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The US-UK Special Relationship and its Impact on UK Decision-Making

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Master's Degree in Literature and Civilization**

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Dedication

This work is dedicated to the memory of our beloved parents, whose love and sacrifices continue to inspire us. To our families and friends for their unwavering support and encouragement throughout this journey.

Acknowledgements

In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful.

First and foremost, praise is for Allah, on whom we depend for help and guidance.

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We would also like to take this opportunity to thank all our teachers.

Finally, our thanks go to the members of the jury for kindly agreeing to discuss and evaluate this dissertation.

Abstract

This dissertation explores the influence of the US-UK Special Relationship on British foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East. Rooted in shared values and historical ties, the special relationship has long been a cornerstone of transatlantic diplomacy. However, its specific impact on British policies in the Middle East has not been extensively studied. This research aims to fill this gap by analyzing how the special relationship shapes UK policy decision-making in the region. Utilizing a qualitative methodology, including historical analysis and case studies, the study investigates the mechanisms through which the special relationship impacts British foreign policy. The findings revealed that the special relationship significantly influences UK foreign policy in the Middle East, particularly in areas that witnessed military interventions, diplomatic engagements, and regional alignments. Bilateral diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation emerged as key factors shaping British responses to regional challenges. These findings contributed to a deeper understanding of contemporary international relations, emphasizing the complexities of the US-UK alliance and its implications for regional stability and global security. By examining the complicated interactions of this bilateral relationship, the research provides valuable insights into how the special relationship continues to shape British foreign policy in a critical region, offering a perspective on its role in addressing regional and global challenges.

Keywords: British foreign policy, Decision-making, Diplomacy, Middle East, US-UK Special Relationship.

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
DOS	Defence and Overseas Secretariat
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MI6	British Secret Intelligence Service
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
SCR	Security Council Resolution
UBL	Usama bin Laden
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSCRs	United Nations Security Council Resolutions
USA	United States of America
US	United States
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WWII	World War II

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General Introduction

1. Background of the Study

The backbone of the US-UK special relationship is a rich history built upon common values, traditions, and institutions wherein personalities have played an important role in the way the partnership has been conducted and the way it has operated throughout the history of the special relationship. The core principles of democracy, individual rights, the rule of law, and freedom will form the primary foundation of the special relationship. This unique partnership, rooted in shared values and ideals, encompasses various cultural and traditional connections. The modern special relationship emerged during World War II and was formally acknowledged in Churchill's "Sinews of Peace" address. The interactions between UK and US leaders during the Second World War highlighted the true nature of the modern special relationship, demonstrating how personalities, policies, and agreements were crucial in establishing this partnership and shaping its future. This period revealed the strength and uniqueness of the relationship, and the formation of the Anglo-American alliance effectively advanced their common interests and goals.

With respect to Middle East issues, the special relationship has become important because of the strategic importance of the region and the ongoing geopolitical challenges that exist there. The Middle East is a region that is full of contradictions for the UK; it is an area in which foreign priorities are shaped by history as well as by other contemporary issues such as energy security and regional conflicts. Given this context, it is necessary to know the role that the UK-US alliance plays in determining British decision-making in the Middle East if we have to demystify the intricacies characterizing contemporary international relations along with confronting numerous challenges affecting the region.

2. Statement of the Problem

Despite extensive research on US-UK special relations and British foreign policy in the Middle East, there remains a significant gap in understanding how this partnership influenced British policymaking in the region. While the existing literature provides important insights into the historical evolution of the unique and wider implications of Britain's relationship with the Middle East, there is a lack of in-depth analysis of how specific transatlantic alliances affected areas of major British policy choice, such as military operations, diplomatic engagement, and regional integration. This gap hinders a better understanding of the issues involved in the formulation of British foreign policy and its consequences for regional stability and global security.

3. Research Questions and Research Hypotheses

The present research attempts to answer a set of questions related to the US-UK special relationship and its impact on UK foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East. The objectives of the study are guided by the following questions:

- (1) How does the US-UK special relationship influence UK foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East?
- (2) What are the key mechanisms through which the special relationship shapes British policy choices in the region?
- (3) What role do factors such as bilateral diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation play in shaping UK responses to regional challenges in the Middle East?

Based on the above-stated questions, the study tries to test the following hypotheses:

- (1) The US-UK special relationship exerts significant influence on UK foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East, leading to a high degree of alignment between the two countries.
- (2) Military interventions that are undertaken by the UK in the Middle East are usually coordinated with or influenced by the US under the broader context of transatlantic cooperation.
- (3) If the UK engages in bilateral diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation, then its responses to regional challenges in the Middle East will be enhanced through improved strategic decision-making and operational effectiveness.

4. Aims of the Study

This study attempts to explore the historical development and key dimensions of the US-UK Special Relationship in terms of the impact it has on UK foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East. The study also tries to look at how transatlantic relations in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Iraq War of 2003, as well as other matters, impact British policy, including military intervention, diplomatic policy, and regional alliances. In addition, this paper also seeks to identify the extent and nature of the contributions of bilateral diplomacy, intelligence sharing, and military cooperation in shaping the UK's responses to regional challenges. The study further evaluates the impact such an alliance has on the UK's diplomatic influence, strategic independence, and national interests in the Middle East with reference to both the opportunities and constraints posed by the continued US-UK partnership.

5. Significance of the Study

The significance of this study stems from the following points:

- This study attempts to provide students, professors, and researchers in the fields of history, political sciences, literature, and civilization in English departments with thorough knowledge and information about the US-UK special relationship and its impact on Britain's foreign policy decision-making, mainly in the Middle East.
- The study also provides knowledge-seekers with an overview of the mechanisms utilized by the United States so that they can influence UK decision-making.
- This research work is also significant as it attempts to interrelate, in a mosaic form, history, politics, diplomatic strategies, and intelligence to question and answer whether the US-UK special relationship had an impact on UK decision-making.

6. Research Methodology

The current qualitative study is divided into two chapters: one is theoretical and the other is practical. The historical approach is employed in the first chapter, titled "The Root of the Anglo-American Special Relationship," to emphasize the history of the US-UK special relationship. The second chapter, "US-UK Special Relationship: Impact on UK Foreign Policy in the Middle East", uses qualitative research methods in an analytical framework, attempting to both prove that the US-UK special relationship has an impact (overt or covert) on UK foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East and investigate the mechanisms utilized to achieve this influence.

7. Structure of the Study

This study is divided into two chapters. The first chapter is titled The Root of the Anglo-American Special Relationship. This research section is the theoretical part of this study. It sheds light on the US-UK special relationship. This chapter is concerned with defining the concept of a special relationship, its historical background, and its nature during WWII. Moreover, it tries to shed light on the special relationship during the Cold War and the post-Cold

War period. The second chapter is practical in this research work. In this section, there is a focus on proof that the US-UK special relationship had an influence on the UK's foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East. This chapter aims to present two case studies of the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Iraq War of 2003 in order to examine the manifestation and mechanisms of this influence.

CHAPTER ONE

The Root of the Anglo-American Special Relationship

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Introduction

The term "special relationship" is an appropriate description of the deep and multifaceted relationship between the United States of America and the United Kingdom. A special and intricate political, cultural, and historical relationship exists. This chapter seeks to define this special relationship from a shared heritage into a strategic alliance. The special relationship between the US and the UK has been molded by common interests and mutual support in any critical global event. Partnership became even more prominent, especially during World War II, when common efforts against the Axis powers could be considered a good background for further partnership.

A variety of crises and conflicts would test, but ultimately solidify, the special relationship over the course of the Cold War. The beginning of the Cold War brought immediate union between the two nations against the spread of communism, from the Berlin Blockade to the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Suez Crisis of 1956 showed that, nonetheless, there had sometimes been tensions and limits within the partnership as the interests of the US and UK diverged. Still, such a strained relationship was mended again and again by diplomatic renovation and mutual recognition of a common strategy. The breaking point came during the Vietnam War, which exposed the differing views regarding military intervention. However, the relationship between the two states survived and thrived when it was revitalized, championed judiciously, and reinvigorated by Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The new-found personal relationship between the duos of leaders showed the world, and indeed the two nations, the symbiotic relationship.

In the post-Cold War period, the special relationship adapted to new global challenges. The Gulf Crisis and War of 1990–91 saw renewed cooperation, with the UK supporting US-led efforts to liberate Kuwait. Tony Blair's era marked a strengthening of the

alliance, particularly during the early 2000s. The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent War on Terror further reinforced the relationship, with the UK playing a key role in supporting US initiatives in Afghanistan and Iraq. From the late 2000s to the present day, the special relationship has continued to evolve, navigating the complexities of modern geopolitics. While disagreements and challenges persist, the permanent legacy of shared values and strategic cooperation remains a pillar of US-UK relations.

This chapter deals with the details of these themes and covers the important moments of the Anglo-American special relationship, tracing the influential figures. By exploring its historical roots as well as its significance in today's world, it is possible to gain a fuller understanding of this fundamental alliance and its implications for world politics.

1.1 Defining Special Relationship

Setting a baseline for what constitutes special in interstate relations is necessary before delving into the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. This is especially important given the opinions of scholars who either deny that the relationship between the two countries is special at all or argue that it is "special no more" (Dickie 1994). Winston Churchill first coined this term to characterize the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom. However, Sebastian Harnisch and other scholars have expanded on its meaning and have found additional interstate interactions that may also qualify as special (Harnisch, 2017). According to Harnisch (2017), special partnerships are characterized as “durable and exclusive bilateral relations between autonomous polities that are based on mutual expectations of preferential treatment by their members and outsiders and through the entanglement of some of their (external) governance functions” (p. 2). In special relationships, there exists not only a mutual expectation of preferential treatment among members and

outsiders but also an expectation of such close ties between countries that certain governance functions become intertwined.

