

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

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Abstrac:	The problem of this study addresses is the assassination of the martyr Abane Ramadane by his colleagues. Was this physical liquidation for the benefit of the revolution or was it a deviation from its course? Abane Ramadane's opponents did not stop there, but even went so far as to accuse him of treason and collaborating with the colonialist, and in this way they gave themselves the pretext to get rid of him and betray him. The study concluded that Abane Ramadan's assassination incident was nothing but a tragic episode in the history of the Algerian Revolution, and that the disappearance of Abane in this way only fostered seeds of doubt between the leaders of the revolution at home and abroad, and it also gave a bad tradition of settling scores between brothers in struggle
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### 1. INTRODUCTION

The Algerian revolution, a beacon of hope for freedom fighters worldwide, triumphed against the powerful French colonizer with unwavering determination despite limited resources. Historians often attribute this success to the revolution's unique lack of a single leader. This leaderless structure ensured the revolution's resilience; eliminating a singular figure wouldn't extinguish the flames of resistance.

However, the absence of a unified leadership also posed a significant internal threat. While the revolutionaries embraced collective leadership and held periodic conferences for coordination, the harsh realities of war – French pressure, martyred leaders – hampered these efforts. Communication and collaboration became strained, leading to ambition and competition among military and political figures. This internal conflict reached a tragic peak with the physical elimination, or assassination, of many leaders and fighters, including the renowned martyr Abane Ramdane.

The following questions delve deeper into Abane Ramdane's story: Who was he? Why and how was he assassinated? Did his death serve to rectify the revolution's course or represent a deviation from its path?

### 2. Abane Ramadane and the Soummam Conference

#### 2.1 His life:

Abane Ramadane, born on June 10, 1920, hailed from a well-off family in Azzouza village, Tizi Ouzou. His upbringing facilitated his education, starting at Tizi Ouzou high school and continuing in Blida where he earned his mathematics baccalaureate in 1941. Family circumstances forced him to leave school, but in 1943, the French drafted him for compulsory military service, stationing him in Tizi Ouzou.

Following his service, Abane Ramadane dedicated himself to the national movement's political struggle. His tireless efforts led to increased responsibilities within the movement. This fight

continued until his 1950 arrest in Ain Temouchent, resulting in a six-year sentence with a hefty fine. He served part of his sentence in Algeria before being transferred to France and eventually returning to El Harrach prison in Algeria.

Released in 1955, Abane Ramadane joined the revolution. Two years later, he participated in the pivotal Soummam Conference, becoming a member of its Coordination Committee for implementation. Tragically, El Moudjahid newspaper announced his martyrdom on December 27, 1957, near the Moroccan-Algerian border. ( Ministry of Mujahideen, 2009, p. 67)

### 2.2 2- Abane Ramadane's Role in Organizing the Revolution Through the Soummam Conference:

Abane Ramadane's arrival in the capital during spring 1955 marked the emergence of a new generation of well-educated and well-trained leaders within the revolution. Notably, many university-educated students who joined the revolution significantly contributed to its cultural development. The revolutionary elite surrounding Abane Ramadane exemplified this trend, as most possessed academic qualifications exceeding those of leadership figures within the Five Historical Regions.

Abane Ramadane entrusted a group of students with significant political and military responsibilities. These individuals, despite their high qualifications, remained largely unknown. Some prominent members included Ibrahim Chergui, Malik Al-Hashemi, Mahmoud Messaoudi, Abderrahmane Talib, Boualem Oussedik, Abderrahmane Ben Hamida, Hadj Ismail, and Ali Hawat. This group also encompassed graduates from Islamic institutes and the French University of Algeria. (Khaither, 2005-2006, p. 71)

Rabah Bitat's arrest in March 1955 created a leadership vacancy. With the ongoing war demanding action, Karim Belkacem and Ouamran, officials from nearby tribes, filled the gap. Belkacem, leader of the Kabylie region, appointed Ouamran to head the fourth region and Abane Ramadane to oversee the capital, now designated a "free zone." This new administration,

### Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

formed in early 1955, became the central command for the FLN, coordinating with leaders both inside and outside Algeria. (Al-Saleh, 2015, p. 90)

Abane Ramadane's leadership in the third region spurred efforts toward a more organized structure. By summer 1955, commanders in other regions recognized the need for collaboration. Contacts between Zigoud and Chihani culminated in the significant August 20th attacks, a demonstration of unified force. (Khaither, 2005-2006, p. 128)

Abane further strengthened the revolution by uniting key figures. Shortly after their release in May 1955, he secured the support of Ben Khadda and Saad Dahleb. From June 1955 to April 1956, with the help of these leaders and others like Rachid Amara and Ben M'hidi, he reached out to various national figures. This outreach successfully brought in Al-Wunshi, Al-Amin Dabbaghin, Sheikh Khair Al-Din, and others, integrating them into the FLN. (Harbi, L'Algérie et son destin, 1994, p. 119)

Abane's strategy wasn't simply forming a coalition. He aimed to unify all competencies and energies within the FLN. National currents became increasingly synonymous with the revolutionary organization he envisioned as an armed mass party. Notably, Abane displayed initiative while many leaders remained cautious. A crucial aspect of his pre-Soummam Conference efforts was centralizing revolutionary leadership within Algeria, bringing external bodies in Egypt and France under the control of the central command in Algiers.

This was evident in September 1955 when he sent Dabbaghin to lead the foreign delegation in Cairo. Similarly, Saleh Al-Wenchi was dispatched in November of the same year to oversee the FLN Federation in France, where he encountered resistance from elements close to Mohamed Boudiaf. (Khaither, 2005-2006, p. 144)

From mid-1955 to summer 1956, Abane's key accomplishments included revitalizing the FLN, unifying Algerian political forces within it, effectively countering colonial propaganda, and

Volume09, Issue03, (November- 2024)

PP(315/332)

hindering the establishment of a "third force" by the French. Additionally, he played a role in encouraging the creation of crucial mass organizations that provided multifaceted support to the revolution. (Khaither, 2005-2006, p. 129)

Due to security concerns, the planned national meeting of the revolution was ultimately held in the village of "Ifrane Ouzalagen" within the Akfadou forest. Located in the eastern foothills of the Djurdjura Mountains, the village overlooked the western bank of the Soummam Valley. The conference brought together leaders of the revolution alongside over three hundred soldiers who served as security detail. (Zegidi, 2009, p. 134)

While a delegation of leaders stationed abroad was initially intended to attend, safety precautions necessitated their holding position in San Remo, Italy, and Tripoli, Libya, awaiting clearance to join the conference.

The conference resulted in significant decisions shaping the future organization and management of the revolution. Two key structures were established:

- The National Council of the Revolution: Comprised of 34 members (17 permanent and 17 assistants), this council convened annually throughout the war and held the sole authority to halt fighting.

- The Coordination and Implementation Committee: This five-member committee oversaw political, economic, social, and military organizations. Additionally, they held responsibility for establishing and monitoring various committees and possessed the right to form an interim government in collaboration with delegates abroad.

The conference also addressed the relationship between the revolutionary front and the army, prioritizing the political sphere over the military. In terms of internal and external leadership, priority was given to the leadership within Algeria, while still upholding the principle of shared administration and courts for both civilians and military personnel. Finally, the conference produced a pivotal political document, considered the charter or

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

guiding principle for the Algerian revolution. (Zegidi, 2009, p. 139)

While many nationalist political analysts viewed the Soummam Valley conference as a victory for the Algerian revolution, some Algerian officials abroad held a starkly contrasting view.

