **2.2.3 Challenges and Criticisms of U.S. Military Actions**

The criticism directed at the military interventions led by the U.S., with an exception for operations conducted under the UN auspices, has been directed increasingly towards the selective application of international law and collateral damages perpetrated during these missions. What had started as a brilliant case of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in 2011 in Libya turned rather fast into an example of mission creep. The air campaign for civilian protection soon gave way to active military support of rebel forces and the imposition of regime change, which far exceeded the parameters of the UNSC mandate (Kuperman, 2015). This legitimized power vacuum, leaving Libya in instability, clearly negating the notion of

humanitarian intervention in situations where a viable post-conflict transition is never contemplated (Dodge, 2023).

Similarly, the extraterritorial drone program of the U.S. has been widely criticized by human rights organizations for violations of state sovereignty and civilian casualties in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, often without the consent of the host state or specific authorization from the UN (Alston, 2020). Such activities have deepened perceptions of American exceptionalism, a measure wherein the U.S. advocates for compliance with international norms while excusing itself from analogous critique, and set back the credibility of UN-centered security governance.

Critics have emphasized again the selectivity of U.S. humanitarian engagement, for example, Washington's readiness to intervene militarily in Libya while showing much restraint in Syria, despite the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons against civilians (Lynch, 2019). This inconsistency is matched by a complete absence of accountability for intervention failures, most conspicuously in the disorderly exit from Afghanistan and Iraq, which created security vacuums for insurgent groups to subsequently fill (Jones, 2020). In addition, the U.S. has begun to use Article 51 of the UN Charter increasingly in order to justify its unilateral military actions that sidestep UNSC resolution, an activity that scholars warn creates a dangerous precedent, allowing other states to undercut this legal norm for interventions under unsubstantiated claims of self-defense (Hurd, 2018).

Perhaps most damaging to U.S. credibility is the common perception that its military interventions are guided not so much by humanitarian considerations as by geopolitical interests. In particular, this criticism centers on the differing responses to oil-rich face crises in comparison to resource-poor areas, strengthening the argument that U.S. interventions are determined by strategy, not a humanitarian commitment to global security (Barnett, 2019). These criticisms, all

compared, capture the enduring tension between unilateral American influence and the multilateral norms that the UNSC was created to uphold.

### **2.3 The U.S. and Economic Sanctions: Strategic Leverage**

Since the prevalence of the United States within the UNSC has evolved into a key foreign policy implementation, economic sanctions are now commonly applied to avoid military involvement against states and non-state actors. Sanctions imposed under the UN then have a multilateral view that should implicitly address international peace and security and are hereafter imposed for very restricted reasons that usually pertain to violations of international law, aggression, or threats to peace and security in general. According to the UN Charter provisions, Chapter VII, the Security Council may apply binding measures under international law concerning arms embargoes, bans on travel, and economic sanctions, all of which should be done by all members of the UN (United Nations, 1945).

In contradistinction, the U.S. as a permanent member with the veto power and others above all, will define the extent and character of these sanctions in conformity with American strategic interests. Some specialized UNSC committees, such as the 1267 Committee against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, monitor the implementation of the sanctions imposed on these regimes and compliance by member states in the broad sense. Yet enforcement remains decentralized and relies to a great extent on the political will and capacity of individual states for implementation, leading to inconsistent compliance and selective application.

The pertinent ones include Iraq in the 1990s, Iran over its nuclear program, and North Korea in light of its missile testing. "While sanctions serve as a key instrument of coercive diplomacy aimed at altering state behavior, their application extends beyond coercion to include

symbolic condemnation, deterrence, and containment. When non-coercive measures (e.g., diplomacy, incentives) fail, sanctions represent a calibrated escalation short of military force to pressure compliance with international norms (Baldwin, 1985; Drezner, 2011)."— Unilateral coercion is also exerted outside of UNSC-sanctioned settings through the use of U.S. leverage in the international financial system to enhance pressure in a unilateral sense. Such an approach is epitomized by secondary sanctions, which place third-party states that engage in conduct facilitating sanction breaches in jeopardy of being sanctioned themselves so that multilateral sanctions can be more effective by restricting such offending countries' access to the international financial markets (Hufbauer et al., 2007).

UNSC sanctions are still experiencing much recession due to being circumvented under black market mechanisms, while many states have been wielding discretionary enforcement on a variable scale hardly fulfilling obligations to support sanctions against the target. This has posed a conundrum for U.S. foreign policy action, between balancing its interests with respect to a particular application of sanctions and giving legitimacy and efficacy to the entire sanctions regime. Otherwise, it will endanger that bilateral relationship with respect to sanctions and severely cripple the multilateral sanctions.