Based on this definition, Harnish also defines three analytical specifications for distinguishing international relations from other forms. The first of these is that these relationships, which are frequently founded on pre-existing collective identities, are meant to promote development or greater integration (Krotz & Schild, 2013). Second, a language of inclusion and exclusion is employed, with participants setting standards and distinguishing themselves from other states that are not part of the relationship (Mattern, 2001). Ultimately, these relationships are a temperate form of hierarchal governance, with one partner replacing another with a governance role, located somewhere between the protectorates and the security communities (Hobson & Sharman, 2005; Lake, 2011). Examples of “governance functions” include the protection of national or foreign policy, or more broadly, some of the country’s core duties; significant relationships can therefore be expected to reflect defense and/or foreign policy coordination. When considered collectively, a more distinct image of what constitutes this kind of relationship starts to emerge, with member states fostering improvement or integration through a certain level of hierarchal substitution of governance and the expectation of exclusion or preferential treatment.

In brief, in foreign policy, a special relationship refers to a permanent, exclusive relationship between two independent countries. These relationships are characterized by an expectation of reciprocity, with both parties prioritizing each other’s needs and interests over those of other parties, and thus mutual expectations of treatment, especially since this promotes unity and deep communication. In addition, other countries in the international system have embraced special relationships, underscoring their importance on the global stage. Moreover, these relationships often involve routine governance activities, with ever deeper cooperation on

policy issues, sometimes to the extent that some governance activities are linked between the two countries.

1.2 Historical Background of the US-UK Special Relationship

The special relationship between the United States and the UK was first articulated by Winston Churchill in a speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946. He defined it as a bond of shared leadership, records, values, and a commitment to a liberal world order (Wallace & Phillips, 2009). Indeed, many academics and audiences point to the shared language and common Anglo-Saxon heritage as key factors in the unique relationship (Marsh & Baylis, 2006). Before World Wars I and II, the United States was the most isolated nation in the world, thereby limiting both its international relations and its presence on the global stage. Churchill's notion of the special relationship constructed on shared history and values combined with chronic overtures to US President F.D. Roosevelt made the UK a natural best ally while the US commenced to look outside of itself as incidents dictated. Despite its ability and sometimes propensity to act unilaterally, the United States was, and still is, able to derive legitimacy from its presence actively supported by an international partner (Conley, 2010, as cited in Strauss, 2021, p. 9).

Before looking at the unique eras of US-UK cooperation, it is beneficial to speak about the preliminary warming of US-UK relations. The two countries enjoyed warm relations at best in the 19th century following the American War of Independence. The United States looked to expand its borders and fought the British north in the Canadian territories. The War of 1812 was the result of these problems, and since then, the United States has made great efforts to stay out of military conflict with the British. The newly-seceded Confederate States of America sent diplomats to Great Britain, and even though it is far doubtful how close the UK came to officially recognizing them or providing assistance to their cause, simply accepting diplomats of the Confederacy precipitated tensions with the United States that lasted for a period of time.

With the end of the 19th century and the pre-World War I crisis in Europe, this period came to be known as “The Great Rapprochement.” Relations between the United States and the United Kingdom have warmed during this period due to the attitudes of the politicians and the warmth of the people in the two countries. Trade has become more ordinary, as has a renewed sense of kinship between the two countries. While not the connection we realize nowadays, this laid the basis for the ever-nearer ties that started out to be shaped in World War II and following it.

1.3 The Nature of Special Relationship During WWII

There has been no real ‘special relationship’ earlier than the Second World War. This term was coined after the Second World War, wherein Britain and America labored closely together. The relationship has become special since it was clear that America advanced over Britain on the world stage. Diplomats and domestic officials from the two nations collectively negotiated the form of postwar international institutions meant to secure a long-lasting peace. A close personal relationship between the two countrywide leaders, Churchill and Roosevelt, gave this partnership legitimacy and a strategic route (Wallace & Philips, 2009, p. 264).

It was Churchill who, in his ‘iron curtain’ well-known speech, called on the U.S. to turn again to protect Europe from the emerging threats of Soviet-led communism. Churchill produced the idea of an Anglo-American unique relationship, a ‘fraternal association’ to lead the free world:

I have come to the crux of what I have traveled here to say. Neither the sure prevention of war nor the continuous rise of world organization will be gained without what I have called the fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples. This means a special relationship between the British Commonwealth and Empire and the United States of America. [...] Fraternal association requires not only the growing friendship and mutual understanding

between our two vast but kindred systems of society. (Churchill, 1946, as cited in Dumani, 2016, p. 47)

This speech, as Fraser Harbutt, author and international relations history professor, maintained, was the pivot on which the whole transformation eventually turned. Harbutt's statement is that it was this discourse that enabled the U.S. to move far from neutrality, and that was a whole lot of Churchill's pressure for such a movement (Harbutt, 1988, p. 280–281).

In the period of World War II, the USA and the UK labored noticeably intently to defeat Nazi Germany and the Axis Powers. Under the realist concept, this closeness may additionally have dissipated if not for the risk of the Soviet Union that emerged soon after. Churchill and the British elite saw the relative power of the UK declining and therefore decided to align themselves with the US so that they could hedge their bets and prepare for a globe wherein they were not the number one hegemon. During this era and into the early Cold War, the US and UK evolved a “uniquely intimate” mixture of defense and intelligence linkages (Dumbrell, 2004). This unique sharing started in the 1947–48 UK–US agreement, wherein the two international nations began to trade intelligence. Later, the 1958 mutual defense agreement gave the U.K. privileged access to American nuclear technology and information, which laid the basis for the introduction of Polaris (later Trident) nuclear submarines. Britain received access to technology and information, and in return, the USA was given a dependable site for military bases in Europe. Economically, a devastated postwar Britain was able to gain special access to the US's lend-rent program and other loans so as to spur economic and industrial recovery.

1.4 The Special Relationship during Cold War

The special relationship between the US and the UK during the Cold War witnessed numerous tests and transformations. It began amidst the Cold War—from the ideological constrictions between capitalist West and the communist East. The Suez Crisis in 1956 depicted

edgy relations when the UK, alongside France, went against strong oppositions by the US in their intrusion into Egypt. Events such as the building of the Berlin Wall, the Cuban Missile Crisis added further dimensions to the nature of the alliance as both countries tried to manage the issues of Soviet expansionism. The Vietnam War though more or less an American one strained the relationship with its clashing foreign policy approaches. Throughout them all, the special relationship opened up some of the limitations though it survived. Leaders such as Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan attempted to renovate and reconfigure this alliance toward more convergent values and interests during their leadership. Ultimately, mutual efforts by Thatcher and Reagan solidified the notion of the special relationship; it transformed or evolved with time but never lost its significance in different geopolitical arrangements.

1.4.1 The Emergence of the Cold War

As we have learned from history, U.S. relations with the UK were very good during the Second World War, when their common enemy was the Nazi-Fascist Axis. After the war, however, these relationships became more special for several important reasons. The main reason was the mutual perception of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the fact that Great Britain lost its role as an empire that determined the destiny of the world in previous centuries is another reason why these two countries developed a special relationship after WWII. Britain was also badly damaged by World War II; its economy was completely ruined, and its military force was greatly weakened. The enlightened leaders of Great Britain, best represented by Churchill and Bevin, realized that the UK had lost its previous role and found itself in a new reality. They also realized that the best way to keep their influence in worldwide relations was to become a member of an "empire," as the United States was. These leaders invited this "empire" to contribute to the military stabilization and economic restoration of Britain and Western Europe. At that era, Britain was unable to protect its interests against a potential major aggressor,

the Soviet Union, and its awareness of its declining strength in the post-war world necessitated that Britain and the United States develop special relationships (Warner, 1989, p. 479).

1.4.2 The Sues Crisis

Many scholars agree that relations between Britain and the US were really special during the first decades after World War II. In 1947, the U.S. and the UK (together with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) pooled their intelligence assets through the UK and US contracts. British diplomacy in 1948–49 served to establish the Atlantic Alliance, which brought in the United States and the UK as external guarantors for weaker states in Western Europe. Britain confirmed its main role as America's European best ally with its important leading position within the negotiations in 1954–1955, which authorized the return of formal sovereignty to Western Germany (Wallace & Philips, 2009, p. 265).

Since the end of World War II, the Suez crisis has sharply fractured the special relationship. The Americans were angry that the British had distracted the world's attention from the Russian invasion of Hungary, and the British were angry that their most trusted friends stabbed them in the back when they felt their vital interests were at risk (Warner, 1989, p. 486). Although the Suez crisis represented a major rupture in the development of the special relationship, it actually had little immediate impact on British strategic thinking (Dockrill, 2002, p. 25). The Suez crisis showed that Britain was no longer an empire that could be considered a pillar of global politics. It highlighted the fragility of the relationship and confirmed how quickly Britain could be surpassed and overruled. It did show the need to strengthen Britain's hand through the US (Porter, 2010, p. 359).

Thus, the Suez crisis aroused both annoyance at Washington's alleged unfaithfulness and a recognition of British vulnerability. At this time, there have been anti-American emotions

in Britain, and the U.S. Embassy in London recorded on November 23, 1956, that this feeling within the UK was ‘at a very high pitch (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 54).

Before Suez, Great Britain had already ended up properly aware of its dependence on the United States, despite the fact that it had persevered to conduct itself as a great power. After Suez, it interpreted the special relationship with America as a means of gaining maximum impact over decisions that have been basically made in Washington (Kissinger, 1994, p. 548). It is therefore clear that Britain’s only future was to act as a junior partner in the hope of guiding the Americans and perhaps sharing some of their glory (Wheatcroft, 2010, p. 38).