Fathi El-Deeb, an Egyptian intelligence officer, cites Ahmed Ben Bella in his book "Abdel Nasser and the Algerian Revolution." Ben Bella reportedly expressed concern that the conference marked a dangerous turning point, outlining several potential consequences:

- Eastern and Western Regional Objections: Ben Bella feared that regions absent from the conference wouldn't simply disagree with its resolutions, but might escalate to internal conflict aimed at eliminating the leadership.
- Weapon Withholding by Neighboring States: There were worries that neighboring countries might withhold weapon supplies from regions within Algeria in an attempt to pressure them to reverse the conference decisions.
- International Image Concerns: The potential for internal conflict spilling over and impacting the positive image of the Algerian revolution among Arab and international communities was also raised.
- Politicization of the Military: Finally, Ben Bella expressed concern about a potential power struggle between politicians and the military, with the spread of political and military influence within the National Liberation Army potentially harming the revolutionary process. (Al-Dheeb, 1990, p. 248)

### 3. Assassination

#### 3.1. Causes and Circumstances

There are a number of reasons and circumstances that preceded and contributed to Abane Ramadane's absence by his companions, not only from the revolution field, but also from the scene, that can be summarized in two main points:

## 3.1. 1. Internal Conflicts

History has shown that the "primacy of the political over the military" decision resulting from the Soummam Conference caused a major and painful rift in the ranks of the revolution, which was not mentioned in The Declaration of 1 November. Some people said, "I am from the Liberation Army," and others said, "I am from the Liberation Front." One of the negative consequences of this decision is that the military revolutionary front cracked at home. Those who sided with politicians got more weapons and also opened doors to contact the enemy and try to negotiate without consulting those at home or the heads of state leaders, as well as the plane hijacking, which was not unlikely to be included within the framework of attempts to negotiate and keep pace with what happened on the Tunisia and Morocco wings, so that the revolution would not go further and achieve true complete independence, social transformations, justice and democracy in accordance with the goals of the first of November. (Kafi, 1999, p. 122)

The Soummam Conference decisions sparked disagreements between the leadership abroad led by Ben Bella and Boudiaf, and the leadership within Algeria comprising Belmehidi, Krim Belkacem, Abane Ramadane, Ben Khedda, Bedjaoui, and Ozgan. One point of contention was the exclusion of the foreign delegation from the Coordination and Implementation Committee. After their plane was hijacked by the French and they were imprisoned, tensions further escalated within the leadership in Algeria.

Krim Belkacem grew increasingly frustrated with Abane Ramadane's ambition. He regretted appointing Abane to oversee the capital, which Abane had dared to designate as an "independent region." Belkacem also held Abane responsible for the failure of the battle for the capital. With the capture of Belmehidi, Belkacem saw himself as a potential leader, mirroring Abane's earlier criticisms of the military's "political stupidity." (Al-Saleh, 2015, p. 93)

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

Meanwhile, Boussouf and Ben Tobal grew dissatisfied with the concentration of power between Abane and Belkacem. They sought to join the leadership abroad and share power.

These developments gradually led to a new internal conflict: the military wing, represented by Krim Belkacem, Boussouf, and Ben Tobal, on the one hand, and the political wing, led by Abane Ramadane, Ben Khedda, Farhat Abbas, and others, on the other. These internal disputes negatively impacted the revolution and delayed solutions to the challenges faced by the Mujahideen fighters within Algeria.

### Internal Conflicts Intensify

- **Power Struggle and Shifting Alliances:** Discontent with the concentration of power between Abane Ramadane and Krim Belkacem led Boussouf and Ben Tobal to seek partnership with the leadership abroad, potentially altering the balance between the military wing (Krim Belkacem, Boussouf, Ben Tobal) and the political wing (Abane Ramadane, Ben Khedda, Farhat Abbas). (Hilali, 2012, p. 255)

- **Foreign Delegation's Discontent:** The leadership abroad, excluded from the Soummam Conference, strongly opposed its decisions and called for a rival conference in Cairo (August 1957) to overturn the Soummam outcomes. This conference notably rejected the prioritization of the political sphere over the military or the internal leadership over the external. (Harbi, Les archives de la révolution Algérienne, 1998, p. 171)