### **2.3.1 The Mechanism of UNSC Sanctions**

The UNSC sanctions system has been designed to be both structured and flexible to meet diverse threats to international peace and security. Generally, the sanctions are initiated by the member states, discussed at the Security Council, and then formulated into a resolution that describes the dimensions, area of concern, and the nations or regions affected under those measures. Sanctions may be comprehensive, covering entire economies or they may refer to a specified individual, group, or sector like arms, or finance (UN Security Council, 2006).

Execution is done by sanctions committees composed of representatives from all UN Security Council members. These committees review exemption requests and assess compliance with the sanctions. The 1718 Committee, for example, observes North Korea's nuclear undertakings and recalibrates sanctions, if necessary (Erickson, 2019). Relying heavily on national jurisdictions to enforce because it has no independent enforcement mechanism, the system can also make it less effective.

Although focused and effective in their essence, national sanctions often have problems related to poor packaging, political resentment, and humanitarian issues. The United States was instrumental in enforcing these mechanisms through intelligence-sharing, lobbied for better enforcement, and imposed unilateral sanctions (Biersteker & Eckert, 2018). Divergence among permanent members on particular matters, especially with Russia and China, however, would curb the further effectiveness of such resolutions, and in some cases, lead to deadlock. Using third-party intermediaries and shadow banking networks to evade sanctions has also made it easier for these sanctions to remain ineffective (Farrell & Newman, 2019). As a counter, the U.S. has increased financial monitoring and used pressures on states and institutions to eliminate illicit transactions. Despite such efforts, however, the transparency and fairness of UNSC sanctions have faced negative criticisms and demands for better accountability mechanisms to avoid unintentional humanitarian consequences.

### **2.3.2 U.S.-Led Sanctions and Their Impact**

An important lever of international geopolitics in recent years has been the US-sponsored sanctions through the UNSC. It has also become, in most cases, the single most important instrument for pressuring opposed regimes. A clear example is the UN Resolution 1929 (2010), which imposed sanctions on Iran's nuclear program. However, after the signing of the JCPOA,

the U.S. left the JCPA to exercise "maximum pressure," which increased the level of sanctions (Katzman, 2021). This indeed stalled Iran's nuclear program, showcased the coercing ability of sanctions, and insulted Iran's economy as more than 80% of oil exports were cut down leading to a violent domestic uprising (Pape, 1997). So, just as the sanction imposed on Russia due to the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the U.S. will mobilize international community efforts to give credence to such mitigation, but the political resultant effects of these sanctions have been an issue of debate (Gurvich & Prilepskiy, 2015).

Thus, the horror-and-cry of humanitarian consequences raised some significant ethical issues when sanctions were indiscriminate and had indirect, disproportionate effects on civilians. During the 1990s the United Nations went so far as to warn that sanctions on Iraq caused more death and destruction as starvation moved into the ranks of weapons of mass destruction by inflicting dire shortages of food and prescribed medicines among civilians: resulting in dire suffering without obtaining the aimed political results (Gordon, 2010). Consequently, the UNSC started shifting towards targeted or "smart" sanctions aimed at having an impact only on elites or specific industries and reducing the collateral damage incurred. Unfortunately, even these might have adverse effects on local economies and harm those most needy. The U.S. pretends to allow its humanitarian provision through humanitarian aid even when it enacts a broad sanctions regime. However, such provisions take weeks or months to reach places, sometimes due to enforcement problems and banking restrictions in delay for the delivery of essential supplies (Weiss & Carayannis, 2021). The implication has been that one of the persistent challenges within U.S. sanctions diplomacy has been intact between the political objectives of sanctions and their ethical implications.

### **2.3.3 The Effectiveness and Ethical Considerations of Sanctions**

Most critics of sanctions as a tool of foreign policy point out that very few actually achieve behavioral change. There are some cases, however, with which most critics disagree. For example, the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and Libya's nuclear disarmament (Baldwin, 1985) were considered as a success for sanctions. Critics would argue, however, that almost all the non-democratic regimes outlast the sanctions. In fact, they tend to reinforce some regimes in instances, such as Cuba and North Korea, where governments flourish on oppression and cut-throat illegal trading (Nephew, 2017). Sanctions are typically used in that "grey area" between diplomatic pressure and military aggression, but their effectiveness depends significantly on the characteristics of the target state, the coalition's unity in imposing the sanctions, and the demands' clarity (Drezner, 1999).