In fact, the Suez crisis of 1956 shook relations so much that President Harold MacMillan felt the need to restore harmony by signing a “Declaration of Common Purpose” with Eisenhower in 1957. The idea that the United States has a special relationship with Britain was especially encouraged in London as a means of justifying its inferiority to its transatlantic counterpart (Wilkinson, 2009, p. 293).

Macmillan sought to extend the concept of special relationships to more inclusive Atlantic communities. The era of President John Kennedy and Prime Minister Harold Macmillan (1961–3 years) brought an Anglo-American rapprochement that continued, although in a weakened form, into the post-Cold War years (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 5). Nuclear security cooperation was central to the Kennedy-McMillan alliance. It explained the special relationship of the Cold War. The Polaris deal is the cornerstone of the relationship.

1.4.3 The Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crises

The crisis of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban crisis marked two subsequent differences between Washington and London. The former revealed that London and Washington differed in their reactions to the peace treaty. Macmillan and British diplomats pressed Washington for a political rather than a military response. There was some success in persuading Washington that

the main issue should be access to West Berlin, not the peace treaty itself (Dumbrell, 2006, pp. 56–60).

The Cuban Missile Crisis revealed the limitations of the special relationship between the U.S. and Britain and exposed their differing interests. It also showcased the difficulty of imposing sanctions without the cooperation of allies (Wilkinson, 2009, p. 292). The U.S.'s disregard for British concerns during this crisis was evident. While U.S. planes carrying nuclear weapons patrolled near the Arctic and a secret deal was made with the Soviets to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey, British officials were left in the dark and denied even basic information or consultations (Wheatcroft, 2010, p. 36).

Although London became aware of the Washington supremacy over Cuba issue, it has constantly aimed at pursuing a policy of its own. Both countries shared the intention of giving an end to communism; however, Britain ironically opposed this goal. It is paradoxical how Britain, Washington's closest ally, never completely agreed to the U.S. embargo.

1.4.4 The Vietnam War

Regarding the Vietnam War, Britain's support for the United States was limited due to numerous motives. Firstly, while the British authorities under Wilson backed the U.S. in its anti-communist efforts in the Far East, they became determined to avoid direct involvement in Vietnam. This stance stemmed from Britain's engagement in its very own local war, helping Malaysia against Indonesia, which had backing from China (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 82). Secondly, Britain was dealing with financial challenges locally, which restricted its capacity to devote resources to overseas conflicts. Thirdly, as a co-chair of the 1954 Geneva Conference, Britain felt a continued obligation to seek non-violent resolutions to conflicts in Southeast Asia. Despite pressure from the US, Britain refrained from sending troops to Vietnam. However, it normally avoids overtly criticizing the U.S. role. At times, London reluctantly supported American

actions, even though it maintained its preference for peaceful solutions to the war (Lundestad, 2005, p. 158). Following Britain's withdrawal from the Far East, there was concern in Washington that Britain's largely demobilized military presence signaled that the defense of the 'ramparts' of the free world would fall solely on the shoulders of the United States (Hughes & Robb, 2013, p. 871).

1.4.5 The Limits of the Special Relationship

The limits of the special relationship were manifested in the American engagement in the Vietnam War. Washington was unable to make the British contribute to that war. Nonetheless, Britain did combat the jungle-war of confrontation in the defense of Malaysia against Indonesia for two years until 1966. It might be said that this final security responsibility of the Empire in the Far East helped to rescue Britain from involvement in the U.S. South Asian imbroglio (Rossbach, 2009, p. 15).

Britain, under the leadership of Edward Heath, sought to end the special relationship in the late 1960s because the United States was shifting its focus from Europe to East Asia. Heath guided the United Kingdom in this manner as it prepared to join the European Community in 1973. Britain wished to support the European Community in advancing its cooperative foreign policy. Still, the deeply ingrained Anglo-American cooperative structures persisted. Although there was less overlap in military missions, intelligence cooperation and military exchanges continued (Wallace & Philips, 2009, p. 266). Edward Heath despised and mistrusted US policies, despite putting on a formal front of excellent relations with the Nixon White House. In contrast to US foreign policy, he made every effort to promote the formation of a unified European Community foreign policy (Gilbert, 2006, p. 77).

The paradox was that Britain confirmed little interest in the special relationship at a time when the United States was finally showing a lot of interest in it. More than any of his predecessors, Prime Minister Edward Heath was prepared to accept the European Community almost exactly as it was and was devoted to Britain's membership in the organization. Nixon and Heath's connection remained distant, mostly because of Heath's policy of creating a certain amount of space between the United States and the United Kingdom in order to achieve membership for Britain (Lundestad, 2005, p. 181).

1.4.6 Mending the Relationship

However, Harold Wilson (prime minister from 1974–6) and James Callaghan (1976–9), the leader of the Labour Party, wanted to mend the relationship's fences that Heath had shattered (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 94). In his own words, Callaghan was ‘a strong advocate of Anglo-American cooperation when crises developed’. In Callaghan’s behavior, both in the Foreign Office and as premier, and in spite of the diverse rifts with Washington, we will discover a clear aspiration to the role of Atlantic middleman: an explainer of America’s approaches to Europe and of Europe’s way to America. This role was desired by Wilson but rejected by Heath. Callaghan consciously placed himself forward as a diffuser of potential U.S.-European misunderstandings on the intertwined problems of disarmament and détente (Lane, 2004, p. 163). As developed by Callaghan, however, the role of the Atlantic intermediary raised some acute difficulties. One of the problems was that its role might be taken for granted by the U.S. With Britain following a clear ‘Atlantic Intermediary’ method, Washington is probably desirous of concentrating its attention either on France (the NATO bad boy) or probable on West Germany (the key to NATO modernization and security and, in all likelihood, the chief of an

integrated Europe). Even more damaging was the simple issue of Britain's credibility in Europe (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 98).

1.4.7 Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and the 'Special Relationship'

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had a profound impact on American foreign policy. She had a very close relationship with Reagan, and they were described as soul mates. Margaret Thatcher skillfully catered to Reagan's whims, much like Churchill did with Roosevelt.

The United States and the British government had tense relations at times, but when it came to things like Reagan's overdue support in the Falkland War, the United States' unilateral intervention in the commonwealth island of Grenada, the United States and Soviet Union's nuclear heads of agreement in Reykjavik to eliminate all ballistic nuclear weapons, etc., the British government supported the United States. Despite public protests, Britain approved US cruise missiles, refrained from opposing the "Star Wars" initiative despite reservations in Whitehall, and—unlike France and Spain—allowed US aircraft to operate from British bases in order to bomb Libya in 1986 (Wallace & Philips, 2009, p. 266). Thatcher regarded America as an essential guarantor of Europe's security. This was the true motive behind Reagan's support.

Reconstruction was the strategy chosen by Reagan and Thatcher. They referred to their unquestionably cohesive strategy as "conviction politics." They guided their respective nations through periods of profound transformation by remaining steadfast in their belief in individual responsibility and their national universalist missions (Holmes, 2010, pp. 265-259).

1.5 The Special Relationship in the Post-Cold War Period

This section explores the complications of the Anglo-American special relationship in the post-Cold War period. It examines crucial moments and transformative moves in global geopolitics. It begins with the Gulf Crisis and War of 1990–91, highlighting a pivotal event that

tested the alliance between the UK and the US. The focus then moves to the evolving interactions, noting significant turning points such as the era of Prime Minister Tony Blair, which was marked by numerous international challenges that both countries navigated together. Another critical stage is the aftermath of September 11, which profoundly impacted global politics and further cemented the UK-US alliance. Throughout these events, the section investigates the complex relationship of shared interests and conflicting priorities that characterize the alliance.

1.5.1 Gulf Crisis and War, 1990–91

In the aftermath of the Cold War and the collapse of the Berlin Wall, some thought the special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom had ended. They believed that because there was no longer a major enemy like the Nazis or the Soviets, the relationship was no longer useful. John Dickie said that the relationship was "special no more" because there was no more Soviet threat, Europe was getting closer together, and the United States and the United Kingdom were becoming more unequal (Dickie, 1994). But history proved him wrong.

According to Margaret Thatcher (1993), the 1991 Gulf War marked the reassertion of the special relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States in the post-Cold War era. She believed that the British military's capabilities and the government's determination to fight alongside America made the UK an indispensable partner in leadership in Europe. However, other memoirs from the same period provide a contrasting perspective. James Baker (1994, p. 381), for instance, regarded the British and French contributions to the war as equivalent. Both nations had a long and complex history in the Middle East and saw the crisis as

a chance to highlight their global power status. With the fall of the main communist adversary, the United States rose to unchallenged superpower status. As a consequence, everyone sought to establish closer ties with the United States. US Ambassador Raymond Seitz (1998, p. 326) believed the partnership between the US and UK in the Gulf War was the final triumph for their long-standing alliance. Historian John Dickie (1994, p. 326) saw the conflict as the conclusion of the Anglo-American relationship. As the allies entered the war in January 1991, plans were implemented to significantly reduce or close 79 American bases in Europe, including 13 in England. This indicated the end of Britain's role as the US's representative in Europe.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Margaret Thatcher's presence in the US offered her a chance to influence American policy. At a planned meeting in Aspen, Colorado, just after the invasion, Thatcher counseled President George H.W. Bush to stand firm against the violation of international law. The US president announced to the press: 'Prime Minister Thatcher and I are looking at it on exactly the same wavelength' (Freedman & Karsh, 1993, p. 73). General Colin Powell (1995, p. 467) observed Thatcher's significant impact. He believed that Thatcher's experience in the Falklands War influenced President Bush. Notably, Thatcher swiftly secured support from Britain and, after contacting President Mitterrand, French military assistance. Despite differences between UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US Secretary of State James Baker on the necessity of a specific UN resolution authorizing military action, they collaborated diplomatically at the United Nations. Thatcher believed that Kuwait's request for assistance under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for self-defense, was sufficient. The Gulf War commenced under a different United Nations resolution passed on November 29th, giving Iraq until January 15th, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait. On August 26th, then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher publicly stated that it was "no time to go wobbly" regarding the war effort, a phrase that amused officials in Washington and became a symbol of her unwavering stance (Renwick, 1996, p. 262).