- **Public Disagreements and Alliance Formation:** Public pronouncements against the Soummam Conference by Ben Bella (representing the foreign delegation) clashed with Abane Ramadane's firm implementation of its decisions within Algeria. This discord culminated in the formation of opposing alliances by fall of 1956. (Khaither, 2005-2006, p. 141)

- **Fragmentation and Lasting Impact:** These internal divisions solidified along regional lines. The pursuit of power, personal ambitions, and pre-revolution rivalries resurfaced. Competing power centers emerged, leading to internal

contradictions and clashes that threatened to tear apart the revolutionary front. Only the continued dedication and sacrifices of the National Liberation Army soldiers across Algeria, along with their commitment to the revolution's principles, prevented a complete collapse. (Kafi, 1999, p. 104)

### 3.1. 2. Abane Ramadane's Ambitions

Following early victories on the battlefield and diplomatic triumphs by the Algerian delegation abroad, Abane, a man of both intellect and ambition, recognized the revolution's progress. Within eleven months, the movement had achieved success in military, political, diplomatic, and media spheres, swaying public opinion and gaining support from many parties. Despite their resources, French generals couldn't quell the rebellion in its first year.

Abane saw this as an opportunity. He envisioned a new approach to solidify his leadership and become the moderate alternative the revolution craved. He aimed to distance himself from the "bombers" – revolutionaries advocating violence – whose radical tactics he believed alienated both the French and Algerian moderates. He sought to reassure French moderates and offer a path to peace that wouldn't compromise Algerian independence.

However, Abane's fatal flaw was his belief that armed struggle had served its purpose. He saw the revolution as entering a purely political phase and considered himself its rightful leader. This shift in strategy alienated his comrades, ultimately leading to his downfall.. (Hilali, 2012, p. 260)

Following his self-appointment as coordinator of the Coordination and Implementation Committee, Abane faced dissent regarding his leadership and vision. His actions fueled these tensions:

- **Military Redeployment:** Abane controversially redeployed military leaders from the critical Kabylie region. These fighters were sent to confront opponents within Algeria, specifically in the Souk Aurès, Aurès, and Tunisian border regions. This move

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

prioritized internal power struggles over ongoing battles against French forces.

- **Centralized Control:** Abane accelerated the implementation of a centralized leadership structure established at the Soummam conference. However, some viewed this as a way to consolidate his own power rather than a genuine effort to improve efficiency.

- **Strong-Arm Tactics:** Abane sent a forceful letter to the leadership abroad, represented by Ben Bella. The message delivered a stark warning: the revolution's decisions were final and anyone opposing them would be crushed.

These actions further alienated Abane from some revolutionaries. They pointed to his earlier decision to establish the capital, Algiers, as a "free zone," isolating it from the main revolutionary structure. This, combined with his centralist appointments and strong-arm tactics, fueled suspicion that Abane prioritized personal ambition over the revolution's success. (Hilali, 2012, p. 250)

Tensions rose towards Abane Ramadane, with accusations of him being a French collaborator. Ali Kafi initially expressed trust in Abane due to his association with the People's Party. However, after a year, a shift occurred. Revolution leaders like Amirouche, Belkacem, and Ben Tobal alleged secret communication between Abane and France. They accused him of unauthorized contact with the enemy. Rumors even circulated about a death sentence from the revolution. Kafi mentions Abane engaging in secret communications his colleagues only discovered later, raising suspicions. This ultimately led them to lure Abane to Morocco under the pretense of meeting King Mohammed V, where he was reportedly tried and sentenced. (Kafi, 1999, p. 101)

Amirouche provided specifics, claiming Abane intended to sow discord within the revolution and had ties to a rebel leader who surrendered to the French. He further stated verified information about a Coordination and Implementation Committee member's contact with the enemy, confirmed by Salah Zamoum. A written statement by Amirouche explicitly accused Abane.