Sanctions policy has increasingly turned into a problematic ethical issue, especially in terms of collective punishment and the violation of human rights. These targeted sanctions are supposed to focus on civilians with as little damage as possible, but some secondary sanctions cause unintended disruptions to global trade and humanitarian efforts (Weiss & Carayannis, 2021). According to legal scholars, sanctions would need to be consistent with international humanitarian law, which guarantees access to basic items and services (O'Connell, 2002). Some would suggest improvements, including increased exemptions for humanitarian purposes and better assessments of the effects of sanctions, as avenues for making sanctions fairer. On the contrary, the national strategic interests that often commit U.S. sanctions policy lead to the remaining debate about the ethics involved. The debate usually parallels the "harsh realities" regarding the use of sanctions in foreign policy action.

## **2.4 The U.S. and the UNSC Reform Debate**

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a furious debate about the organisation and functioning of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as the international order tries to mold itself into present-day geopolitical realities. The United States, as a permanent member with veto power, has played a central role in this debate, balancing its multilateral commitments with aspirations to maintain its privileged status in the system. The composition of the Council, the veto system, and the working methods of the Council are the three issues that remain critical to the maintenance of international peace and security and which lie at the heart of the reform debate (Luck, 2018). The leading and acrimonious debate today is whether the reforming of the Council will increase its legitimacy and effectiveness, or whether such a restructuring will compromise the Council's ability to respond fast and flexibly to global crises. The posture of the U.S. on these crucial issues gives telling insight into its approach to global governance as well as its vision of what these institutions should look like in the foreseeable future.

### **2.4.1 Global Calls for UNSC Reform**

Reformation of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has grown into a raging trend during the last few decades due to increasing perceptions that the structure of the Council reflects a distribution of power, for example, in 1945 as opposed to the reality currently in the 21st century. Countries like the G4-Brazil, Germany, India, and Japan have grown vocal in advocating the expansion of permanent membership, arguing that political and economic realities go hand in hand with a greater role in global security decisions (Panda, 2021). Similarly, the African Group has pressed for at least two permanent seats for Africans, considering the general underrepresentation on the continent and the fact that most current UN peacekeeping missions are hosted in the continent (Vogt, 2020). Besides the membership debate, increasing calls are

heard regarding expanding veto use-sale with respect to mass atrocities, such as those shown in the French-Mexican initiative and the Code of Conduct of the ACT group (Security Council Report, 2022). Illustrating the on-the-surface problems posed by modern security issues, these appraisals include civil wars and humanitarian crises.

The dispute about reforms has also become further knotty because the member states have been divided on their position. Some advocated comprehensive reforms, while some are geared toward perceiving the Council's working methods in a smaller context. The smaller and middle-sized states, especially, have focused on transparency and more inclusivity in the decision-making processes within the Council (Malone, 2021). With no real progress being made in this area, there were warnings about the possible "legitimacy crisis" the UNSC would face, where decisions of the body would be seen as increasingly apart from the interests and perspectives of the wider UN membership (Weiss & Daws, 2018). This hanging reform struggle has stemmed from a fundamental tension whereby there is almost universal consensus regarding the need for change but no consensus within the permanent members because of each power's entrenched strategic interests.

#### **2.4.2 The U.S. Position on UNSC Reform**

In fact, during the years, the U.S. position on reform has been influenced by the geopolitical currents over time. The Obama administration appeared to be somewhat amenable to making changes that would include expanded permanent membership. The Trump administration, by contrast, adopted a rather transactional style, linking support of reform for other policy objectives such as burden-sharing or reductions in the UN budget (U.S. Mission to the UN, 2020). It is within this context that the Biden administration seeks to find a middle ground, taking for reforms made responsibly protecting the essence of the current system (U.S.

Department of State, 2021). All these tactical differences, however, underscore the same underlying strategy: the U.S. will not abjure its right to influence within the Council. Critics would characterize the position as excessively conservative, while others would consider it within the realm of pragmatism, given the realities of contemporary interventionist politics and the dim prognosis for any substantive reformation.

Going perfectly with time, the position of the U.S. over reform has shifted depending on geopolitical currents. The Obama administration opened a door by being receptive to reforms that included the expansion of permanent membership. The Trump administration, by contrast, adopted a transactional tone on the matter, relating support for reform to other policy objectives such as burden-sharing or cuts to the UN budget (U.S. Mission to the UN, 2020). To this end, the Biden administration seeks to find a middle ground in reforms made responsibly while safeguarding the essence of the current system (U.S. Department of State, 2021). The underlying strategy, however, remains the same: the U.S. will not renounce the freedom to influence within the Council. The position comes too conservative in the eyes of critics; this is, however, viewed by others as pragmatic considering the harsh realities of today's intervening politics and dismal prospects for substantive reform.