From August 1990 until she resigned on November 22, 1990, Margaret Thatcher strongly supported military action in the Gulf War, similar to her approach during the Falklands crisis. European allies were heavily criticized for their weaknesses, and mediation efforts, such as those proposed by former Prime Minister Edward Heath, were mocked. Heath (1998, pp. 654–6, 669) later had a personal disagreement with James Baker, accusing him of half-hearted attempts at diplomatic solutions. During Margaret Thatcher's last Cabinet meeting, on the day she stepped down, it was decided to increase the British military presence to divisional levels. When John Major became Prime Minister, there was no significant change in foreign policy. Major had a better relationship with President George H.W. Bush than Thatcher had. Charles Powell, Thatcher's foreign policy adviser, continued in his role under Major, ensuring continuity. British and American military leaders, General Peter de la Billière and General Norman Schwarzkopf, worked closely, but it was clear that the United States was in charge of the military operations (Freedman & Karsh, 1993).

Despite similar public support for war in the US, the British public more strongly backed the use of force. Furthermore, many pro-war Britons believed that removing Saddam Hussein was a crucial objective, not just liberating Kuwait (Freedman & Karsh, 1993). The Labour opposition in Parliament advocated giving sanctions against Iraq more time. However, it was highly likely that the Labour leadership would ultimately support military action if it were taken. During the House of Commons' debate on January 15, 1991, regarding war, the atmosphere was less combative than in the US Congress's corresponding debate. In Westminster, the vote to use force to meet the deadline passed overwhelmingly (534 to 57). In contrast, the US Senate approved President Bush's request for war authorization by a smaller margin (57 to 42), as did the House of Representatives (250 to 183).

During the first Gulf War, the United States and the United Kingdom maintained close military collaboration. Britain stood out as one of the few European countries that actively

supported the U.S. by providing a fully equipped armored division for their coalition forces. This exceptional contribution highlighted the unique bond between the U.S. and U.K., distinct from their relationships with other European nations (Wallace & Phillips, 2009).

1.5.2 Blair's Era: Strengthening the UK-US Special Relationship

The Bosnian crisis revealed significant misunderstandings between the two governments after the Gulf War. Prime Minister John Major's perspective on US-UK ties differed from James Callaghan's and other supporters of the "Atlantic intermediary" role. Major asserted that "we straddled the divide between the United States and Europe. The U.S. sought a strong ally in Europe and not a fifty-first state" (Major, 1999, p. 578). The engagement of President Clinton in solving the North Irish issue brought divergences between the two countries. John Major's government strongly opposed Clinton's intervention (Dumbrell, 2004, p. 439).

However, with Blair coming in as prime minister in the 1997 elections, the relationship between the two countries improved. Blair and Clinton shared similar views. Unlike Major, Blair welcomed USA engagement to solve the Northern Irish issue. Anglo-American nearness after 1997 was partly attributed to Blair's positive welcoming of U.S. engagement in Ireland (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 142). Blair and Clinton shared closer perspectives on European development compared to Major and Clinton. In 1997, Blair emphasized that Britain could maintain strong ties with both Europe and the United States, asserting that a strong European position would enhance Britain's relationship with the U.S. (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 144).

The UK greatly values its alliance with the United States. In the 2008 National Security Strategy, Britain emphasized the crucial importance of this partnership. Former Prime Minister Tony Blair demonstrated this by supporting the US in military campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo in 1999. If America were the new guardian of world order, Britain's role would be to align itself "not as a superpower but as a pivotal power" (Porter, 2010, p. 359).

Although a degree of tension was seen between U.S. and British policy during the Kosovo war, where the disorganized air campaign demonstrated Washington's unilateralism in the operations, London and Washington were brought closer, and Kosovo served as an 'Atlantic bridge' for the special relationship. From Blair's viewpoint, Kosovo demonstrated the potency of the 'Atlantic bridge' and of the US-UK alliance (Dumbrell, 2006, p. 147).

1.5.3 Post-September 11 and the War on Terror

Blair strongly believed in the importance of the UK-US alliance and the need for an international response to the 9/11 attacks, rather than any inherent inclination of London to align with Washington's policies (Dumbrell, 2009, p. 65). In response to the formation of the international coalition against terrorism, Tony Blair played a key role as an energetic, dedicated, and spontaneous leader. Before the start of the Afghanistan conflict, the Wall Street Journal acknowledged Blair's pivotal position as the United States' primary diplomatic representative in building the emerging coalition (Curtis, 2003, p. 113). There were a variety of reasons why Toni Blair took a largely unwilling country into the Iraq war, but most importantly was the belief that he ought to support the United States in all its actions (Wheatcroft, 2010, p. 32).

British Prime Minister James Gordon Brown emphasized Europe-America ties instead of the traditional U.S.-UK relationship. This was seen by Washington as an attempt to distance the UK from the U.S. Brown portrayed the UK's connection to the US as "bilateral" rather than a special relationship. Unlike Tony Blair, Brown sought to distance himself from the US, believing that the UK could play a broader role beyond serving as a bridge between Europe and America. A major problem in Brown-Bush diplomacy was the policy to be pursued in Iraq. Britain remained in Iraq, but its mandate and role were reduced to neither fully withdrawing nor

fully engaging. At the strategic level, Britain found itself self-struggling, and it was confused about performing its domestic and strategic objectives. Britain's attempt to oppose President Bush while maintaining support for the United States was unsuccessful (Dunn, 2008, pp. 1136–1137).

1.5.4 Late 2000s to Present Day

Despite occasional disagreements and contrasting views between US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers, their nations maintain a strong partnership. Even when their personal opinions differ, as with Gordon Brown and Barack Obama, the narrative of close ties and shared beliefs prevails. Although the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee predicted its demise, the special relationship between the UK and US was revived under Prime Minister David Cameron. President Obama promptly contacted Cameron after taking office, reaffirming the commitment of both countries to the special relationship. Obama said:

The United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom, and I reiterated my deep and personal commitment to the special relationship between our two countries—a bond that has endured for generations and across party lines. (Dumani, 2016, p. 51)

According to Obama, this alliance is crucial for the security and prosperity of both nations, as well as for the wider world. In spite of Europe's skepticism, the United States and the United Kingdom maintained their military cooperation in Libya and Afghanistan. As the UK prepared to exit the European Union, Prime Ministers Theresa May and Boris Johnson sought to strengthen relations with President Trump, emphasizing the enduring "special relationship" between their countries. They aimed to leverage their new freedom in trade and defense to enhance cooperation and foster new trade agreements with their longstanding ally.

With the approaching "Brexit" departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union and the election of Joseph Biden as the new President of the United States, the future of

the UK-US relationship is uncertain. Biden has expressed stronger disapproval of the UK than his predecessor, Donald Trump, and has publicly criticized British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. Whether Biden's comments are intended to convey genuine disapproval or are merely playful remains unclear. While Biden and Johnson may be at odds or personally dislike each other, Biden is expected to align with British sentiment in supporting international organizations, particularly the United Nations. Unlike Trump, who weakened these organizations, Biden may collaborate with Johnson to strengthen them and uphold the principles of liberalism that they embody. Even if the two have a rocky relationship, the deep intelligence and diplomatic ties between the United States and the United Kingdom are unlikely to be disrupted, even if their public statements lack enthusiasm.

Conclusion

The history of the Anglo-American special relationship is directly linked to the same political development within the two nations and their common cultural and political heritage. The similar perspectives on world affairs suppose that both America and the United Kingdom have been on the same side on every occasion threats are present. The two World Wars, the Communist threat, and the war on terror allowed these nations to experience and test the power of their cooperation. In the beginning, the partners resisted imperialist Germany, then faced Hitlerian fascism, and at the end, they confronted the Communist danger represented in the Soviet Union, performing in all three cases with greater consistency than before in a strong wider alliance context.

The United States acknowledged the fundamental strategic principle that, even though it had the most overwhelming power, it wanted allies to execute its policies and earn the legitimacy it needed in a world meant to be governed by international instances and laws. The two nations might have some intense disagreements over cases such as Suez, Vietnam, the

Falklands, and Grenada, but they were effective in overcoming those crises whenever. This alliance had survived multi-risk conflicts in the Cold War. Certainly, their mutual political legacy of constitutionalism and the rule of law were guiding lines in the special relationship, but pragmatism and real politics are of enormous importance, representing the final goal of this relationship.

The special relationship between America and the United Kingdom had a significant effect on numerous fields, with a brilliant impact on UK foreign policy decision-making. While this alliance has structured defense, nuclear competencies, and intelligence cooperation among the two international nations, it has been especially essential for the United Kingdom in declaring its worldwide impact and fundamental power status. The UK's reliance on this relationship highlights its importance in guiding British foreign policy decisions and strategic positioning on the international stage.

CHAPTER TWO

The Impact of the US-UK Special Relationship on UK Decision-Making: Special Focus on UK Foreign Policy in the Middle East

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Introduction

Since World War II, the "special relationship" between the US and the UK has been a defining aspect of international diplomacy. It is marked by strong collaboration and assistance between the two countries in various domains, including military, intelligence, economic, and political fields. This chapter adopts two crucial case studies: the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the Iraq War of 2003, to analyze how this bilateral relationship affected British foreign policy decisions in the Middle East.