Volume09, Issue03, (November- 2024)

PP(315/332)

Malik bin Nabi believed Abane's actions were undoubtedly suspicious. He suggested Abane played a deceitful role throughout the revolution, aiming to undermine its leadership and ultimately control it for his own ends. (Bennabi, 2002, p. 124)

According to Ali Kafi, Abane Ramadane secretly communicated with the enemy without informing his leadership colleagues. These communications were eventually discovered, raising suspicion about Abane's loyalties. This led his colleagues to lure him to Morocco, supposedly for a meeting with King Mohammed V, where he faced trial and sentencing. (Kafi, 1999, p. 123)

Abane also attempted to exert control over the revolution's foreign delegation in Cairo. He initially appointed Mohamed Lamine Dabaghine to lead the delegation, aiming to bring it under the central leadership's control. However, this move backfired. Ben Bella, a prominent figure within the delegation, rejected the appointment, viewing it as an overreach of Abane's authority.

Despite this setback, Abane persisted in mid-1956. He pushed for prominent nationalist parties to join the Cairo delegation, including Taoufik El Madani, Farhat Abbas, and Lamine Dabaghine. Abane seemingly believed he could manipulate the situation. By gaining political support, he aimed to weaken the military's influence and undermine the foreign delegation's authority. He envisioned himself as the natural leader, historically and practically qualified to guide the revolution. He harbored the delusion of achieving three main goals:

- **Subduing the Military:** By prioritizing political action over military operations, Abane aimed to diminish the military's importance, who were initially credited with sparking the revolution.

- **Politicians:** He prioritized domestic issues over international diplomacy, sidelining the existing foreign delegation. He replaced them with Dr. Lamine Dabaghine and removed them from the Coordination and Implementation Committee, favoring centralists who opposed the revolution's declaration.

### Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

- **Military:** He deliberately excluded state officials from the Soummam Conference, believing they wouldn't endorse his vision. This fuelled tensions. The Cairo delegation, in response, held a counter-conference in 1957, aiming to undermine Abane and his political allies. They expanded the National Revolutionary Council and the Coordination and Implementation Committee, shifting power towards military leaders like Karim, Ben Toubal, and Boussouf.
- **Threats and Isolation:** Abane refused to back down. He threatened his opponents, fearing a military takeover. He used the Al-Mujahid newspaper to criticize the military's intellectual and political shortcomings. This alienated him further, including from key figures like Karim Belkacem. (Hilali, 2012, p. 267)
- **Miscalculation and Desperation:** Abane made a critical error by neglecting to build a military force loyal to him. He believed politicians held the true power. However, when his position weakened, he was forced to seek help from the very military forces he antagonized – the Aurès group and the eastern base. Despite their past animosity, they offered him refuge. However, their support was insufficient. Abane's struggle ultimately ended with his disappearance in Morocco. (Hilali, 2012, p. 255)

#### 3.2. Reasons and facts

Tensions between Abane Ramadane and the colonels escalated to the point where Abane stopped attending meetings of the Coordination and Implementation Committee. A final mediation attempt by the three politicians on the committee (Abbas, Dabaghine, and Mehri) failed to break the deadlock. Abane remained defiant.

In December 1957, the colonels decided to eliminate Abane's opposition. While some advocated for imprisonment, others opted for a more drastic solution. Ultimately, they lured Abane to Morocco under false pretenses and assassinated him there. Karim Belkacem shed light on the circumstances surrounding the killing. He revealed that shortly after the Cairo conference in

Volume09, Issue03, (November- 2024)

PP(315/332)

August 1957, a report surfaced from a senior officer on the eastern border. The report alleged that Abane was secretly contacting Major Hadj Ali Hamdi, aiming to manipulate his troops stationed near Tunisia. Abane's alleged plan was to eliminate the Coordination and Implementation Committee, leaving him in sole control. This information, considered a serious threat to the revolution, prompted the colonels to take action against Abane.

While some accounts claim a de facto court sentenced Abane Ramadane to imprisonment, this has been disputed. The intention may have been to use the threat of incarceration to coerce Abane into submission. However, Abane remained defiant.