#### **2.4.3. Implications of Reform for U.S. Influence**

The implications that a reformed UNSC would have on American power are uncertain and complex. Countries such as Japan entering into permanent membership, on the one hand, would serve to strengthen the position of the U.S. by forming a coalition of like-minded states with similar foreign policy interests (Panda, 2021). Contrastingly, with an increase in the number of permanent members with divergent foreign policy orientations, some of which could stand in opposition to U.S. interests, American influence could be diluted and consensus harder to

achieve (Malone, 2021). Parallel considerations arise when considering changes to the veto system: limiting the veto, particularly concerning humanitarian cases might enhance American credibility, yet it also strips the U.S. of an instrument to veto actions that it sees as strategically disadvantageous (Weiss & Daws, 2018). These tensions underscore the primary dilemma faced by the U.S., seeking a more representative and functional Council while holding to the very end its authority over decision-making in the sphere of global security.

The longer-term consequences of reform or non-reform may extend well beyond the Council itself. Ignoring the call for reform might hasten the emergence of alternative governance mechanisms and regional security architectures, thus rendering the UNSC less relevant in international affairs (Vogt, 2020). On the contrary, successful reform that lends more legitimacy to the Council could, in turn, strengthen the UN's position as the hub of global governance, with the continued active involvement of the U.S. in the system. Some analysts assert that the U.S. would reap gains from whatever limited reforms would address urgent legitimacy issues while retaining the system's essential features (Luck, 2018). In the end, changes in U.S. influence will therefore depend not so much on formal changes to the structure of the Council itself, but instead on how such changes fit within much larger changes within the international system and American diplomatic strategy for years to follow.

## **2.5 Results and Discussion**

In Chapter 2, we have seen how the U.S. appears to be a complicated political actor in the United Nations Security Council, using its influence as a political power to gain control over the global security situation. A look into the U.S. utilization of its veto, leadership in peacekeeping and military operations, imposition of economic sanctions, and involvement in the current debate

over reforming the UNSC would lay bare the overwhelming facade of and debate about U.S. actions within the Council.

The balance of national interests has often found justification with the exercise of veto powers, which leads to many instances of subverting collective security (O'Neill, 2021). While the U.S. invented the authorizing peacekeeping actions and military interventions, there have also been occasions when it called for unilateral military action, such as the Iraq War in 2003, which raised questions concerning the intervention's legitimacy (Patrick, 2020). Sanctions form one of the most vital tools in U.S. foreign policy. They are criticized for their allegedly humanitarian effects as well as their selectivity (Erickson, 2019). Last but not least, the U.S. would participate only reluctantly in any discussions of reforms of the UNSC, which would not be supportive of reforms that would have any probability of jeopardizing the privileged status of the U.S. in the Council (Malone, 2022).

Thus, the U.S. continues to be a major player in the UNSC, trying to balance hegemonic influence with the demands of multilateralism within it. However, if the power balance in the world changes, it will find itself under more pressure to seek legitimacy in the face of changes to the world order. Future research may address how rising power will challenge American unilateralism or whether UNSC reform can change power concentration to a more shared model.

### **Conclusion**

The U.S.-UNSC engagement is nuanced, based more on power, diplomacy, and institution-building than on unilateralism. The right of veto is used both as a protective right and as a cause for global contention, and the preeminence in both military intervention and peacekeeping exerts considerable unidirectional power but is largely deemed unilateral. The use of economic

sanctions is still favored but debated amidst humanitarian and strategic costs debates. On institutional reform the U.S. finds itself walking the line between preserving power and a global demand for reform. The above-suggested examples of the way Washington can define global security in the face of delegitimizing challenges. This tension between unilateral interests and multilateral obligations has remained at the heart of its role in the UNSC. As demands for institutional reform of U.S. hegemony increase, it remains to be seen whether U.S. power can be restructured and if that restructuring will change U.S. dominance. This chapter reveals the stabilizing and destabilizing role of American involvement in the UNSC. But this must be taken into consideration in a more nuanced analysis of its impact on global governance.

## General Conclusion

This dissertation aimed to offer an account of U.S. power over the UNSC that is comprehensive in its historical, legal, political and power impact on the multilateral organization. By critically assessing these components, the purpose of this research was to gather if the U.S. reaction was indeed an attempt to work in concert and lead collectively for the sake of collective security or whether it was an exercise in hegemony acting based on national interests. Also, it attempts to contribute to the current debate on UNSC efficiency and legitimacy in the current international order.