The 1956 Suez Crisis is regarded as a pivotal and significant period in Anglo-American relations following World War II. Despite their shared history and common interests, the two countries' major differences and priorities were brought to light by the crisis. Following Gamal Abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, the UK, France, and Israel attempted to regain control of the waterway. However, the lack of explicit support from the United States, which prioritized its strategic interests in maintaining stability and preventing Soviet influence in the region, forced the UK to reevaluate its stance. This crisis highlights the complexities of the special relationship when national interests diverge, emphasizing the implicit but significant influence of the US over British foreign policy.

On the other hand, the 2003 Iraq War presents a situation in which the influence of the US-UK relationship was explicit and direct. Following the September 11 attacks, the US, under the Bush administration, launched a global campaign against terrorism, culminating in the invasion of Iraq. The United Kingdom, under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Blair, remained a key ally, offering both political and military backing despite widespread domestic and international opposition.

2.1 Defining Foreign Policy

In essence, foreign policy is the state's choice of self-interest strategies that it uses to protect its national interests and carry out its goals within the international community. This is why these approaches are utilized strategically when interacting with other nations. Countries in worldwide politics aim for a couple of basic things: national interest and foreign policy. The latter comes from the former. In political terms, national interest places emphasis on addressing matters that would improve the political situation, people's economic and social welfare, health care and culture, and political survival. In other words, national interest is people-oriented policies that have the ability to improve the lives of the people and make them stand out among other nations. It must be policies that promote the greatest happiness among the greatest number of citizens. To illustrate, a policy that leads to the realization of full employment within a country while at the same time moving that nation closer to economic and political liberation relative to other members of the international system (Ojo & Sesay, 1988).

A country's foreign policy, also referred to as the 'international relations policy', is a set of political and economic goals that seeks to outline how a country will interact with other countries in the world. Thus, foreign policies are generally designed to help protect a country's national interests, national security, ideological goals, and economic prosperity. It consists of decisions and actions that involve, to a considerable degree, relations between one state and others. It is a collection of specific goals regarding the world outside the boundaries of a certain social unit, together with a collection of methods and techniques intended to accomplish those goals. This suggests the realization that there might be a necessity for affecting the behavior of other countries or international organizations. The aim is to ensure that such states or international organizations maintain the existing pattern of behavior, especially if the influencing state perceives it as contributing to the achievement of its own objectives, or to change the present pattern by initiating a new set of policies or by modifying or interrupting the

implementation of existing ones (Frankel, 1968; Legg & Morrison, 1971). According to Modelski (1962), foreign policy is the system that communities have adopted in order to change other nations' conduct and adapt their own activities to the international environment. Foreign policy is basically a stated set of attitudes towards the international environment, an implicit or explicit plan about a country's relationship with other nations, a conscious image of what is or ought to be the country's place in the world, or some general guiding principles or attitudes determining or influencing decisions on specific issues. This, however, supports Adeniran's (1983, as cited in Alozie, 2016) assertion that foreign policy consists of three elements: The first is the overall orientation and policy intentions of a particular country toward another. The second is the objective that a country seeks to accomplish in its relations or dealings with other countries, and the third is the means for achieving that specific goal or objective. The interaction of nation-states within the international system shows these elements. It is sufficient to say, then, that any state's foreign policy must be perceived as reflecting some recognizable aims, and that a state's foreign policy can only be deemed successful or unsuccessful based on how well the objectives have been met. In the view of Hartmann (1983, as cited in Alozie, 2016), because a foreign policy consists of selected national interests seemingly formulated into a logically consistent whole that is then implemented, any foreign policy can be viewed analytically in three stages: conception, content, and implementation. Conception is the strategic evaluation of what objectives, in light of the assumed structure of the international system, are desirable and achievable. Content is the result and reflection of that appraisal. Implementation examines the mechanisms by which a state coordinates and the ways in which it communicates its opinions and desires to other states.

2.2 The Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis demonstrates the multifaceted and complex nature of relations between the United States and the United Kingdom during the Cold War. The aggressive foreign

policy of Egypt, which nationalized the British-owned Suez Canal, turned into a situation where the American administration came to exert a lot of pressure on foreign British policy. While Britain was initially inclined to completely control the territory, American intervention and integration were enough to make Great Britain reconsider its positions. This part will review how the United States managed to influence British decision-making during the crisis, looking at the tactics used, the success achieved, and the implications of this event for the Anglo-American relationship.

2.2.1 The Historical Background of the Suez Canal

The Suez Canal is referred to as the “crossroads to Europe, Africa, and Asia” because the direction became used to move commodities to and from all three continents (Dowling, 2011, as cited in Chemmar, n.d.). The canal is a 119-mile-long artificial waterway that has served global exchange for the last one and a half centuries. The canal connects the Mediterranean Sea with the Gulf of Suez, providing navigational access to Far East Asian countries. The Suez Canal in Egypt, west of the Sinai Peninsula, connects port Said at the Mediterranean Sea to port Suez at the Red Sand, giving supply a basically direct route for the transport of goods between Europe and Asia. It supports approximately 8% of the globe’s shipping traffic, with almost fifty ships navigating across the canal every day. The canal spans a length of roughly 195 kilometers (121 miles) and is 300 meters wide. With a minimal channel width of 60 meters (197 feet), the Suez Canal is able to accommodate ships as large as 150,000 tons fully loaded. As no locks interrupt traffic in this sea-level waterway, the transit time only averages approximately 15 hours (Roger, 2010, as cited in Chemmar, n.d.).

In 1854, a French former diplomat, Ferdinand Marie de Lesseps, accomplished an agreement with the Ottoman governor of Egypt to construct a canal spanning one hundred miles along the Isthmus of Suez. In 1856, the Suez Canal Company was formed and granted the right

to operate the canal for 99 years after completion of the work, and on April 24, 1859, the construction began. Digging was done by hand with picks and shovels wielded by forced labor. European workers with dredgers and steam shovels arrived, causing labor conflicts and cholera epidemics, and the Suez Canal was not finished until 1869 (Roger, 2010, as cited in Chemmar, n.d.).

After World War II, Egypt demanded that British forces leave the Suez Canal Zone, and in July 1956, Egyptian President Jamal Abel Nasser nationalized the canal, believing that toll charges could pay for the construction of a huge dam on the Nile River. As a result, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula in late October and later, in November, took it over by the British and French expeditionary troops who had landed in the Canal Zone. Under pressure from the United Nations, France and Britain were compelled to withdraw in December, while Israeli troops retreated in March 1957. Egypt managed to retake control of the canal and successfully reopen it for commercial shipping the following month (Roger, 2010, as cited in Chemmar, n.d.).

Ten years later, Egypt closed the canal once again in response to Israel's seizure of the Sinai Peninsula and the Six-Day War. The Suez Canal, which separates Egypt and the Sinai Peninsula, served as the front line between Israeli and Egyptian forces for the following eight years. In 1975, Anwar El Sadat, the Egyptian President, reopened the Suez Canal as a signal of protection after talks with Israel. Nowadays, an average of 50 ships navigate the canal daily, carrying more than three hundred million tons of goods a year (Simmon, 2010, pp. 2-12).

2.2.2 The US-UK Collaboration in Countering Nasser's Influence

As Britain still held greater impact in the Middle East than the United States, the special relationship did not always see the two partners having a common policy in the region. Despite the fact that they both had a common goal of limiting Nasser's authority, their views on

specific issues varied. The Omega Plan was designed by the US and approved by the British to lead Colonel Nasser to realize that he cannot cooperate as he is doing with the Soviet Union and at the same time enjoy most-favorite nation treatment from the United States (Takeyh, 2000, p. 110). According to the terms of this plan, Nasser was required to: stop acquiring weapons from the Soviet Union; aid in attempting to reach a peaceful resolution between the Arab states and Israel; assist in enhancing relations between Egypt and Iraq; and decline the Soviet offer to provide assistance in constructing the Aswan Dam (Takeyh, 2000, p. 111). In order to reduce Arab nationalism and establish a strategy of Western influences in the Middle East, the US and Britain collaborated on this. Since Great Britain took on a greater part in the Middle East, the USA had to use British influence and seek British backing to take actions in other countries of the region aimed at decreasing the importance of Cairo. To prevent a pro-Egyptian coup from toppling the government of Jordan, the United States needed Britain to continue its treaty alliances with the latter under the Omega Plan; additionally, the United States would require Britain's support in containing Egyptian influence within the boundaries of certain African countries such as Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, and Syria, as well as for other purposes (Takeyh, 2000, p. 112). Nevertheless, even though they were trying to come together on the Omega Plan, Britain, Eden, and his strategists wanted to take a tougher stance on Nasser as they felt he would be hard to influence. The plan ultimately failed; it merely ended with the British and American withdrawal of their financial support for the Aswan Dam; however, it is evident that by this time, the essence of the special relationship lied in collective efforts to extend Western dominance in the Middle East despite the failure of the plan. By working in this way, the US was able to exploit Britain's influence in the area to co-establish a joint policy with their shared desire to restrict Nasser's power.

2.2.3 The American Reaction to the Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis of 1956 tested the alliance between the United States and Britain. Despite their historical closeness, the US strongly opposed Britain's decision to join France and Israel in a surprise military attack to regain control of the Suez Canal. This disagreement was rooted in conflicting priorities. The US, concerned about escalating Cold War tensions, disagreed with a move seen as supporting European colonialism. The American public also overwhelmingly criticized the invasion. The Suez Crisis served as a clear demonstration of how the United States impacted British foreign policy choices, highlighting the intricate dynamics of the Anglo-American relationship in the midst of the Cold War. Let's delve into the ways in which American influence shaped British decisions throughout this critical event.