He was ultimately lured into a deadly trap orchestrated by Boussouf's men. Interestingly, Boussouf himself allegedly objected to the idea of a "prison sentence" during a revolution, arguing there were no proper facilities.

Harbi, in his book "Les archives de la révolution Algérienne," quotes Mahmoud Cherif: "I confirm here that this trap almost dragged me and Mahmoud Cherif into assassinating us with him" (Harbi, Les archives de la révolution Algérienne, 1998, p. 179)

On December 22nd, Abane was informed in Tunis of a supposed critical situation in Morocco. The story was that three Coordination and Implementation Committee (CCE) members and a battalion of Boussouf's forces had been disarmed by the Moroccan army. King Mohammed V's intervention was supposedly needed. Abane, along with Karim and Mahmoud Cherif, agreed to help resolve the situation.

On December 24th, the three men booked flights to Tetouan, Morocco, via Rome and Madrid. Upon arrival on December 27th, they were met at Tetouan airport not by the expected delegation, but by Boussouf and two of his intelligence officers.

Everyone entered a car, supposedly heading towards Tangier. However, after a few kilometers, the car veered off the main road onto a dirt path leading to a farm. Arriving at the farm, the two officers forced Abane out of the car and dragged him inside.

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

Boussouf, Karim, and Mahmoud Cherif, meanwhile, continued to a villa where dinner awaited them.

Later, the officers returned to the villa, informing Boussouf that Abane was "in an adjacent room." They found him lying motionless on a bed – dead. (Belhaj, 2006, p. 22)

News of Abane Ramadane's assassination sent shockwaves. The French press seized the opportunity to exploit the situation. To manage the narrative, the colonels concocted a story claiming Abane had "fallen on the battlefield."

Houari Boumediene, acting on their behalf, informed Karim Belkacem, then commander of the armed forces. Another member, Omar Boumenjel, was tasked with writing a eulogy for the Al-Mujahid newspaper. The fabricated story appeared five months later in issue no. 24, dated May 29, 1958.

The eulogy portrayed Abane's death as an honorable sacrifice: "Abane was wounded in a battle that lasted several hours. Initial signs indicated his injuries were not life-threatening. Intensive treatment was provided, and we held onto hope that Abane's strength would prevail. Unfortunately, after weeks of isolation, severe bleeding claimed his life. We mourn a brother lost on the battlefield. His memory remains a guide to us!" (Boumendjel, 1958, p. 24)

### 4. What is going on after the assassination?

The elimination of Abane Ramadane had far-reaching consequences.

- Internal Purge: Many of Abane's close associates faced organizational repercussions. Lamine Debaghine and Ali Mendjli were removed from their positions. (Harbi, Les archives de la révolution Algérienne, 1998, p. 148)

- Shifting Ideology: Zbiri viewed Abane's assassination as a turning point for the revolution. He believed it marked a shift towards a dangerous ideological deviation (Al-Zubairi, 1999, p. 121). He argued that the principle of collective leadership was shattered when the most powerful members of the Coordination and Implementation Committee decided and executed Abane

Volume09, Issue03, (November- 2024)

PP(315/332)

without a trial or a clear explanation, bypassing the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, the only body authorized to handle such a case. Zbiri further argued that this disregard for established procedures set a precedent for future controversial decisions, such as the move to fight the war within France and the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

Conflicting Perspectives:

Despite the tragedy, reactions to Abane's death varied.

- Karim Belkacem: Farhat Abbas recounts Karim visiting him in February 1958. Karim reportedly admitted his responsibility for Abane's death, claiming Abane posed a threat to the movement. Abbas states that Karim expressed no regrets (Farhat Abbas testimony).