This dissertation has been articulated into two chapters, tackling distinct yet interrelated issues about the United States and its position in the context of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). This study aimed to explore the nature and evolution of the United States' role within the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), focusing particularly on how its influence has developed over time and the broader implications of its actions for global peace and security.

To achieve this aim, the research examined the historical background and legal foundations of the UNSC, with particular attention to the US's status as a permanent member with veto power. It further analyzed key cases of the U.S. involvement in UNSC decision-making, including military interventions, peacekeeping efforts, and sanctions enforcement.

The methodology relied primarily on qualitative analysis of official documents, UNSC resolutions, voting records, and relevant scholarly literature to assess both the direct and indirect impacts of US actions on international peace and the effectiveness of the UNSC.

This dissertation has examined the U.S. role in the UNSC by posing three central research questions. The results affirm a more nuanced picture of U.S. hegemony and institutional power

in relation to security in the world. The main findings of the study are summarized below in relation to the study's research questions.

First, the U.S. has a unique and predominant role in the UN Security Council due to being a founding partner, a permanent veto-wielding member, and a financial and logistical powerhouse for the UN. The U.S. engages in diplomatic efforts to influence the UNSC agenda and decisions, builds alliances with states that serve to advance its agenda, and regularly uses the veto power to safeguard national interests and strategic allies. This is evidenced by its leadership on peacekeeping missions and sanctions implementation, revealing a permanent trend that employs the Council as a vehicle for its own global foreign policy achievements.

Secondly, U.S. influence in the UNSC has evolved from the situation of rival superpower blocking Council initiatives during the Cold War period, to one of U.S. preeminence after the Cold War, when the United States became the "engine of the majority of UNSC initiatives". Nevertheless, in recent decades, the emergence of multipolarity, where new powers began to oppose U.S. unilateralism and ask for structural changes in the Council, has become evident. The U.S. is still a leading power, but its ability to mobilize action without a broad consensus has waned, indicating a more contested and diplomatically challenging framework.

Thirdly, the U.S. presence in the UNSC has also supported and obstructed global peace and security efforts. It has, on the one hand, taken the lead on coping with international emergencies, sanctioning peace-keeping operations and instituting sanctions against 'rogues'. The controversial other, prominent vetoes, particularly in the case of the Middle East, alongside unilateral military interventions, have also receded from collective security norms. The inconsistent application of international law and the opposition to reforms to the UNSC have

created an environment of skepticism regarding the legitimacy and objectivity of the Council's decisions that now seem to occur under U.S. influence.

Future research may need to examine the role of changing US foreign policy agendas in terms of its implications for US leadership in the UNSC under changing administrations, particularly in developing fields such as cybersecurity, climate security, and great power competition with China and Russia. Additionally, it could be examined if the US hegemony in the UNSC is in the process of weakening as multiplicity expands and regional powers influence its decision-making.

This research has several limitations. As it analyzed official documents and scholarly sources, the study's qualitative approach meant some interpretations remain open to debate. We recognized that focusing primarily on U.S. actions might unintentionally minimize how other permanent members shape UNSC outcomes. The reliance on publicly available records also created blind spots. Current geopolitical shifts happened rapidly that some observations may need updating. These limitations highlighted how future studies could expand and refine our understanding of this complex topic.

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## المخلص

تحقق هذه الدراسة في دور الولايات المتحدة في مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة. من خلال تحليل استخدامها الاستراتيجي لحق النقض (الفيتو)، وتدخلاتها العسكرية الأحادية، ونُظُم العقوبات في تشكيل حوكمة الأمن العالمي من الحرب الباردة إلى العصر متعدد الأقطاب الحالي - و من خلال منهج وصفي تحليلي وعبر نقص نوعي، تحلل الدراسة بشكل منهجي سلوك الولايات المتحدة اتجاه قرارات مجلس الأمن. يتضمن هذا المنهج استقراء البيانات الأولية كالثائق الرسمية للأمم المتحدة لتقديم نظرة عامة شاملة لتأثير الولايات المتحدة وقوتها المؤسسية بشؤون الأمن العالمي. إذ تتمتع الولايات المتحدة بدور فريد ومهيمن في مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة نظرا لكونها شريكا مؤسسا، وعضوا دائما يتمتع بحق النقض (الفيتو) وقوة مالية لوجستية هائلة داعمة للأمم المتحدة.

الكلمات المفتاحية : الولايات المتحدة ، مجلس الأمن التابع للأمم المتحدة ، حق الفيتو عقوبات.