There was strong opposition to the invasion by Britain, France, and Israel on the part of the United States during the Suez crisis. President Eisenhower's administration strongly condemned Britain, France, and Israel's military intervention against Egypt. A United Nations General Assembly resolution was adopted condemning this act of aggression after heavy pressure from Eisenhower's administration was applied to these three countries, pressuring them to withdraw their forces. The reason Eisenhower was against invading Egypt was that he wanted to avoid making the situation worse and keep stability in that region of the world. During the Suez Crisis, the United States was seen as being against European imperialism and placed emphasis on backing Middle East governments threatened by Soviet aggression, as outlined in what became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine (Broadwater, n.d., as cited in Gianaris, 2023).

The invaders executed the operation with the intention of controlling Gaza, the Suez Canal, and parts of Sinai, which was very successful in military terms but a failure politically due to global condemnation and foreign diplomatic threats. Along with the crisis over the Suez Canal, the United States was also dealing with the Hungarian revolution that happened at the same time. Borhi (1999) noted that Vice President Richard Nixon explained, "We couldn't, on one hand, complain about the Soviets intervening in Hungary and, on the other hand, approve of

the British and the French picking that particular time to intervene against Nasser” (p. 105). Besides, it was Eisenhower's belief that if the United States were seen to acquiesce in the attack on Egypt, the resulting backlash in the Arab world might win the Arabs over to the Soviet Union (Neff, 1988, p. 391).

One of Eisenhower's aides, Emmet Hughes, recalled that the reaction at the White House to the Bulganin (premier of the Soviet Union from 1955 to 1958) letters was "sombre," as there was fear that this was the commencement of the countdown to World War III, a war that, if it occurred, would result in a genocidal loss of hundreds of millions of lives (Turner, 2006, p. 368). In a private conversation, Eisenhower told Under Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr. of his fears that the Soviet Union might be ready to initiate any wild adventure. They are as scared and outraged as Hitler was in his last days. There is nothing more perilous than a dictatorship in that mindset (Neff, 1988, p. 403).

On October 31, 1956, Dwight D. Eisenhower declared that the United States had not been consulted nor informed in advance about the military actions taken by the UK, France, and Israel during the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower acknowledged that it was the sovereign right of these nations to make such decisions. He confirmed that the United States equally possessed the right to disagree if it judged these actions to be incorrect. He firmly asserted that the military intervention was indeed a mistake and emphasized that the United States did not believe the use of force to be a wise or proper instrument for resolving global disputes. Through this statement, Eisenhower implicitly criticized the military actions of the United States' allies. He had also emphasized his administration's commitment to a principled approach in international relations, which accentuated the rule of law and justice as foundations for global peace. By advocating for legal and diplomatic means over military force, Eisenhower reinforced a universalist vision of American foreign policy aimed at promoting democratic values and human rights worldwide.

This stance highlighted the United States' role as a leader of a just and lawful international order. Moreover, it demonstrated a clear disagreement in policy between the US and its traditional allies, showing a commitment to peaceful and lawful conflict resolution (Eisenhower, 1956).

2.2.4 The US Strategy to Force UK Withdraw From the Suez Canal

In the wake of the Suez Crisis, the United States employed a multifaceted strategy to force the United Kingdom to withdraw its forces from the Suez Canal. This strategy combined economic pressure, diplomatic isolation, and public criticism. The United States employed its significant post-World War II economic influence over Britain. It also utilized international forums like the United Nations to isolate the UK diplomatically. Moreover, it did not hesitate to publicly denounce British actions. These tactics accentuated the shifting balance of global power, uncovering the growing dominance of the United States in international affairs and marking a new era in the Anglo-American special relationship.

2.2.4.1 Economic and Financial Pressure

During the post-World War II era, the United States had a lot of economic power over Britain. This was evident during the Suez Crisis, when America used its financial influence, including aid through programs like the Marshall Plan, to pressure Britain into cooperating. The United States had also pressured the UK financially to stop the invasion. On the days between October 30 and November 2, the Bank of England had lost \$45 million and their oil supply had been affected because of the closure of the Suez Canal; hence, the British sought urgent help from the IMF, which was however denied by the United States. Eisenhower actually commanded the US Treasury Secretary, George M. Humphrey, to be ready to sell part of the US

government's Sterling Bond holdings. According to Wallace and Phillips (2009), the UK government thought about attacking Kuwait and Qatar in the event of US-imposed oil sanctions.

Harold Macmillan, who is Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, advised his Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, that the United States was fully ready to carry out this threat. He also warned his Prime Minister that Britain's foreign exchange reserves simply could not withstand the devaluation of their currency (the pound) that would come after the United States' actions and that within weeks of such a move, the country would be unable to maintain an adequate supply of food or fuel needed to sustain the population on the islands. However, there were suspicions in the Cabinet that Macmillan had deliberately exaggerated the financial situation in order to force Eden out. What Treasury of Financials had told Macmillan was much more serious than what he passed it on to the Cabinet (Kyle, 2011, p. 464).

In concert with U.S. action, Saudi Arabia started an oil embargo against Britain and France. The U.S. then withheld consent until Britain and France agreed to a quick withdrawal. Other NATO members would also not supply Britain and France with oil from Arab nations (Love, 1969, p. 651). There was also a general feeling within the administration that the United States should not become involved in getting oil to the European countries until an agreement on Anglo-French forces evacuation from the Suez Canal had been reached.

2.2.4.2 Diplomatic Isolation

In his speech, President Eisenhower reported that the United States had taken preliminary action by approaching the United Nations with a demand for Israeli forces to withdraw to their own territory and for an end to British and French hostilities in the region. This maneuver highlights Eisenhower's preference for multilateral diplomacy and international

cooperation over unilateral military actions. By involving the UN, Eisenhower intended to compel international mechanisms to restore peace and stability. Furthermore, he reinforced the importance of collective decision-making and loyalty to international norms in resolving conflicts (Eisenhower, 1956).

Eisenhower's speech demonstrates an essential shift in the US-UK special relationship, highlighting the US's independence from Anglo-French colonial policies and its profound global impact. This declaration forced the UK to reconsider its colonial activities, as it could no longer rely on automatic US support. The US's strategic use of international forums like the United Nations to condemn the Suez intervention further demonstrated the weakening legitimacy of Britain's actions without US approval. Consequently, UK decision-making had to adapt to align more closely with US policies and global anti-colonial sentiment, emphasizing the increasing influence of the US in guiding British foreign policy.

2.2.4.3 The US Criticism to the UK's Actions in the Suez Crisis

The Suez Crisis of 1956 demonstrated the influence of US on UK foreign policy. The United States exerted significant influence over the British withdrawal from the Suez Canal. The US attempted to broker a diplomatic settlement between Egypt, Britain, and France, but when these efforts failed, it applied political and financial pressure on Britain and France to accept a United Nations ceasefire. The Suez Crisis demonstrated also that the United States was willing to use its influence to shape the foreign policy decisions of its allies, even if it meant publicly criticizing them. This incident marked a turning point in the balance of global power, with the United States emerging as a dominant force in the Middle East and the United Kingdom losing most of its influence in the region. Furthermore, the crisis highlighted the importance of the UK-

US relationship, as the two nations continued to consult on foreign policy issues and global problems and share major strategic interests.

Finally, it is important to note that the Suez Crisis was a decisive occasion for Anglo-American relations, exposing complex power play, diplomatic deals and contrasting strategic aims of that period. It thus brought out various aspects about the “special relationship” between UK and the US like having common goals but treating some major geopolitical issues differently.

A combination of diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, and public condemnation effectively pressured Britain into making decisions that led to the country withdrawing its forces from the Suez Canal area; an example which demonstrates increasing global dominance of America’s power; though it also represents how much less effective British strength tends to be whenever America disagrees with it. Besides, this crisis in the Canal the Canal crisis clearly changed the ratio, and the United States emerged as a leading force in determining events in the Middle East, whereas Britain retreated to the background. Consequently, this transformation did not negate strong historical ties between Britain and America because they still consulted and collaborated on matters regarding global politics as well as aligned (mutually) strategic interests.

In essence, the Suez crisis serves as a graphic example of the intricacies and challenges that characterize international relations in addition to shifting patterns in alliance politics during the Cold War.

2.3 The Manifestations of the US-UK Special Relationship in the Iraq War of 2003

The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom has long been a significant factor in international diplomacy, influencing the foreign policies of both nations and impacting global affairs. This relationship was particularly evident in the lead-up to the Iraq War in 2003, where the close alignment between the UK and the US had profound implications for UK decision-making. Blair's strong relationship with US President George W. Bush played a significant role in the UK's backing of the US invasion of Iraq, portraying the depth of this special relationship and its influence on UK foreign policy. Blair's close relationship with Bush was influential in the UK's decision to support the US invasion, despite opposition from within his government and the wider British public. Blair's commitment to the US, as demonstrated in his speeches and communications with US officials, reflected a belief that maintaining a strong alliance with the US was essential for British interests.