- Ahmed Ben Bella: Farhat Abbas also contrasts Karim's stance with Ben Bella's reaction. He cites a letter from Ben Bella to Karim, Lakhdar Ben Tobal, and Boussouf, dated April 26, 1958. In the letter, Ben Bella reportedly commends them for their "purification approach." He emphasizes the importance of being strict to safeguard the revolution's future. He views Abane's elimination as a significant step and urges them to continue this "purification" to ensure the movement's survival. (Al-Zubairi, 1999, p. 121)

Farhat Abbas, in his testimony, sheds light on the contrasting reactions to Abane Ramadane's death.

- Karim Belkacem Takes Responsibility: On February 19, 1958, Karim Belkacem reportedly visited Abbas. Karim admitted his role in Abane's death, claiming Abane posed a danger to the revolution. Abbas states that Karim expressed no remorse.

- Ben Bella's "Purification" Perspective: Abbas contrasts Karim's stance with a letter written by Ahmed Ben Bella on April 26, 1958, to Karim, Lakhdar Ben Tobal, and Boussouf. In the letter, Ben Bella reportedly endorses their actions, calling it a "purification approach." He emphasizes the importance of being ruthless to safeguard the revolution's future. He views Abane's

## Abane Ramadane's Assassination: A Deviation or Correction of the Course of the Revolution?

elimination as a significant step and urges them to continue this "purification" to ensure the movement's survival. Ben Bella's stance suggests he saw Abane as a threat and believed his removal was necessary. (Belhaj, 2006, p. 23).

While Ben Bella accused Abane Ramadane of promoting regionalism, and the foreign delegation criticized him for neglecting Kabylie, these arguments don't justify the establishment of a "purification" principle – the elimination of political opponents. This approach set a dangerous precedent, followed by many vying for power in Algeria, both before and after independence.

Ben Bella himself ultimately fell victim to the same tactic when Houari Boumediene ousted him in 1965. Similarly, Karim Belkacem was assassinated after independence.

Furthermore, Boussouf's intelligence apparatus, emboldened by Abane's elimination, went on to commit more atrocities, such as the killing of diplomat Amira Allaoua in Cairo in 1958. (Al-Dheeb, 1990, p. 422)

But did Abane really deserve this fate?

Abane Ramadane's legacy remains complex. While his contributions to the Algerian revolution are undeniable, his leadership style also created friction.

- Strengths: Abane's organizational skills and strategic thinking made him a valuable asset to the revolution.

- Weaknesses: He struggled to balance the various factions within the revolution. His attempts to marginalize some groups, including the original military leaders and those working abroad, fueled suspicion and mistrust.

A Flawed Solution:

Despite Abane's shortcomings, his assassination was a brutal and unnecessary act. Alternative methods, such as removal from leadership positions or internal exile, could have been pursued.

Accusations of Collaboration:

Volume09, Issue03, (November- 2024)

PP(315/332)

The allegation that Abane collaborated with the French colonizers has not been proven. These accusations may have been used by his opponents to justify his elimination.

In the end, it can be said: Abane Ramadane's arrival on the revolutionary scene proved pivotal.

- Hero or Heretic? His role in the successful Soummam Conference was undeniable. The conference established the revolution's charter, organized its political and military structures, and created the Coordination and Implementation Committee to address leadership issues. However, his subsequent actions sparked controversy.

- Shifting Power and Power Struggles: Some viewed Abane's focus on internal affairs and political control, along with his efforts to influence the Coordination and Implementation Committee, as an attempt to marginalize the military and external leadership. These actions fueled suspicion and ambition within the revolution.

- False Accusations and Deadly Consequences: Opponents escalated the situation by accusing Abane of treason and collaboration with the French, a claim with no substantiated evidence. These accusations tragically served as justification for his assassination.

- A Legacy of Loss: Abane's elimination stands as a dark stain on the revolution's history. It sowed further discord among revolutionaries at home and abroad, and established a dangerous precedent for settling internal disputes through violence.

This rewritten version presents a more balanced view of Abane Ramadane, acknowledging both his contributions and the controversies surrounding his leadership style. It emphasizes the tragedy of his death and the negative impact it had on the revolution.

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