2.3.1 Events Leading Up to the Invasion of Iraq

During the Clinton-Blair era, Saddam Hussein evaded United Nations weapons inspections, leading to air attacks by Anglo-American forces. Plans for invading Iraq had been discussed by US Republican circles since the mid-1990s and were part of Pentagon contingency plans before 9/11. The idea of invading Iraq was raised in National Security Council meetings immediately after 9/11. At this time, Britain was strongly against invading any country, such as Iraq, unless there was clear evidence linking them to the September 2001 attacks. During his State of the Union address in January 2002, President Bush assured the American people that the country would not hesitate to take action. In April of the same year, it seems that Bush informed Tony Blair of the United States' intention towards Saddam. Around that time, the US president started openly supporting the idea of removing the regime in Baghdad (Woodward, 2004, pp. 60, 330–333). By this time, the UK was intensely active in Operation Southern Focus, a big bombing campaign connected to the Iraqi 'no fly zone' policy in the South following the 1991

war. Some saw it as a way to get ready for a possible invasion (Sharp, 2003, p. 62). According to a report from the Joint Intelligence Committee that was given to Blair in 2002, there was little to no evidence found of weapons of mass destruction being created after UN inspectors left Iraq in 1998. However, due to Saddam's lack of cooperation, it was difficult to come to definite conclusions. Tony Blair's foreign policy adviser, David Manning, established important connections with US National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, while Foreign Secretary Jack Straw communicated with Secretary of State Colin Powell. These contacts were utilized by London to help soften or involve multiple parties in the push for action. In the summer of 2002, Blair started to stress the importance of bringing up the topic of Iraq and WMD at the United Nations as a way of dealing with the matter rather than a means of avoiding it (Wintour & Kettle, 2003). In September, London released a report claiming that Baghdad's weapons of mass destruction posed a significant threat to UK security. The report included allegations that Baghdad had attempted to purchase 'yellowcake' uranium oxide from Niger, along with Prime Minister Blair's statement that some Iraqi weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes. In November, the United States, with the help of Britain, successfully got UN Security Council Resolution 1441 passed. This resolution demands that Iraq comply with inspections or face severe consequences. The American and British troops are currently stationed in friendly Gulf countries, warning Iraq to allow UN inspectors back in. This led to a cycle of evasive behavior and partial cooperation, ultimately resulting in the invasion of March 2003.

2.3.2 The US-UK Controversial Journey to the Iraq War

The path to war was filled with chaos, sadness, and even absurdity. According to former Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, Blair emphasized the importance of maintaining a strong relationship with the US, despite doubts within the Cabinet about the justification of going to war based on the September dossier. Cook reported Blair saying that continuing to be engaged

with the US is vital. The voices on both the left and right who want to pull Europe and the US apart would have disastrous consequences if they succeeded (Robin, 2003, p. 213).

Blair's main focus was on pushing Washington towards a second resolution that would officially support an invasion. While Blair's influence played a role in this decision, it is important to note that American public opinion also supported seeking as much UN approval and shared risk as possible to align with US national security interests. Ultimately, Washington did pursue a second resolution, though with minimal enthusiasm (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003, p. 144). Robin Cook wrote on February 25 that "Tony's attempt to wrap himself in the UN flag is fatally hobbled by his inability to say that the UN will have the last word" (Robin, 2003, p. 311). At that point, few people had doubts about the possibility of stopping an American invasion, whether or not other countries or international organizations supported it. The House of Commons decision to go to war on March 18, 2003, was somewhat of a win for Blair, as only a minority of 139 Labour MPs voted against it. Blair stressed the importance of supporting the US, but the victory in the House of Commons was largely credited to both leveraging the 'French card' (referring to President Chirac's perceived stubbornness) and appealing to Labour members to ensure the government's stability, as Jack Straw stated. The government's majority also relied on the backing of some Conservative members, though not all Tories supported Blair (Wintour & Kettle, 2003). Former Conservative minister John Gummer declared on February 26 that there was no member of Parliament who did not know that this was war by timetable, and the timetable had been laid down before the United States had any intention of going to the United Nations (Keohane, 2005, as cited in Dumbrell, 2006). Tory MP Boris Johnson thought that perhaps America should be encouraged to go around making appropriate adjustments to the geopolitical scene. However, he noted that it would help if someone started to make the case for war honestly (Johnson, 2004).

2.3.3 Blair's Diplomacy and the Special Relationship's Impact on UK Foreign Policy

In preparation for Blair's visit to Bush's farm in Crawford, Texas, in April 2002, David Geoffrey Manning the British Ambassador to the United States, sent Blair a memo on March 14, 2002, about a dinner he had with Bush, US National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, and Meyer, the British Ambassador to the United States. This leaked memo reads:

I said that you would not budge in your support for regime change, but you had to manage a press, a parliament, and a public opinion that was very different from anything in the States. [...] The issue of the weapons inspectors must be handled in a way that would persuade European and wider opinion that the US was conscious of the international framework and the insistence of many countries on the need for a legal base. Renewed refusal by Saddam to accept unfettered inspections would be a powerful argument. (Herring & Robinson, 2014, p. 222)

Manning's leaked memo to Blair, just before Blair's visit to Bush's farm in Crawford in April 2002, illustrates the complex dynamics of the US-UK 'special relationship' and how it affected the UK's decision to take part in the Iraq War in 2003. Manning's memo reveals that Blair was totally committed in his quest to get rid of Saddam from power, which almost put him on the same line with America's stand on the same issue.

However, it also points out the problems Blair had in controlling the British media, parliament, and public, whose views were contrary to the Bush position. This highlights the difficult position Blair put himself in, where he had to carefully balance his support for the American agenda with the fears of the British public and political leadership. Moreover, the memo indicated the need for America to win the favorability of Europe and beyond regarding international rule compliance and reasons for starting conflicts based on how the weapons inspectors' affair was resolved. This amounts to acknowledging the global meaning of legitimacy and the importance of Britain's European partners in making decisions.

The memo as a whole provides comprehensive coverage of the US-UK special relationship, showing how UK decision-making about the Iraq War was shaped and revealing the complexities and challenges Blair faced in navigating this partnership in the face of national and global concerns.

Senior British officials understood the importance of using the UN route to achieve regime change in Iraq, a priority that was emphasized in discussions with the Bush administration. Meyer's memo to Manning on March 18, following a meeting with US Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, took the same line as that used by Manning:

On Iraq, I opened by sticking very closely to the script that you used for Condoleezza Rice last week. We backed regime change, but the plan had to be clever, and failure was not an option. It would be a tough sell for us domestically, and probably tougher elsewhere in Europe. The US could go it alone if it wanted to. But if it wanted to act with partners, there had to be a strategy for building support for military action against Saddam. I went through the need to wrong-foot Saddam on the inspectors and the UN SCRs[...].(Herring & Robinson, 2014, p. 222)

Meyer's communication with Manning and his memo about a meeting he attended with Paul Wolfowitz, United States Deputy Secretary of Defense, prove the impact of the US-UK special relationship on the UK's decision-making towards the Iraq War in 2003. The communications portray a common determination between the two countries to effect regime change in Iraq, implying that their strategic goals were converging. Another key idea in the Meyer memo is that the UK recognizes how hard it is to justify the war at home and in Europe, so it chooses a smarter strategy. However, the implication behind this is that, apart from backing America in public, Britain was also aiming to balance other international political forces with internal considerations. The reference to “wrong-footing” Saddam in the context of inspectors and UN Security Council Resolutions shows that there was an agreed-upon approach with the US for inventing a cause for war, which the global community would view favorably. This

indicates that the US-UK special relationship influenced the UK's strategic approach to the Iraq War as well as its efforts to build support for military action. Generally, Meyer's communications underline how important the special relationship is in influencing the British decision-making process in relation to wartime.

It was generally recognized in the Blair administration that armed action against Iraq was illegal in both humanitarian terms and on the basis of any terrorist threat. The reason why it was difficult to find another explanation for war is because, apart from the UN SCRs and Iraq's WMDs, there were no lawful reasons for it (UK Defence and Overseas Secretariat [DOS], 2002). Therefore, on March 25, eight days after Blair's memo to Powell, Straw outlined to Blair in a declassified memo that it was important to give the reasons for the Iraq invasion through international law and WMD, even if it was obvious that the WMD threat had not increased:

If 11 September had not happened, it is doubtful that the US would now have considered military action against Iraq. In addition, there has been no credible evidence to link Iraq with UBL [Usama bin Laden] and Al Qaida. Objectively, the threat from Iraq has not worsened as a result of 11 September. What has now changed is the tolerance of the international community (especially that of the US), the world having witnessed on September 11 just what determined evil people can these days perpetrate. (Straw, 2002, as cited in Herring & Robinson, 2014, p. 224)

Straw's communication to Blair reveals the impact of the US-UK special relationship on the UK's decision-making towards the Iraq War in 2003. His suggestion that "regime change is an essential part of the removal of Iraq's WMD capacity" indicates alignment with the US stance, emphasizing the shared objective of addressing Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. However, Straw also recognizes the lack of reliable evidence linking Iraq to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda.

Straw also said that without 9/11, American military action against Iraq would not be expected, indicating other factors like September 2001, which had an impact on making the Iraq

War happen. Consequently, it can be deduced that the US-UK special relationship, particularly in the context of the global war on terrorism following 9/11, played a significant role in shaping UK decision-making towards Iraq.

In a major foreign policy speech at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library on April 7, Blair offered a more unequivocal commitment to the US:

But if that's what I and many others want, it comes at a price for us too. It means we don't shirk our responsibility. It means that when America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we fight with her. No grandstanding, no offering implausible but impractical advice from the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard not the easy choices on terrorism and WMD, or making peace in the Middle East, but working together, side by side.

(Blair, 2002, para. 63)

Tony Blair's speech in 2002 reflects the significant impact of the US-UK Special Relationship on UK decision-making, particularly regarding foreign policy and military actions. Blair's statement, "When America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we fight with her," underlines the close alignment between the UK and the US in matters of shared values and global security. This depicts how the Special Relationship influences UK decisions to support the US in international accomplishments, even in challenging circumstances.

The phrase no grandstanding, no offering implausible but impractical advice from the comfort of the touchline, no wishing away the hard, not the easy choices... but working together, side by side further emphasizes the collaborative nature of the US-UK Special Relationship. It suggests a commitment to active participation and shared responsibility in addressing global challenges, indicating a willingness to take tough decisions and act with firmness together with the United States.

In general, Blair's speech demonstrates the strong influence of the US-UK Special Relationship on UK decision-making, portraying a relationship characterized by shared values, mutual support, and a commitment to working together in the face of adversity.

2.3.4 Inquiries and Consequences of the Iraq War Decision

The investigations, revelations, and personal accounts that followed the invasion suggested that Blair's main motive was to align Britain with the United States rather than acting on solid proof of Iraq having weapons of mass destruction. The investigation conducted by Hutton in 2004 regarding the way Downing Street managed intelligence, specifically regarding the accusation of manipulating information on weapons of mass destruction, was broadcast on BBC radio in May 2003. This incident was later associated with the tragic death of government scientist David Kelly. Ultimately, the inquiry concluded that the government was not intentionally deceiving the public. Blair undoubtedly exhibited sophisticated and sometimes conflicting intelligence in a surprisingly confident way. The Butler inquiry conducted in 2004 criticized Blair's preference for a closed style of decision-making, where even Cabinet members were not regularly briefed. The report highlighted that, while there was no intentional deception by the government, it should have been more transparent that the conclusions in the various files on WMD were based on uncertain and questionable intelligence. Clare Short, the former minister for overseas development who famously resigned from the Cabinet in opposition to the lack of a UN mandate for the post-invasion occupation, released her memoirs, criticizing Blair's presidential style of leadership and New Labour's disregard for honesty. She warned of the dangers of going to war without proper justification. Short stated that Blair's decision to support the invasion showed his arrogant delight in being the sole world leader capable of negotiating as an equal with the US president (Short, 2004, pp. 181, 272).

2.3.5 Understanding the Intelligence, Politics, and Impact of the Iraq Invasion

Both Bush and Blair had reasons to doubt Saddam's assurances about WMDs, but they lacked solid intelligence on the subject. Although Saddam had brought grave consequences upon himself, the invasion was carried out without proper planning for the aftermath in Iraq.

Blair's strong ties to the US and understanding of American intentions for regime change made him vulnerable to accusations of deceit. A confidential document was shared with top officials, including Blair, Geoff Hoon, Defence Secretary of the United Kingdom, Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, and Richard Dearlove, Chief of MI6 (British Secret Intelligence Service), in July 2002. It warned that Britain was aligning with the US in plans to invade Iraq. Dearlove suggested that policy and intelligence were now centered around the inevitability of American military action. London was urged to find ways to justify regime change legally. Despite this, it appears that Washington did not yet expect British forces to be directly involved, assuming only the use of British bases in Cyprus and Diego Garcia as a minimum requirement (Christopher, 2005). In 2005, more documents were leaked, revealing information leading up to the war. One document highlighted the significant rise in bombings of Iraq by the US and UK in mid-2002, even though officials in London and Washington were still claiming that a peaceful resolution was feasible. This continued despite concerns from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarding the legality of the bombings (Freedland, 2005). Blair's choices regarding the war can be understood mostly through his personal beliefs about the 'special relationship' and the alignment of his liberal internationalism with American neo-conservatives' priorities. The special relationship norms influenced London to back the invasion.

The special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom significantly influenced the UK's decision-making process concerning the Iraq War in 2003. This relationship, characterized by close alignment in foreign policy, played a crucial role in the UK's support for the US invasion. Prime Minister Tony Blair's strong union with President George W. Bush was key in shaping the UK's stance, as Blair believed that strong cooperation with the US was essential for British interests, despite domestic opposition. Blair's commitment to the US, evident in his 2002 speech, underlined shared values and global security concerns, influencing UK decisions to support the US even in challenging situations. The collaborative nature of the

US-UK relationship, as emphasized by Blair, demonstrated a willingness to address global challenges together. The lead-up to the Iraq War involved complex political dynamics, including efforts to gain international support. Blair's focus on the Special Relationship, despite doubts within his government and opposition, shows its significant influence on UK decision-making. Memos and communications between British and US officials reinforce how the alliance shaped the UK's strategic approach to the war and its efforts to garner international backing.

Conclusion

This chapter has investigated the critical impact of the US-UK special relationship on British foreign policy decision-making in the Middle East. It focused on two key events: the Suez Crisis in 1956 and the Iraq War in 2003. The examination of these two important events reveals the varying degrees and mechanisms of American influence on UK actions. It also demonstrates both implicit and explicit impacts within the context of their enduring relationship.

The Suez Crisis of 1956 revealed the complexities of the US-UK special relationship. Despite the UK's attempt to regain its power in the Middle East, The United States' lack of cooperation, stemming from broader geopolitical considerations and the need to stop Soviet expansion, significantly limited British actions. This episode showed how US strategic interests could implicitly shape UK foreign policy, leading to a reassessment of British imperial plans and the recognition of a changing balance of power in the world.

In clear contrast, the Iraq War of 2003 demonstrated how much the United States directly affected British foreign policy. The UK's willingness to participate in the US-led invasion, despite significant opposition, highlighted how much the special relationship affected British strategic decisions. Prime Minister Tony Blair's support for President George W. Bush's administration showed that he valued keeping strong ties with the US more than dealing with opposition at home and abroad. This situation showed how closely the UK and the US worked

together politically and militarily and how much the UK was willing to match its foreign policy with that of the United States.

General Conclusion

The current part is an attempt to recapitulate the main findings of this research to answer the set questions. To better understand how the US-UK Special Relationship has shaped UK foreign policy in the Middle East, the study highlighted the historical context of this alliance. Furthermore, this study introduced significant shifts in British policy marked by events like the Suez Crisis (1956) and the Iraq War (2003), showing how the UK's reliance on US support influenced its decisions.

Regarding the Suez Crisis, the study presented a clear background on how the lack of US support led to the UK's withdrawal, stressing the limitations of British power without American backing. This withdrawal was heavily influenced by the economic pressure and diplomatic isolation imposed by the US, demonstrating an implicit impact on the UK's decision-making process. Conversely, the study examined the Iraq War, illustrating how alignment with US policy demonstrated the UK's commitment to the Special Relationship despite widespread domestic and international opposition. This alignment was driven by strategic considerations, including the desire to preserve transatlantic ties.

The results of this dissertation demonstrated that despite extensive cooperation under the US-UK Special Relationship, the UK faced challenges in balancing its national interests with those of its powerful ally. The study revealed that this relationship significantly influenced British foreign policy decisions, often aligning UK actions with US strategic goals. This confirmed the hypothesis that the US-UK Special Relationship plays a critical role in shaping UK foreign policy in the Middle East.

The findings of this study confirmed the initial hypotheses. The analysis of the Suez Crisis and the Iraq War demonstrated that the US-UK Special Relationship significantly influenced UK foreign policy in the Middle East. The UK's dependence on US support, whether

through economic pressure, diplomatic influence, or strategic alignment, revealed the impact of this bilateral relationship. This research confirmed the hypothesis that maintaining strong transatlantic relations often directed UK actions. It also affirmed the crucial role of the US-UK special relationship in shaping the UK's foreign policy in the Middle East.

Limitations of this research include its unidirectional focus on the impact of the US on UK decision-making. Future research could explore the reciprocal dynamics of the relationship, further illuminating the complexities of the US-UK Special Relationship in contemporary geopolitical contexts. Additionally, further investigation into the role of other actors, such as European allies and regional powers, could provide a more comprehensive understanding of UK foreign policy in the Middle East.

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ملخص

تستكشف هذه الدراسة مدى تأثير العلاقة بين الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية والمملكة المتحدة في صنع القرار في السياسة الخارجية البريطانية إزاء الشرق الأوسط، وهي علاقة خاصة لما يوحد بينهما من قيم وروابط تاريخية، كانت منذ زمن طويل حجر الزاوية في الدبلوماسية الغربية عبر الأطلسي، ولكن تأثيرها على تصرفات بريطانيا في الشرق الأوسط لم ينل حظاً وافياً من الدراسة، ولذلك جاءت دراستنا بغرض سدّ الفجوة؛ وذلك من خلال تحليل كيفية تشكيل العلاقات الخاصة لصنع القرار في السياسة البريطانية في منطقة الشرق الأوسط؛ باستخدام منهجية خاصة تقوم على التحليل التاريخي ودراسة الحالة. تبحث هذه الدراسة في الآليات التي تؤثر من خلالها العلاقة الخاصة على السياسة الخارجية البريطانية، إذ إنّ النتائج تكشف أنّ هذه العلاقة الخاصة بين الدولتين تؤثر بشكل كبير في السياسة الخارجية للمملكة المتحدة في الشرق الأوسط، لا سيما في مجالات التدخلات العسكرية، والشراكة الدبلوماسية والتحالفات الإقليمية، كما أنّ الدبلوماسية الثنائية والشراكة المعلوماتية الاستخباراتية، والتعاون العسكري تمثل عوامل رئيسية في تشكّل ردود الفعل البريطانية على التحدّيات الإقليمية. تسهم هذه النتائج في الوصول إلى فهم أعمق للعلاقات الدولية المعاصرة، ممّا يكشف عن مدى التعقيد في هذا التحالف الأمريكي البريطاني، وأثاره على استقرار المنطقة والأمن العالمي، ولذلك فإنّ هذه الدراسة تسعى — من خلال فحص التفاعلات المعقدة لهذه العلاقة الثنائية — إلى تقديم رؤية قيّمة حول كيفية استمرار هذه العلاقة ونجاحها في تشكيل السياسة الخارجية البريطانية في منطقة حيوية جداً، ممّا يساعد على إبراز دورها في مواجهة التحدّيات الإقليمية والعالمية .

كلمات مفتاحية : السياسة الخارجية البريطانية، صنع القرار، الدبلوماسية، الشرق الأوسط، العلاقة الخاصة

بين الولايات المتحدة و المملكة المتحدة